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Abstract 
 
The aim of my thesis is to test Haffajee‟s propositions in order to determine the most suitable 
construction of the Joint Criminal Enterprise (“JCE”) doctrine to establish a link between an 
accused and a sexual offence, perpetrated by another, where there is reason to believe that the 
accused had intent and made a contribution. An evaluation of cases, concerning incidences of 
sexual violence, from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) revealed that the reoccurring 
inability of the prosecution to successfully link the accused to the crime, committed by another, is 
the cause of the difficulty experienced in securing successful prosecutions. The individual criminal 
responsibility of the physical perpetrator therefore falls beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The JCE doctrine is a mechanism that attributes individual criminal responsibility to an accused 
for crimes that he or she did not physically perpetrate. The accused‟s wrongfulness arises from his 
or her intentional and substantial contribution to the criminal enterprise with the direct intent of 
furthering the common criminal purpose or plan. JCE category three has been successfully used by 
the ICTR, ICTY and United Nations Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (“MICT”) to 
establish the criminal responsibility of high-ranked officials for acts of sexual violence committed 
by others. However the JCE doctrine has not been used by the International Criminal Court 
(“ICC”). My research therefore departed from the primary assumption that the ICC may rely on the 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals when interpreting provisions of the Rome Statute pertaining to 
individual criminal responsibility, in order to sustain the continued use of the JCE doctrine within 
international criminal law. An in-depth investigation revealed that the jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
tribunals is neither expressly listed as an applicable source for interpreting the Rome Statute nor 
does it amount to binding precedent. Nevertheless, the ICC may have to consider the jurisprudence 
of the ad hoc tribunals when interpreting the Rome Statute because the jurisprudence often reflects 
principles and rules of international law.  
Notwithstanding the usefulness of JCE category three, the doctrine cannot unjustifiably limit the 
rights of the accused or infringe the principles of legality and the principle of culpability. The 
original construction of JCE category three, as first applied by the ICTY in the Prosecutor v Tadić, 
poses a threat to the principle of culpability because it imposes equal liability to all contributory 
JCE members, irrespective of their degree of contribution. Furthermore, it has been used to 
establish liability for specific intent crimes even though the accused did not possess specific intent.  
Arguably, the reform of article 25 of the Rome Statute that expressly incorporates and codifies a 
more detailed construction of JCE category three, as developed by the ad hoc tribunals over a 
decade, which allows for attribution of a varying degrees of liability; relative to the specific 
accused‟s intent and contribution, shall ensure the protection of the principle of culpability and the 
principles of legality.  
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Opsomming 
 
Hierdie tesis is daarop gemik om Haffajee se voorstel te toets om „n gepaste verklaring van die Joint 
Criminal Enterprise-leerstuk (“die leerstuk”) te skep waar die beskuldigde aan die seksuele 
misdaad, wat deur „n ander persoon gepleeg is, verbind word.  ŉ Evaluering van regspraak 
betreffende gevalle van seksuele geweld by die Internasionale Kriminele Tribunaal vir Rwanda 
(“ICTR”) en die Internasionale Kriminele Tribunaal vir die voormalige Joego-Slawië (“ICTY”) het 
ŉ herhalende neiging ontbloot waar die vervolging nie in staat was om die beskuldigde aanspreeklik 
te hou nie weens die onvermoë om die misdaad van ŉ ander party aan die beskuldigde te verbind en 
is dus die rede vir die onsuksesvolle vervolgings. Die individuele strafregtelike aanspreeklikheid 
van die fisiese dader val dus buite die bestek van hierdie tesis.  
Die leerstuk is ŉ teorie wat individuele strafregtelike aanspreeklikheid aan ŉ beskuldigde 
toereken vir misdade wat hy of sy nie fisies uitgevoer het nie. Die beskuldigde se wederregtelikheid 
is gegrond in sy of haar opsetlike en wesenlike bydrae tot die kriminele onderneming, tesame met 
die direkte opset om die gemeenskaplike kriminele doelwit te bevorder. Kategorie drie van die 
leerstuk is al suksesvol deur die ICTR, ICTY en die Verenigde Nasies Meganisme vir 
Internasionale Kriminele Tribunale (“MICT”) toegepas om hooggeplaaste amptenare aanspreeklik 
te hou vir seksuele geweld wat deur ander uitgevoer is. My navorsing het dus afgewyk van die 
primêre veronderstelling dat die Internasionale Strafhof (“die Strafhof”) op die regspraak van die ad 
hoc-tribunale mag steun wanneer die Strafhof die bepalings van die Statuut van Rome interpreteer 
om die voortgehoue gebruik van die leerstuk in internasionale strafreg volhoubaar te laat geskied. ŉ 
In-diepte studie het onthul dat die regspraak van die ad hoc-tribunale nie uitdruklik gelys is as ŉ 
toepaslike bron om die Statuut van Rome te interpreteer nie en dit kom ook nie neer op ŉ bindende 
presedent nie. Die Strafhof sal nietemin die regspraak van die ad hoc-tribunale moontlik in ag moet 
neem wanneer die Statuut van Rome interpreteer word, omdat die regspraak dikwels beginsels en 
reëls van internasionale reg weerspieël. 
Desnieteenstaande die nut van kategorie drie van die leerstuk, kan die leerstuk nie ŉ 
ongeregverdigde skending maak op die regte van die beskuldigde of inbreuk maak op die 
legaliteitsbeginsel en die skuldbeginsel nie. Die oorspronklike konstruksie van kategorie drie van 
die leerstuk, soos dit aanvanklik toegepas is deur die ICTY in Prosecutor v Tadić, stel ŉ risiko vir 
die skuldbeginsel omdat dit gelyke aanspreeklikheid aan al die bydraers ingevolge die leerstuk 
toereken, ongeag elkeen se graad van deelname. Dit is ook verder al gebruik om aanspreeklikheid 
vir spesifieke opset-misdrywe op te wek, alhoewel daar geen spesifieke opset deur die beskuldigde 
teenwoordig was nie. Daar kan geargumenteer word dat die hervorming van artikel 25 van die 
Statuut van Rome, wat ŉ meer omvattende konstruksie van kategorie drie van die leerstuk 
inkorporeer, soos ontwikkel deur die ad hoc-tribunale oor die afgelope dekade, aanspreeklikheid 
toepas relatief tot die beskuldigde se opset en bydrae wat sal verseker dat die skuldleerstuk en die 
legaliteitsbeginsels beskerm word. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1 1 Research problem  
 
After reading an article by Haffajee titled: “Prosecuting crimes of Rape and Sexual Violence at the 
ICTR: The Application of the Joint Criminal Enterprise Theory,”1 it became apparent to me that the 
successful prosecution of rape and other acts of sexual violence under international criminal law 
was, and continues to be, a challenge.  Haffajee pin-pointed the establishment of individual criminal 
responsibility as the stumbling block; according to her, the prosecution at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(“ICTR”) struggled to directly or closely link the accused to acts of sexual violence due to the fact 
that high-ranked officials seldom carry out the actus reus of sexual crimes themselves.
2
 
Furthermore, the prosecution often grappled to link the accused to the commission of other 
inhumane acts where it could neither prove that the accused directly ordered others to perpetrate 
acts of sexual violence nor that he or she was present at the scene of the crime.
3
 In this thesis the 
term accused and high-ranked official are hereinafter used interchangeably and the ICTY and ICTR 
are collectively be referred to as the ad hoc tribunals when relevant. Furthermore, sexual violence is 
a broad term used by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“Rome Statute”) to 
describe particular crimes against humanity, including “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, 
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable 
gravity”.4 This broad term is used throughout my thesis to encompass all crimes of a sexual nature 
that amount to serious crimes that concern the international community. 
 In addition, the fact that acts of sexual violence rarely form an express part of the common 
criminal plan and high-ranked officials usually ensure that they are absent when these crimes are 
perpetrated arguably exacerbates the difficultly experienced in establishing individual criminal 
responsibility. Moreover the element of criminal responsibility has a subjective and objective 
element; the accused must have intended the commission of the crime and in some manner 
contributed to its commission. The problem that Haffajee pointed to inspired me to try to find a 
legal theory that would enable the prosecution, within the framework of international criminal law, 
to hold high-ranked officials and masterminds liable for their respective contributions despite not 
having physically carried out the acts reus of crime themselves. The ultimate goal being the 
attribution of principal liability instead of derivative forms of liability where the accused‟s 
contribution and degree of intent warranted such attribution, albeit that he or she was not the 
physical perpetrator. In her article Haffajee proposed that categories one and three of the Joint 
Criminal Enterprise (“JCE”) doctrine could provide such a possible solution to the problem.5 She 
argues that the application of JCE category three removes the duty to establish a direct link where 
the crime was a clearly foreseeable consequence of executing the common criminal plan involving 
                                                          
1
 RL Haffajee “Prosecuting crimes of Rape and Sexual Violence at the ICTR: The Application of the Joint Criminal 
Enterprise Theory” (2006) 29 Harvard Journal of Law and Gender 201.  
2
 Haffajee (2006) Harv J L & Gender 206 and 209. 
3
 209 and 211; according to art 7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, 
entered into force 1 July 2002) (2003) 2187 UNTS 90: other inhumane acts are “acts of a similar character intentionally 
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health”. 
4
 Art 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90. Note that the ICTR in Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgement) 
ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para 686 defined sexual violence as any act of a sexual nature committed during 
coercive circumstances. This broader definition does not require penetration or physical contact. 
5
 Haffajee (2006) Harv J L & Gender 214. 
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genocidal intent or attacks against a civilian population in a widespread or systematic manner.
6
 In 
so doing, her proposal became the springboard for my thesis. Haffajee furthermore set out a test to 
secure criminal responsibility under category three.
7
 In the circumstances where “[o]bjectively the 
crime is part of the natural and foreseeable consequence of the execution of the JCE”8 and the 
accused was subjectively aware of the possible consequence yet he reconciled himself with the 
possibility and participated nonetheless, the accused is individually criminally responsible.
9
  
The aim of my thesis is therefore to further test Haffajee‟s proposition to find the most suitable 
construction of JCE to establish a link between an accused and a sexual offence, perpetrated by 
another where there is reason to believe that the accused had intent and made a substantial 
contribution. The International Criminal Court (“ICC”) has thus far, not used the JCE doctrine, 
which has arguably generated concerns as to it origin, legitimacy and future use. Consequently I 
saw a need to on the one hand evaluate the possibility of the ICC adopting the JCE; and on the other 
explore the possibility of find a legally sound and authoritative construction of JCE that does not 
limit the human rights of the accused or the principles of criminal law unjustifiably. If such a 
construction does not exist, the doctrine must arguably be reformed or replaced. 
My research departs from four primary theoretical discussions: (i) the nature of sexual violence; 
(ii) the duty to effectively prosecute rape and other acts of sexual violence; (iii) the nature, origin 
and categories of JCE; and (iv) the compatibility of principal liability as construed by the ICC and 
the ad hoc tribunals. My pre-study revealed that sexual violence has devastating effects on both the 
victim and society in which the violence takes place. The ICTR in Prosecutor v Akayesu 
(“Akayesu”) explained that both rape and torture are used to purposefully humiliate, degrade, 
intimidate, control, punish, discriminate or destroy people.
10
 Thus rape is often used as a weapon of 
war and genocide; and it is worth noting that some rape victims believe that rape is worse than 
death.
11
  
Significantly, sexual violence that occurs during armed conflict amounts to grave violations of 
international humanitarian law and international human rights law and therefore can and should be 
prosecuted under international criminal law. Rape and sexual violence under international criminal 
law are not however prosecuted as sexual offences instead these offences can be indicted as war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and violations of the common article 3 of the Geneva 
Convention, as listed under article 5 of the Rome Statute.
12
 For example, the ICTR in Akayesu 
convicted the accused of genocide and crimes against humanity for the occurrence of sexual 
violence during the Rwandan genocide.
13
 The ICTY in Prosecutor v Musema (“Musema”) equally 
charged and convicted the accused of committing acts of genocide and crimes against humanity for 
committing and ordering rape during the Yugoslavian conflict.
14
 In addition, the ICTR in 
Prosecutor v Semanza (“Semanza”) convicted the Mayor of Bicumbi, as an accessory, for 
                                                          
6
 212.  
7
 214 cf Prosecutor v Milutinović, Ojdanić & Sainovic (Appeal Chamber) IT-99-37-AR72 Separate Opinion of Judge 
David Hunt on Challenge by Ojdanić to Jurisdiction Joint Criminal Enterprise (21 May 2003) 11. 
8
 Haffajee (2006) Harv J L & Gender 214 cf Prosecutor v Ojdanić et al IT-99-37-AR72 (2003) 11. 
9
 Haffajee (2006) Harv J L & Gender 214 cf Prosecutor v Ojdanić et al IT-99-37-AR72 (2003) 11. 
10
 AA Obote-Odora “Rape and Sexual Violence in International Law: ICTR Contribution” (2005) 12 New England 
Journal of International Law and Comparative Law 135 148 cf Prosecutor v Akayesu ICTR-96-4-T (1998) para 687. 
11
 Obote-Odora (2005) New Eng J Int‟l L & Comp L 139 cf SK Wood “A Woman Scorned for the „Least Condemned‟ 
War Crime: Precedent and Problems with Prosecuting Rape as a Serious War Crime in the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda” (2004) 13 Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 274 276.  
12
 The Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90. 
13
 Prosecutor v Akayesu ICTR-96-4-T (1998) para 731. 
14
 Prosecutor v Musema (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-96-13-A (27 January 2000) paras 933-936 and 967. Note that 
the conviction was overturned on appeal.  
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instigating rape as a crime against humanity.
15
 The ICTR found that he facilitated rapes by 
instigating the physical perpetrator with his words and his presence.
16
  
The Rome Statute creates an obligation to prosecute “persons for the most serious crimes of 
international concern”.17 Obote-Odora argues that effective prosecution is the first step in deterring 
crimes of rape.
18
 The aim of International criminal law is not only to convict those responsible as 
accessories, but to hold them responsible as principal perpetrators. This is especially difficult when 
the accused was neither present nor the one who carried out the actus reus of the crime.
19
 In 
Prosecutor v Katanga and Chui (“Katanga”) the ICC acquitted the accused of all sex-related 
charges.
20
 Judge Usacka warned, during the charge confirmation, that the evidence was not strong 
enough to establish substantial grounds to believe that the accused was criminally responsible for 
the crimes of rape and sexual violence.
21
 In addition, the ICC stated in Prosecutor v Katanga 
(“Katanga Confirmation Decision”) that general evidence on the prevalence sexual offences in the 
area provided an insufficient base to infer the accused‟s knowledge or intent (subjective 
elements).
22
  
JCE is a form of “common purpose or common plan liability”.23 The JCE doctrine is therefore an 
“individual criminal responsibility theory in international criminal law”24 and a “form of crime 
commission”.25 Goy, in referring to the ICTY Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v Tadić (“Tadić”), 
clarifies that committing could include physical perpetration, participation in a JCE or playing an 
integral part, while carrying out the crime with others.
26
 Furthermore, the ICTY Appeal Chamber in 
Prosecutor v Tadić (“Tadić Appeal”) found that participating in the implementation of the JCE 
(common purpose or plan) could amount to a commission of war crimes, genocide, crimes against 
humanity and violations of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
27
 
The JCE doctrine is only applicable to crimes with multiple perpetrators who participate in the 
same criminal conduct and share the same intent. This doctrine considers each member of the 
common plan responsible for the crimes committed by other members.
28
 There are three categories 
                                                          
15
 Prosecutor v Semanza (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-97-20-T (15 May 2003) para 479. 
16
 Paras 475-478. 
17
 Art 1 of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90. See also art 5 of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90. 
18
 Obote-Odora (2005) New Eng J Int‟l L & Comp L 139 cf Wood (2004) Colum J Gender & L 276. 
19
 Haffajee (2006) Harv J L & Gender 217 cf Prosecutor v Kajelijeli (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-98-44A-T (1 
December 2003) para 937. 
20
 Prosecutor v Katanga & Chui (Pre-Trial Chamber II) ICC-01/04-01/07-717 (7 March 2014). 
21
 Prosecutor v Katanga & Chui (Pre-Trial Chamber) ICC-01/04-01/07-717 Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 
Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Usacka 19-22 (30 September 2008) paras 19-22 (“Katanga Confirmation 
Decision”). 
22
 Katanga Confirmation Decision ICC-01/04-01/07-717 (2008) paras 568-569. 
23
 Haffajee (2006) Harv J L & Gender 212. 
24
 212 cf Prosecutor v Furundžija (Appeals Judgement) IT-95-17/1-A (21 July 2000); Prosecutor v Tadić (Appeal 
Judgement) IT-94-1-A (15 July 1999); Prosecutor v KvoČka, Kos, Radić, Zigić & Prcać (Judgement) IT-98-30/1-T (2 
November 2001); Prosecutor v Krstić (Judgement and Sentencing) IT-98-33-T (2 August 2001); Prosecutor v 
Furundžija (Judgement) IT-95-17/1-T (10 December 1998); Prosecutor v Tadić (Opinion and Judgment) IT-94-1-T (7 
May 1997); Prosecutor v Karemera (Amended Indictment) ICTR-98-44-I (23 February 2005). 
25
 Haffajee (2006) Harv J L & Gender 212. 
26
 B Goy “Individual Criminal Responsibility before the International Criminal Court A Comparison with the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals” (2012) 12 International Criminal Law Review 8 cf Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-T (1997) para 188. 
27
 Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A (1999) para 188. 
28
 Goy (2012) ICL Rev 28 cf Prosecutor v Vasiljević (Appeal Judgement) IT-98-32-A (25 February 2004) para 111.  
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of the JCE doctrine.
29
 Each applies to different circumstances. These categories have different 
requirements and differ in the scope of involvement required. In Prosecutor v Haradinaj 
(“Haradinaj”) the ICTY stated that these categories could overlap.30 Category one is the most 
widely used and accepted construction.
31
 According to category one, the accused is required to 
participate in implementing the group‟s common objective that includes the commission of a crime 
under the Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY 
Statute”).32 In Haradinaj the ICTY concluded that “[a]n individual intentionally acts collectively 
with others to commit international crimes pursuant to a common plan.”33 In Prosecutor v Martić 
(“Martić Appeal”) the ICTY stated that “crimes contemplated in the [ICTY] Statute mostly 
constitute the manifestations of collective criminality and are often carried out by groups of 
individuals acting in pursuance of a common criminal design or purpose”.34  
In Haradinaj the ICTY concluded that the second category “provides for liability for individuals 
who contribute to the maintenance or essential functions of a criminal institution or system, such as 
a concentration or detention camp”.35  In the same case the ICTY concluded further that “[t]he third 
category provides for extended liability, not only for crimes intentionally committed pursuant to the 
common design, but also for crimes that were the natural and foreseeable consequence of 
implementing the common design”.36 In summation, those who participate in the JCE, risk criminal 
responsibility for the undesired and unintentional yet foreseeable crimes that result from 
implementing the JCE (common plan or purpose).
37
  
Therefore, according to the interpretation of category three found in Haradinaj, the crime for 
which the accused is being tried need not be the crime as desired by the common objective of the 
group. Category three has been used to establish criminal responsibility where an express order and 
the presence of the accused were lacking. For example, in Prosecutor v Martić (“Martic”) the 
prosecution secured a conviction under category one and three of the JCE doctrine for crimes 
against humanity.
38
 The ICTY was able to convict Martić by using category one of the JCE doctrine 
to establish individual criminal responsibility because deportation and forced transfer formed part of 
the common plan or purpose. With the help of JCE category three, Martić was found to be 
individually responsible for murder, extermination, imprisonment, torture and inhumane acts as 
crimes against humanity.
39
 Category three was utilised further to convict Martić of violating the 
laws and customs of the Geneva Convention by engaging in torture, cruel treatment, wanton 
destruction of a village and institutions as well as plundering property.
40
 
Even though the JCE doctrine has been used by the ICTY and the ICTR there is uncertainty as to 
its origin and legitimacy.
41
 With regards to the latter, contribution to a JCE is not expressly 
mentioned in the ICTY Statute or the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
                                                          
29
 Prosecutor v Haradinaj (Judgement) IT-04-84-T (3 April 2008) paras 135-139. 
30
 Paras 135-139. 
31
 Prosecutor v Zigiranyirazo (Judgement) ICTR-01-73-T (18 December 2008) paras 407-408 and 468.
 
 
32
 FP Bostedt “The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in 2006: New Developments in 
International Humanitarian and Criminal Law” (2007) 6 Chinese Journal of International Law 403 417 cf Prosecutor v 
Krajišnik (Judgement) IT-00-39-T (27 September 2006) para 4. 
33
 Prosecutor v Haradinaj IT-04-84-T (2008) paras 135-139. 
34
 Prosecutor v Martić (Appeal Judgement) IT-95-11-A (8 October 2008) para 82. 
35
 Prosecutor v Haradinaj IT-04-84-T (2008) paras 135-139. 
36
 Paras 135-139. 
37
 Paras 135-139. 
38
 Prosecutor v Martić (Judgement) IT-95-11-T (12 June 2007) paras 435-455.  
39
 Prosecutor v Martić IT-95-11-T (2007). 
40
 Prosecutor v Martić IT-95-11-T (2007). 
41
 Haffajee (2006) Harv J L & Gender 219. 
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(“ICTR Statute”).42 Yet judges in the ICTY, as indicated above, have found the JCE doctrine to be 
implicitly included in article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute on individual criminal responsibility.
43
 
Haffajee furthermore argues that JCE can also be incorporated into, the almost identical article for 
individual criminal responsibility, article 6(1) in the ICTR. 
In order for the ICC to use the JCE doctrine, it would have to be included in article 25 of the 
Rome Statute like the ICTY included it in article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute. The ICC can only be 
persuaded to follow the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals if it recognises it as an applicable 
source in interpreting the Rome Statute. It would further require the conceptualisations of individual 
criminal responsibility and principal liability to be compatible for comparison.  
In addition to Haffajee‟s work, Goy‟s consideration of individual criminal responsibility before 
the ICC
44
 provided a theoretical base for the analysis of the ad hoc tribunal‟s jurisprudence as a 
source in interpreting the Rome Statute. His work was essential in the analysis of two of my 
hypothesis. Firstly, it supported my understanding of the JCE doctrine as a vehicle for establishing 
individual criminal responsibility in the prosecution of sexual offences. Secondly, it helped me 
explore whether the ICC may, as Goy disputes, accept participation in a JCE as a form of 
commission and principal liability.  
This, one of the objectives of my research is to establish whether the jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
tribunals amount to general rules and principles of international law. The ICC and ad hoc tribunals 
serve the same function ie to prosecute violations of international human rights and humanitarian 
law. The Preamble to the Rome Statute states that the ICC is “[d]etermined to put an end to 
impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such 
crimes.”45  The ICC has “the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious 
crimes of international concern”.46 The ad hoc tribunals serve the same general purpose yet apply to 
specific contexts.
47
  Both the ICTY and ICTR Statutes state that the tribunal “shall have the power 
to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law”.48 From 
this perspective these institutions are arguably eligible for comparison. If it can be established that 
the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals have created principles and rules of international law then 
the ICC could, arguably, use the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals to further its understanding of 
                                                          
42
 AM Danner & JS Martinez “Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the 
Development of International Criminal Law” (2005) 93 California Law Review 75 103. 
43
 Prosecutor v KvoČka, Omarska, Keraterm & Trnopolje (Appeal Judgement) IT-98-30/1-A Separate Opinion of 
Judge Shahabuddeen (28 February 2005) para 41; Prosecutor v Ojdanić et al IT-99-37-AR72 Separate Opinion of 
Judge David Hunt on Challenges by Ojdanić to Jurisdiction Joint Criminal Enterprise (2003) para 20; Prosecutor v 
Ntakirutimana & Ntakirutimana (Appeal Judgement) ICTR-96-10-A and ICTR-96-17-A (13 December 2004) para 462. 
44
 Goy (2012) ICL Rev 1. 
45
 The Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90. 
46
 Art 1 of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90. 
47
 Note that differences between the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC do exist when you compare their respective statutes. 
The ICC is a permanent institution. While the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”), ICTY 
and ICTR are ad hoc; set up specifically for the prosecution of crimes that occurred in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda respectively, during a set period of time. The ICC only has the jurisdiction to try the accused who are 
nationals of a member state to the Rome Statute or the accused who committed a crime within a member state‟s 
territory. The United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”) on the other hand can impose the tribunal‟s jurisdiction on 
individuals by means of UNSC resolution, a prosecutor‟s suggestion or the state‟s recommendation.  
48
 Art 1 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (adopted 8 November 1994, entered into force 
8 November 1994) (1994) 33 ILM 1598; art 1 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia (entered into force 25 May 1993) (1993) 32 ILM 1159. 
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the Rome Statute. The Rome Statutes makes it clear that “[n]othing in this Part [referring to Part II 
„Jurisdiction, admissibility and applicable law‟] shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any 
way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute.”49  
 
1 2 Research aims, questions and hypotheses 
 
In exploring the research problem set out above the primary research question guiding my research 
was, whether the JCE doctrine could be useful to the ICC in prosecuting crimes of sexual violence? 
The usefulness in this regard refers to successful prosecutions leading to a conviction of acts of 
sexual violence under international criminal law. This primary question rests on two assumptions. 
Firstly, that JCE category three could be an effective tool in prosecuting crimes of sexual violence 
before the ICC relating to the nature of sexual violence and secondly that the JCE doctrine could be 
applied within the realm of the Rome Statute. In order for the latter to be true the jurisprudence of 
the ad hoc tribunals would have to be recognisable before the ICC as an applicable source in 
interpreting the Rome Statute.  Furthermore, the construction of their respective provisions that 
determine the modes of participation and individual criminal responsibility ie article 25 of the Rome 
Statute, article 7 of the ICTY Statute and article 6 of the ICTR Statute would also have to be 
compatible for comparison.  
I based my first assumption, ie that JCE category three would be the most suitable construction 
for improving the prosecution of high-ranked-officials for rape and other acts of sexual violence 
committed by another, on Haffajee‟s postulation, as indicated above. She explains that category 
three is most suitable because it attributes liability for crimes that fall outside of the common 
purpose yet which were a natural and foreseeable consequence of implementing the common 
criminal plan. In order to further analyse her proposition I had to begin my investigation by 
exploring the nature of sexual violence.  
 
In light of the primary research question and the related assumptions set out above the following 
secondary research questions have been central to my research: 
 
1. What is the nature of sexual violence? (Addressed in chapter two) 
2. What are the obligations resting on the international community to prosecute acts of sexual 
violence and to ensure the reasonable prospect of a conviction? (Addressed in chapters two 
and three) 
3. Under which international crimes can acts of sexual violence be prosecuted? (Addressed in 
chapter three) 
4. What are the difficulties experienced in prosecuting acts of sexual violence under 
international criminal law? (Addressed in chapter three) 
5. What is the general theory and application of the JCE doctrine? (Addressed in chapter four) 
6. Can JCE category three be used to establish the individual criminal responsibility of an 
accused who did not physically carry out the acts of sexual violence? (Addressed in chapter 
four) 
7. As the JCE doctrine has been successfully used by the ICTY and ICTR to establish the 
principal liability of high-ranked officials, can it be accepted and implemented by the ICC? 
(Addressed in chapter five) 
8. Does the application of the JCE doctrine, specifically in establishing principal liability, limit 
the rights of the accused, infringe the principals of legality or violate the foundational 
notions criminal law? (Addressed in chapter six) 
 
                                                          
49
 Art 10 of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90. 
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1 3 Methodology and sources 
 
My research was conducted as a desktop study where I reached my findings by discussing and 
comparing available international instruments and peer-reviewed resources. While I did not engage 
in a traditional comparative study of one country‟s legal position against another, I compared the 
constitutive statutes and jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals against the Rome Statute and the 
jurisprudence of the ICC. In doing so, I first relied on the primary constitutive instruments and the 
interpretation of these instruments through case law to form a theoretical base before relying on the 
opinions of scholars for deeper understanding.  
My thesis generally falls within the sphere of international law and includes discussions about 
international humanitarian law and international human rights law. However, the focus is 
predominately on international criminal law. The majority of my sources are international sources, 
such as international instruments and the case law the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC have been 
central to my findings as described below. International instruments such as the Rome Statute, the 
ICTY and the ICTR Statutes were used to determine the duty to prosecute rape and other acts of 
sexual violence. Cases from the ICC, the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia 
(“ECCC”), United Nations Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (“MICT”), ICTY and 
ICTR were furthermore used in my chapter three to determine the source of the difficulty 
experienced in prosecuting rape and other acts of sexual violence and in chapter four to discuss the 
practical application of JCE doctrine. Furthermore, these cases were used to reveal which category 
of the JCE doctrine that would be most suitable to the prosecution of rape and others sexual acts 
under international criminal law. These primary sources were supplemented by secondary sources 
in the form of academic articles and books, predominately, as indicated above, from the 
international criminal law genre. Various feminist, legal and socio-political theorist authors were 
furthermore analysed and discussed in chapter two, which involved a theoretical discussion of the 
general nature of sexual violence as well as the reasons for its predominance and nature of its use 
during armed conflict. Additionally, the works of Goy
50
 and Cassese
51
 formed the theoretical basis 
for the discussion about whether the ICC may rely on the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals to 
interpret the Rome Statute in chapter five. In chapter six I used and evaluated the varied academic 
opinions of Ohlin,
52
 Cassese, Badar,
53
 Werle
54
 as well as Danner and Martinez
55
 to determine 
whether the JCE doctrine limits the rights of the accused to fair trial or threatens the principles of 
legality and other foundational notions of international criminal law.  
 
1 4 Limitations 
 
During my pre-study I came across a number of different factors that hamper the prosecution of 
rape and other acts of sexual violence. For instance, the cultural and social consequences of rape 
coupled with the taboo topic of sexual violence, discourages witnesses and victims from coming 
forward. In addition, the chaotic and violence nature of armed conflict means that evidence is 
                                                          
50
 Goy (2012) ICL Rev 1. 
51
 A Cassese “Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under the Doctrine of JCE” (2007) 5 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 109.  
52
 JD Ohlin “Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise” (2007) 5 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 69. 
53
 ME Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law: The Case for a Unified Approach (2013) 1.  
54
 G Werle “Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute” (2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 953. 
55
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cali L Rev 75.  
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destroyed or lost and the parties involved in the crime or who witnessed the crime may be dead or 
too traumatised to come forward. While these factors arguably impede the successful prosecution of 
rape and other acts of sexual violence, the challenges experience by investigators and prosecutors in 
collecting real and oral evidence fall beyond the scope of this thesis.  
In addition, the prosecution of the physical perpetrator of the crime ie the one who carries out the 
actus reus of rape or other acts of sexual violence, equally falls beyond the scope of my thesis. 
Additionally, my engagement with international human rights law is limited to three aspects. 
Firstly, the discovery of international obligations that arise when the commission of acts of sexual 
violence violate human rights. Secondly, the value of internationally recognised human rights when 
interpreting the Rome Statute, pursuant to article 21(3); and thirdly, the human rights of an accused 
to a fair trial. With regards to this point, this discussion in itself is not comprehensive, as I have 
chosen to discuss only the parts of international human rights law that would be directly relevant 
within the context of JCE category three.  
 
1 5 Overview of the chapters  
 
The first step in my analysis of Haffajee‟s proposal is to determine why the prosecution of rape and 
other acts of sexual violence is challenging. In chapter two I by relying on secondary sources, 
investigate the prevalence of, and reasons for, the commission of rape and acts of sexual violence, 
particularly during armed conflict. Firstly, the general nature of rape and sexual violence during 
armed conflict is discussed. Secondly, various feminist, legal, socio–political and socio-economic 
theories are analysed in order to provide explanations for the occurrence of sexual violence and its 
prevalence during armed conflict. The works of Buss
56
 and Brownmiller
57
 was selected to present a 
feminist perspective. Additionally, the works of Chinkin,
58
 Obote-Odora
59
 and the “World Report 
on Violence and Health” by the World Health Organisation (“WHO”)60 was cited to provide an 
initial international law perspective. Furthermore, the report “Sexual Assault and Male 
Dominance”61 by the Advocates for Human Rights was cited to present the human rights 
perspective. Finally Turshen‟s chapter on “The Political Economy of Rape”62 and El Jack‟s article 
on “Gender and Armed Conflict”63 provided a gendered perspective on socio-economic and socio-
political influences. The works of these scholars and institutions reveal why the prosecution of rape 
and other acts of sexual violence committed during armed conflict is more difficult and different to 
prosecute than those committed within a domestic setting during times of relative peace. Armed 
conflict exacerbates the difficulty experienced by the prosecution in securing a conviction for acts 
of sexual violence by impeding their ability to satisfy certain elements of the crime.  
                                                          
56
 DE Buss “Rethinking „Rape as a Weapon of War‟” (2009) 17 Feminist Legal Studies 145. 
57
 S Brownmiller Against our will: Men, women and rape (1975) 1. 
58
 C Chinkin “Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women in International Law” (1994) 5 European Journal of International 
Law 326. 
59
 Obote-Odora (2005) New Eng J Int‟l L & Comp L. 
60
 EG Krug, JA Mercy, LL Dahlberg, AB Zwi & R Lozano “World Report on Violence and Health” (2 October 2002) 
World Health Organization 161 <http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2002/9241545615_eng.pdf?ua=1> (accessed 
19-07-2015). 
61
 Anonymous “Sexual Assault and Male Dominance” (1 February 2006) Advocates for Human Rights 
http://www.stopvaw.org/sexual_assault_and_male_dominance (accessed 2-10-2014). 
62
 M Turshen “The Political Economy of Rape:  An Analysis of Systematic Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women During 
Armed Conflict in Africa” in C Moser & F Clarke ed Victors, Perpetrators or Actors: Gender, Armed Conflict and 
Political Violence (2001) 55. 
63
 A El Jack “Gender and Armed Conflict” (2003) Overview Report by BRIDGE (development-gender) 1. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
10 
 
In addition, I approach the origin of the prohibition of sexual violence within humanitarian and 
the human rights, in chapter two. In this discussion I mainly rely on primary sources of international 
law.
64
 The aim is to understand the gravity of acts of sexual violence as violations of international 
humanitarian and human rights law. Thereby unearthing the remedies available to the victim as well 
as consequences of breaches for state parties. Furthermore, the prosecution of rape and other acts of 
sexual violence under the Rome Statute as well as the ICTY Statute and ICTR Statute are analysed 
in chapter three. The point of departure is to determine whether a duty, under international criminal 
law, to prosecute such crimes exists and if so; under which offenses it can be charged and who can 
be prosecuted. Subsequently, an analysis of the ad hoc tribunals‟ case law, pertaining to rape and 
other acts of sexual violence follows; in order to determine which elements, if any, are proving 
consistently difficult to prove.  
The JCE doctrine, as the proposed solution, is then introduced in chapter four. The doctrine is 
defined and its origin discussed. Thereafter, the three different categories of the JCE doctrine, 
including; their requirements and fields of application, are set out. In addition, the requirements to 
establish liability through the JCE doctrine and its application to crimes of a sexual nature are 
illustrated through the case law of the MICT, ICTY and ICTR. The aim is to determine the 
doctrine‟s usefulness and reveal which category of JCE is most suitable for the prosecution of rape 
and other acts of sexual violence.  
Chapter five begins with a discussion on the nature and use of precedent in international law. It 
is evident from my pre-study, as indicated above, that the ICC has not yet used the JCE doctrine. 
Furthermore, article 25 of the Rome Statute, which sets out the modes of perpetration and 
participation does not expressly refer to the JCE doctrine. Before the ICC can theoretically be 
encouraged to accept of the JCE doctrine, legal authority for a duty or at least a responsibility to 
look to the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals would have to be provided. Moreover, the arena of 
international law is made of independent actors that elect to behave in a certain manner despite not 
being bound to do so. Therefore it is important to discuss if and how states and judicial bodies have 
elected to use jurisprudence or not. The most important instrument in persuading the ICC to take 
judicial notice of relevant sources is the Rome Statute. All its operations must be consistent with, 
and authorised by, the Rome Statute. Consequently, I firstly looked to article 21 of the Rome 
                                                          
64
 In this discussion the provisions that address rape and acts of sexual violence in: the Hague Convention (II) with 
Respect to the Laws and Customs of war on Land and its Annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land and the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations 
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War of 1949 (“Fourth Geneva Convention”) and its two Additional Protocols, the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal (“Nuremberg Charter”) and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of the Far 
East (“Tokyo Charter”) will be discussed pertaining to the provisions that address rape and acts of sexual violence.  In 
addition, situations from Human Rights Committee (“HRC”), cases from the ad hoc tribunals, the Inter-American Court 
on Human Rights (“IACtHR”), the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (“IACHR”)  and the European Court 
of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) as well as various international and regional human rights instruments, such as; the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”), the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
on the Rights of Women in Africa (“Women‟s Protocol”), the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”), African Charter on Human and People‟s Rights (“ACHPR”), the American Convention on Human Rights 
(“ACHR”), Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on 
Human Rights) (“ECHR”), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(“CERD”),  the United Nations Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(“CEDAW”), the General Recommendation No 19 of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women (“CEDAW Committee”) and the VCLT will be relied upon. 
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Statute that sets out the sources that may be used when interpreting the Rome Statute and the order 
in which these sources may be used. If the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals is found to fit 
within one of the listed sources, it would certainly promote the ICC‟s use, or at least 
acknowledgement, of the JCE doctrine. In addition, any interpretation of the ICC must be consistent 
with internationally recognised human rights standard. Thus, secondly, I looked to article 21(3) of 
the Rome Statute that sets out the human rights standard for interpretation.  Furthermore, the 
interpretation of the provisions of the Rome Statute, could not be concluded without referring to the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”). Thirdly, I evaluated article 31 of the VCLT 
that sets out the general rules for interpreting treaties. If these inquires reveal that the ICC ought to 
look to the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC will only do so if article 25 of the Rome 
Statute is comparable to the relevant provisions within the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals. While 
the ICTY and ICTR Statutes might support the application of the JCE doctrine, it does not 
necessitate the ICC‟s acceptance because they are independent judicial bodies that are constituted 
and authorised by separate instruments. Chapter five will therefore be rounded out with a 
comparison of article 25 of the Rome Statute to articles 6 and 7 of the ICTR Statute and ICTY 
Statute, respectively, to determine their compatibility. This will include a comparison of; the modes 
of participation and perpetration, the requisite subjective and objective elements for commission 
and the test that distinguishes modes of participation and perpetration that give rise to principal 
liability from those that result in derivative forms of liability. The aim is to determine whether the 
Rome Statute can support the same construction of the JCE doctrine as advocated by the ad hoc 
tribunals. Particularly whether a contribution to a JCE can amount to a commission and thereby 
principal liability.  
The legitimacy of the JCE doctrine is evaluated in chapter six by investigating its origin. I 
furthermore analyse whether it infringes the right of the accused to a fair trial, the principles of 
legality and the basic norms and principles of criminal law, including the principle of individual 
culpability. Irrespective of whether the JCE doctrine offers a solution to the perceived problem and 
the ICC accepts that it should at least consider the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals because it is 
useful and comparable; the ICC should only accept it if this doctrine is legitimate. Thus, in addition, 
the various criticisms of the JCE doctrine from case law and academic scholars is evaluated. In this 
regard the most contentious issues: its origin in customary international law, the equal attribution of 
liability, its application to special intent crimes and whether a contribution to JCE liability can 
constitute a commission and therefore result in principal liability, are explored. After considering 
the criticisms and evaluating their strength by comparing them to case law as well as opposing and 
supporting authors, possible solutions will be discussed and evaluated. Chapter six is concluded by 
a discussion on the proposed use and reform of the JCE doctrine. Chapter seven concludes my 
thesis with a summary of all my findings and I make recommendations for the future application of 
the JCE doctrine within international criminal law.   
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CHAPTER 2: THE NATURE OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE  
 
2 1 Introduction 
 
As explained in the introduction this thesis is aimed at exploring whether it is possible to improve 
the conviction rate of hold high-ranked officials and the masterminds for acts of sexual violence 
that were committed by others.  To ensure the efficacy of prosecutorial doctrines or measures the 
nature of the crime and the environment within which these crimes occur must be considered. In 
understanding the nature of sexual violence, pursuant to my first research question, measures can 
arguably be improved to better suit the context and specific challenges faced when prosecuting 
sexual violence.  Furthermore, the nature of a specific crime and context may warrant the use of 
special prosecutorial or evidentiary rules, inferences and concessions in order to ensure the 
reasonable prospect of a successful prosecution.  
In this chapter I firstly discuss, the general nature of sexual violence during armed conflict. 
Secondly, I discuss various feminist, legal, socio–political and socio-economic theories. These 
theories can separately or in combination offer explanations to the occurrence of sexual violence 
and its prevalence during armed conflict. They also overlap and share common denominators such 
as the systematic use of sexual violence to achieve a larger goal. As sexual violence is a world-wide 
phenomenon examples from all over the globe are used in this chapter to illustrate the arguments 
brought forward by the literature. Thirdly, I approach the origin of the prohibition of sexual 
violence within international humanitarian law. In this discussion I mainly rely on primary sources 
of international law. Fourthly, I investigate the impact that the commission of acts of sexual 
violence have on international human rights. In doing so, I rely on case law from regional human 
rights courts as well as regional and international human rights instruments. The aim thereof being 
to determine whether the international community is obliged to prosecute acts of sexual violence 
and to ensure the reasonable prospect of a conviction, in accordance with my second research 
question. 
 
2 1 1 The nature of sexual violence  
 
The nature of a crime can arguably either hamper or ease the ability to prosecute. Sullivan states 
that a remedy or measures‟ “[e]ffectiveness depends also on the nature of the violation”.65 
Therefore, the nature of the crime and the context within which it is committed can and should be 
considered when interpreting provisions of a statute that set out the elements of the crime. For 
instance, rape committed during periods of relative peace is traditionally private in nature, which 
means that there are usually no witnesses except for the two parties involved.
66
 The prosecution 
often finds it difficult to establish the element of non-consent. Context-sensitive and gender-
sensitive interpretative and evidentiary rules could be developed to assist the prosecution of sexual 
violence. For example, rule 96(i) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“RPE”) of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, which supplement the Statue of the 
                                                          
65
 DJ Sullivan “Overview of the Rule Requiring the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies Under the Optional Protocol to 
CEDAW” (2008) International Women‟s Rights Action Watch Asia Pacific 15 <http://www.iwraw-
ap.org/publications/doc/DonnaExhaustionWeb_corrected_version_march%2031.pdf> (accessed 1-10-2014). 
66
 World Health Organization “Violence Against Women: Intimate partner and sexual violence against women” 
(November 2014) World Health Organization <http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs239/en/> (accessed 22-06-
2015). See also EJ Wood “Sexual Violence during War: Toward an Understanding of Variation” in L Sjoberg & S Via 
(eds) Gender, War, and Militarism (2010) 124 124: “Some acts occur in private setting; many are public, in front of 
family or community members.”  
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ICTY Statute does not require corroboration of the victim‟s testimony.67 Sexual violence is a grave 
and independent crime, however; harsh cultural and social consequences of rape coupled with the 
taboos surrounding the topic of sexual violence, often discourage victims and witnesses from 
coming forward.
68
 In addition, the cultural sensitivities together with the trauma experienced, 
sometimes make it very difficult for the victim or witness to describe the anatomical details that are 
necessary to discharge the element of penetration, required for a rape conviction.
69
 Therefore, as 
found by the ICTR in Akayesu, the definition of rape must be sensitive to the context including the 
culture of the area.
70
 Hence, it is important to include the nature of sexual violence that occurs 
during armed conflict, when evaluating the prosecution of sexual violence and the respective 
elements of the crime. In doing so, the reasons for successful or labored prosecution; including 
which elements of the crime are difficult to satisfy, can be discovered. This knowledge, I argue 
provides a better foundation for creating, evaluating and proposing solutions, if necessary.    
In addition, sexual violence is rarely expressed as the intended objective of armed conflict or 
expressly ordered. It is however, very often an implicit part of war strategy, which is supported, 
planned and coordinated by individuals in a position of power.
71
 Furthermore, armed conflict is 
established and maintained by using a chain of command.
72
 Arguably, the distance created by the 
chain of command together with the absence of a direct order to commit rape, makes it difficult to 
establish any individual criminal responsibility of high-ranked officials. It is therefore unlikely that 
the participation of high-ranked officials through planning, support or acquiescence can establish 
individual criminal responsibility as a principal perpetrator because he or she did not physically 
rape or sexually assault the victim him or herself. This argument is discussed further in chapter 
three, with reference to case law from the ICTY and the ICTR. 
Furthermore, sexual violence during armed conflict is characteristically widespread, often 
committed by numerous perpetrators and on numerous occasions.
73
 The impact is therefore 
arguably grave.  The widespread character hints at its instrumentality and foreseeability.
74
 
Moreover, if it is occurring so frequently over a large area, the awareness of the incidence or 
possible occurrence is more likely. Arguably, the widespread nature and gravity creates an 
obligation to protect, prevent and punish.  
Moreover, sexual violence that occurs during armed conflict is different from rape committed 
during periods of relative peace because it is inflicted predominately in a public manner. Public 
perpetration is often intentionally used to terrorise local populations.
75
 Sexual violence is often 
committed in front of family members or family members are forced to rape their relative.
76
 Due to 
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the public nature rape is often witnessed. The witness can help the prosecution establish the 
occurrence, however; the violent nature of armed conflict may destroy any prosecutorial advantage 
that the public nature provides. The victim or witness may be killed during the conflict or end up so 
traumatised that they are unable or unwilling to come forward and testify. The challenges 
experienced by investigators and prosecutors in obtaining the necessary real and oral evidence for 
trial, clearly impacts the prosecution‟s prospect of success, however; these hurdles fall beyond the 
scope of this analysis.  
Additionally, the ICTR in Akayesu, acknowledged that both torture and sexual violence have an 
instrumental nature.
77
 Both can be used as tools to intimidate, humiliate, degrade, destroy, 
discriminate, control or punish.
78
 Recognising the deliberate and instrumental nature of sexual 
violence may assist its prosecution as a crime against humanity or an act of genocide because its 
instrumentality indicates that it has been intentionally used to fulfill a purpose. The intentional 
nature of sexual violence impacts the prosecution by influencing the satisfaction of the subjective 
elements of the crime. The perpetrator‟s intention includes his or her foresight with regards to the 
conduct and the victim. During armed conflict the commission is concerned with the perpetrator, 
the victim and the groups to which they both belong.
79
 Sexual violence is therefore a means to 
target a specific group.
80
 Buss posits that “[r]ape follows from the very existence of conflicts 
understood as occurring between two polarised sides”.81 Rape is thus integral, not incidental, to 
armed conflict.
82
 Rape is systematically and intentionally used as part of a wider strategy or plan.
83
  
 
2 2 Theories explaining the prevalence of sexual violence  
 
2 2 1  Sexual violence as a tool used to gain economic and political power  
 
The struggle for power ie the access to and control over resources, human or otherwise, has been 
the cause of armed conflict for centuries.
84
 War is often concerned with the transfer of assets from 
the weak to the strong.
85
 The control of resources and the exercise of power are both engendered.
86
 
Gender relations, as further discussed below, are “typically characterised by unequal access to, or 
distribution of, power”.87 The have-nots are disproportionately female.88 Yet women, especially 
while pregnant or lactating, are in need of additional nutritional and medical resources.
89
 In 
addition, the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(“CEDAW”) by recognising the need to make opportunities available to women, arguably 
acknowledges that women experience an inferior position in society over-all, which can be 
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aggravated by violence.
90
 Gender inequality is illuminated by war because people are more 
sensitive to the allocation and control over resources when lacking. Moser states that sexual 
violence has been systematically and deliberately used during civil war as a strategy to wrest 
personal assets, political or economic, from women.
91
  
The use of sexual violence as an economic and political tool presupposes society‟s belief, 
conscious or unconscious, that women are commodities. Historically women were, and in some 
places still are, considered the property of a man.
92
 Rape would therefore constitute a crime against 
her brother or father who would in turn be entitled to compensation.
93
 A woman‟s value in these 
contexts is determined by her productive value as a caregiver, gatherer and worker and by her 
reproductive value as bearer of children who can grow and strengthen the community.
94
 During 
armed conflict women serve as cooks, cleaners, tailors, farmers and porters, which are necessary for 
the continued operation of warfare, especially guerrilla warfare.
95
 Furthermore, she is valued for her 
access to assets and her value is closely connected to and determined by her virtue and modesty. A 
woman‟s value in this regard, can be illustrated by the cultural practice of paying a bride-price. An 
amount is paid to the bride‟s family as compensation for losing her reproductive and productive 
value when she marries into her husband‟s family.96 The amount paid is usually determined by her 
skills, education, perceived fertility, beauty and reputation. Cultural practices are important because 
they; form part of a person‟s perceived identity, have significant meaning and may add value to the 
woman sense of self yet whenever a value is attached to a women, no matter how noble or 
complimentary the motivation, that value can also be diminished. In addition, payment may indicate 
ownership.
97
  
Something of value is a commodity; it can be traded, exchanged, bought or sold. Arguably, when 
a person‟s value is quantifiable or conditional, not purely based on her existence as a human being, 
it can be diminished or lost entirely. Any indiscretion can diminish the amount payable or more 
likely ruin a woman‟s marriage potential, which would be shameful for her and her family. For 
example, her rape can diminish her value because of the many social and cultural issues related to 
women's “cleanliness” and “good behavior”.98 Furthermore, bearing a child out of wedlock, 
whether as a result of consensual sex or not, in some cultures classifies a woman as “loose” and 
therefore frees the family from their duties to protect and provide for her.
99
 The language of public 
morality and stereotypes are used as weapons to manipulate and interpret the control over 
resources.
100
 Concepts of virtue and family honour can therefore objectify women.
101
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A woman‟s perceived value and symbolism is intrinsic to her use as a weapon.102 Leaders of the 
opposing side are aware of a community‟s valuation of women and therefore sometimes 
intentionally use rape as a tactic to demoralise, segregate and impact the strength and growth of the 
group.
103
 In addition, rape and abduction are ways of obtaining access to a woman‟s productive and 
reproductive labour.
104
 Women of a child-bearing age were, as an example, specifically targeted 
during the Rwandan genocide.
105
 Furthermore, girls who were abducted in Rwanda were referred to 
as “umusanzu”, a term meaning a contribution to the war effort.106 Furthermore, rape has been used 
to impregnate women with the enemy‟s offspring or to injure her so badly that she miscarries or is 
unable to bear children for her own community.
107
  
In addition, inheritance and marriage are interrelated and sometimes connected to warfare; a 
man‟s interest in a female relative is comparable to his interest in property.108 For example, 
Rwandan militiamen organised bogus weddings to legitimise the seizure of land.
109
 Soldiers of the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (“RPF”) targeted Tutsi women who were married to Hutu men, in order to 
gain access to the man‟s property.110 Due to the nature of civil wars, enemies, who were once 
neighbours, are aware of the other‟s family and financial situations.  For example, widows and 
elderly women were abducted during the India and Pakistan Partition in 1947 in order to use the 
women to gain access to her husband‟s property.111 In the alternative, men would forcibly marry 
widows or become the sons of elderly women in order to lay claim to the property she may 
access.
112
  
Turshen explains that rape, during armed conflict, is a “socially constructed experience;” a series 
of deliberate policy decisions used to systematically deprive or transfer assets.
113
 Moser proposes 
that we should extend our understanding of rape as an expression of social and cultural violence to 
an expression of political and economic violence, as well.
114
 For example, forced pregnancy and 
sterilisation by brutal rape are expressions of political and economic violence. Sex work is 
considered by Turshen to be the “crudest form of asset transfer in civil war”.115 Sex is a commodity 
and is therefore traded in exchange for protection and survival.
116
  El Jack lists Rwanda and Sierre 
Leone as examples of where sexual favours have been traded for food.
117
 Turshen explains that 
perceived random acts of sexual violence, during a genocide, are not merely “war booty;” these acts 
fall within a greater and systematic asset stripping strategy. In Rwanda, the Kinyarwandan word for 
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rape literally means to liberate.
118
 The same word for rape was initially used to describe the act of 
coercing someone to change political parties and later used to describe the act of forcibly taking 
land or resources.
119
 Rape therefore literally refers to the theft of assets. Arguably, rape is 
inseparable from the general purpose of war; to obtain power and inevitably conquer.   
 
2 2 2 A feminist theory: Sexual violence is used to re-stabilise gender relations 
 
Another explanation for the prevalence of sexual violence is the desire to restore the pre-conflict 
status quo, with regards to gender relations. Gender relations refer to the relationships, roles, 
interactions and the power play between genders. The perception of gender appropriate behaviour 
and roles are determined by social and cultural expectations.
120
 The status quo regarding gender 
relations is one of inequality. According to El Jack, a superior and subordinate gender always exits 
and their interactions are dependent on a “dominant understanding of gender roles”.121 Women are 
stereotyped as passive and nurturing, which is perceived to be synonymous with the lesser gender or 
the victim.
122
 This characterisation of women is used to justify the force used by men to protect 
them.
123
 Men are stereotyped as the aggressor, protector or the stronger, which is perceived to be 
synonymous with the superior gender.
124
 The WHO posits that sexual violence is a result of 
ideologies, which foster a man‟s sense of entitlement.125 
Armed conflict usually destabilises stereotypical gender relations.
126
 El Jack explains that 
“conflict breeds distinct types of power relations and imbalances”.127 For example, men fall victim 
to violence and are emasculated by their inability to protect their communities. In addition, men are 
also raped.
128
 Moreover, some women are elevated to heads of the households through death or 
displacement and others choose to enlist or fight.
129
 Furthermore, war is traditionally perceived as a 
man‟s business.130 Therefore some men feel the need to correct this shift and sex, due to its 
gendered nature, is often the tool of choice.
131
 Advocates for Human Rights explain that: “rape is 
the male response to social inequality between men and women”.132 Moreover, that “[r]ape has been 
used historically for the subjugation of women and as a means of ensuring that women conform to 
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the behaviour patterns required by the community”.133 El Jack explains how certain men 
purposively set out to torture women who break the mould by enlisting. As an example, El Jack 
refers to a woman who was tortured for “betraying her womanhood” by enlisting.134 She was raped 
by men who threatened her with impregnation one day and sterilisation another.
135
 Similarly, in a 
Honduran refugee camp female combatants were punished for breaking female tradition. Rape was 
used as a tool of psychological torture, reserved for women.
136
 El Jack also uses Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Kosovo as examples where rape was used as a weapon to punish women 
belonging to the Kosovo Liberation army.
137
   
Rape is “essentially a crime committed against women”.138 This is so, because sexual violence is 
used to maintain female subordination.
139
 The United Nations Economic and Social Council 
(“ECOSOC”), in reviewing the strategies of Nairobi, acknowledged gender based violence as a 
human rights violation; a form of gender discrimination, which stems from women‟s unequal status 
in society.
140
 Women have been historically discriminated against for centuries due to deep-seeded 
socio-cultural attitudes.
141
 Furthermore, the preamble of CEDAW acknowledges that sexual 
violence is a manifestation of the historically unequal power relations between men and women, 
which systematically maintains the subordination and inequality of women.
142
 Eriksson states that: 
“the fact that violence against women is a universal phenomenon and pervasive in all cultures 
points to its roots in patriarchy”.143 MacKinnon avers that sexual violence is both a manifestation of 
a woman‟s subordinate status and evidence that gender inequality exists.144 MacKinnon goes on to 
describes rape as an “act of dominance, over women, that works systematically to maintain a 
gender-stratified society in which women occupy a disadvantaged status as the appropriate victims 
and targets of sexual aggression”.145 Sexual violence is therefore a social mechanism of gender 
subjugation.
146
 The ICTY Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v Delalic, Mucic, Delic & Landzo 
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(“Celebici Camp”) confirmed that rape may amount to discrimination because it primarily and 
intentionally targets women for being women.
147
 The Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights (“IACHR”) in Maria da Penha Fernandes v Brazil (“Fernandes”) found that where the state 
fails to prevent and protect they effectively perpetuate the violence.
148
 The state therefore has a duty 
to work towards eradicating the gender bias and institutions, which institutionalise and maintain the 
unequal status of women. Acknowledging sexual violence as a form of gender discrimination 
therefore acknowledges the systemic root of sexual violence, which is essential for developing 
effective prevention and protection measures. 
Arguably, the rape of a man does not negate the gendered nature of rape. Male rape is designed 
to “shatter male power”.149 Some male victims of rape are labelled as women or gay.150 The 
inability of society to view a heterosexual male as the victim of rape arguably illustrates how 
femininity is synonymous with the role of a victim. The refusal of former Yugoslavia to 
acknowledge that males could be victims of rape is an institutional example of the gendered nature 
of rape.
151
 Dolan argues that male rape has an even higher stigma attached to it because the 
violation undermines his masculinity in addition to the physical assault.
152
 The humiliation and 
feminisation caused by male rape makes it a perfect tool for men to assert their power over other 
men. 
According to Gibson, rape has throughout most of recorded history, been a crime against men.
153
 
Bennett and El Jack also propose a male-centric approach to rape. According to this approach, as 
alluded above, the rape of a female is actually targeted at her male counterparts. Rape is a “heinous 
crime against men” ie “a humiliation inflicted upon a nation, an affront to a man‟s pride as guardian 
of his women”.154 Bennett elaborates, rape is a public act of aggression, which violates and 
demoralises the men in her community by dishonouring their women.
155
 This interpretation 
supports the conceptualisation of sexual violence as a tool used to gain economic and political 
power, as discussed in the previous sub-chapter. Certain Tutsi women, who were the wives of Hutu 
men, were protected from rape and violence because the Hutu combatants realised that their Hutu 
brother would be impacted negatively by her rape.
156
 Her rape or murder would deprive him of her 
productive and reproductive capacities and he would therefore be entitled to seek revenge.
157
 A 
male-centric approach does not necessarily trivialise the experience of women, instead it illustrates 
how “gender-based violence disrupts and destabilises gender relations in often irrevocably 
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damaging ways that negatively impact everyone”.158 Arguably, a male-centric interpretation also 
illustrates the gendered nature of rape; because it is founded on the gendered stereotype that women 
require the protection of men. Irrespective of their stereotypical or non-stereotypical roles, “all 
women experience discrimination, due to unequal power structures that govern their relationships 
with men”.159 Women are the common victims during armed conflict. 
By acknowledging sexual violence as a manifestation of gender discrimination, the focus 
expands beyond the individual victim to include the victim as part of a group-based harm.
160
 
Without acknowledging its systemic use and the group-based nature of the harm, the remedies and 
prevention plans adopted by the state or the ICC will be inadequate because they will only be 
focused on the individual needs of the one victim instead of the systemic problem.
161
 In addition, 
Eriksson proposes that the group nature of the harm creates a presumption that sexual violence is 
generally discriminatory, which forgoes the need to establish the individual perpetrator‟s intent.162  
 
2 2 3 A utilitarian theory: Rape is a strategic weapon of war  
 
A third explanation for the prevalence of sexual violence is its purposive use as a weapon of war.
163
 
Enloe argues that “militarized rape is a distinctly different act because it is perpetrated in a context 
of institutional policies and decisions,” which are directly connected to the functions of a formal 
institution such as the state‟s national security or defence apparatus or an insurgency‟s military 
arm”.164 The United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”) has declared that rape is often part of a 
“planned and targeted policy”.165 Rape is a “political event”.166 It serves a function.167 It can be used 
to further militaristic or nationalist goals.
168
 Buss also refers to “„rape as a weapon of war”.169 This 
phrase indicates that sexual violence has a systematic, pervasive, or officially orchestrated nature. 
Sexual violence under international criminal law is not random.
170
 It forms part of a larger plan.  
The instrumentality of rape creates an environment where women are perceived to be “inherently 
rapable”.171 In addition, victims may be sexually violated by numerous perpetrators on one or many 
different occasions.
172
 The WHO cites Korea during the World War II (“WWII”) and Bangladesh 
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 149 cf CN Narchos “Women, war, and rape: Challenges facing the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia” (1995) 17 Human Rights Quarterly 649 658. 
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 Buss (2009) Feminist Legal Studies 155 cf S Marcus “Fighting bodies, fighting words: A theory and politics of rape 
prevention” in J Butler & J Scott (eds) Feminists theorize the political (1992) 385 and 388. 
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during the war of independence, Algeria,
173
 India (Kashmir),
174
 Indonesia,
175
 Liberia,
176
 Rwanda 
and Uganda
177
 as examples of where sexual violence was used as a strategy of war.
178
  
A mentioned above, sexual violence during armed conflict occurs in public areas, in front of 
family members or family members are forced to rape their relative.
179
 The purpose is two-fold. 
Firstly, the public nature creates fear and panic; terrorising all women with the possibility of being 
raped at any moment by any man.
180
 In support of this, Brownmiller argues that men are aware that 
they can use their genitals to generate fear.
181
  Secondly, the public nature sends a message to the 
opposition that the perpetrators have conquered their woman and therefore the group to which she 
belongs. Women are perceived to be the preservers of family honour and often symbolise a nation‟s 
“racial purity and culture”.182 This message, especially when delivered publically, is more than one 
of victory; it attacks the opposition psychologically, by creating the impression that they are unable 
to protect their own and therefore emasculates and demoralises them.
183
 The WHO posits that 
sexual violence is used to subvert the perceived enemy by breaking down community bonds.
184
 It 
also incites more violence through what is perceived to be justified retaliation. In addition, male 
spouses who are “crippled by guilt and anger” through their inability to protect their women may 
ironically resort to sexual or physical violence to assert their masculinity.
185
 Furthermore, sexual 
violence can be an attack on the entire country, her community, the males within her family and her 
human rights.
186
  
Women are therefore the perfect target of genocide and ethnic cleansing because the enemy can 
hurt or kill them at the same time as destroying women‟s ability to produce offspring for the 
community. During sectarian conflict; conflict between different racial, political, ethnic or religious 
groups, the rape of women, belonging to opposition, is a common tactical practice.
187
 For example, 
Turshen states that rape, as part of the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, was designed to drive women 
from their communities and cripple their ability to grow their ethnicity‟s population.188 In 
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 El Jack (2003) Overview Report by BRIDGE 19 cf A El Jack “Gender Perspectives on the Management of Small 
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Yugoslavia it was used as “a method of ethnic cleansing intended to humiliate, shame, degrade and 
terrify the entire ethnic group”.189 Additionally, during the Rwandan genocide women were 
targeted, raped and killed as part of “a policy specifically encouraged and directed to further the 
goal of the leaders of the genocide to destroy all Tutsi as a social group”.190  The WHO affirms that 
sexual violence was used in Rwanda and Yugoslavia as a tool for ethnic cleansing.
191
 
Turshen explains that extra-legal activity, such as rape, during armed conflict is justified by 
combatants as serving a sectarian purpose even when the victim does not fall within the targeted 
group.
192
 For example, in Rwanda even Hutu women, with no affiliation to Tutsi men, were 
raped.
193
  Rape therefore became a gender issue; women across political and ethnic lines were 
targeted.
194
 Consequently, the utilitarian theory supports the feminist approach by acknowledging 
that women are intentionally targeted through the commission of sexual violence; whether the 
purpose is to maintain female subordination as discussed in the feminist approach, above or to 
destroy the group that the women form part of, as discussed here.
195
  
 
2 2 4 Sexual violence in armed conflict mirrors pre-existing gender relations  
 
The prevalence of sexual violence can be explained by the aggravating affect that armed conflict 
has on pre-existing gender relations that exist within a society.
196
 El Jack states that “militarisation 
exacerbates inequalities”197 and escalates everyday violence.198 Armed conflict creates a generally 
violent environment, within which sexual violence occurs.
199
 Societies that experience more 
violence, for example during armed conflict, are more likely to experience high rates of sexual 
violence.
200
 Chinkin posits that rape is not about sex. Sexual violence is an expression of power and 
control as understood by “male soldiers‟ notions of their masculine privilege,” which are exercised 
and empowered by “military‟s lines of command and by class and ethnic inequalities among 
women”.201 Cultural and subconscious patterns of gender discrimination are institutionalised by 
patriarchal structures and ideas, which can manifest as violence during armed conflict. 
The exacerbation is stimulated by a myriad of factors. A militaristic mentality, similar to a mob-
mentality, encourages violence and numbs the communal conscience. Military and patriarchal 
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institutions are based on cultural constructions of manliness.
202
 For example, a “proper man” can 
use a weapon.
203
 Advocates for Human Rights posit that “where the ideology of male superiority is 
strong (…) emphasizing dominance, physical strength and male honour (…) rape is more 
common”.204 In addition, the general violent nature of a society encourages aggressiveness in 
men.
205
 Society expects all men to be inherently violent.
206
 When they do not meet these 
expectations, their masculinity is attacked and therefore some men resort to public or private 
violence to assert their position of power and masculinity.
207
  Moreover, traditional structures, 
which maintain and enforce law and order, break down during armed conflict.
208
 Therefore 
perceived as well as actual consequences, which traditionally act as deterrents, are limited. 
Furthermore, modern-day civil wars are fought among civilians. The distinction between conflict 
and safe zones is therefore a myth.
209
 Women are forced to continue their lives within the 
battlefield, which expose them to violence. Certain war policies even target homes.
210
  
 
2 3 Sexual violence as a violation of humanitarian law 
 
In 1863, article 44 of the Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the 
Field (“Lieber Code”) banned rape as a punishable act under article 47.211 Thereafter article 1 of the 
Annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land to the Hague Convention 
(II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of war on Land (“the Hague Convention (II)”),212 article 
1 of the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: 
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (“Hague Convention (IV)”) 
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prohibited all war crimes, including rape.
213
 Sellers argues that the prohibition was based on the 
protection of family honour.
214
 Furthermore, the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of 
Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and the Charter for the International Military Tribunal 
(“Nuremberg Charter”) and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(“Tokyo Charter”) prohibited war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes against peace, 
however; neither expressly referred to rape.
215
 Nonetheless, both tribunals admitted and ruled on 
evidence of rape.
216
 For example, the prosecutors of the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East at Tokyo (“IMTFE”) indicted the rape of prisoners and nurses.217 However, the prosecutors at 
the IMTFE received criticism for failing to lead evidence on the systematic nature of sexual 
violence, particularly with regard to the sex slavery of girls and women who were used to comfort 
members of the Japanese army.
218
  
In 1949, four Geneva Conventions were signed into existence. Article 27 of the Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 1949 (“Fourth Geneva 
Convention of 1949”), concerning the treatment of civilian populations under enemy occupation, 
prohibits attacks on women‟s honour including rape and forced prostitution.219 According to 
Pictet‟s Commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949; the focus on sexual crimes as an 
attack against honour, did not acknowledge the violent nature of sexual crimes.
220
 In 1977, the 
signing of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (“Additional Protocol I”)221 and the 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (“Additional Protocol II”) expanded the 
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prohibition of rape that occurs during civil and international armed conflict.
222
  Article 75(2)(b) of 
the Additional Protocol I prohibits rape, enforced prostitution and indecent assault as an outrage 
upon personal dignity.
223
 Article 76(1) of Additional Protocol I specifies the protection of women, 
in armed conflict, against rape, forced prostitution and indecent assault.
224
 Article 77(1) of 
Additional Protocol I protects children, in armed conflict, against any form of indecent assault.
225
  
According to Hevener, article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and article 76 of 
Additional Protocol I do not prohibit sexual violence in armed conflict instead they place a duty on 
the state to protect women “against attacks on their honour and accord them special respect”.226 
Hevener‟s interpretation makes sense because these are humanitarian instruments, which place a 
duty on states to protect civilians and regulate conduct during armed conflict, not instruments of 
international criminal law, which criminalises certain acts. However, the breach of international 
humanitarian laws and norms does give rise to international criminal law obligations to punish and 
prosecute.
227
 Article 8 of the Rome Statute, expressly criminalises violations of the Geneva 
Conventions.
228
 
 
2 4 Sexual violence as a violation of international human rights 
 
A person‟s sexuality and sexual life forms part of their human dignity, right to privacy and sexual 
autonomy. For instance, the United Nation‟s Fourth World Conference on Women (“Beijing 
Platform”) put forward that “sexuality is a fundamental aspect of human dignity”.229 Furthermore, 
the Human Rights Committee (“HRC”) as well as the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) 
in Dudgeon v United Kingdom (“Dudgeon”)230  and in X and Y v Netherlands (“X and Y”) found 
that a person‟s private life includes their physical and moral integrity as well as their sexual life.231 
Moreover article 4 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa (“Women‟s Protocol”), acknowledges sexual autonomy by obliging the 
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state to “prohibit all forms of violence against women including unwanted or forced sex whether the 
violence takes place in private or public”.232  
Hence a person‟s sexuality and sex life forms part of their human rights; consequently the 
commission of acts of sexual violence violates human rights. For instance, the IACHR in Maria 
Dolores Rivas Quintanilla v El Salvador (“Quintanilla”) referred to the rape of a seven year old girl 
as a heinous crime and “contempt for even the most elementary principles of human dignity”.233 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“IACtHR”) in Raquel Martín de Mejía v Perú 
(“Meija”) found that the utilisation of rape for punishment and intimidation was an outrage on 
human dignity including the victim‟s private life.234 Consequently, the IACHR in Mejía found that 
sexual violence violated article 11(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights
 (“ACHR”), 
which guarantees the right to privacy.
235
 Sellers argues that the IACtHR in Meija and the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”) implicitly 
provide for the right to be free from sexual violence.
236
 Therefore the commission of sexual 
violence violates the rights to human dignity and privacy. 
Furthermore, the IACtHR in Meija found that rape satisfies the human rights prerequisites of 
torture.
237
 Additionally, the IACHR stated obiter that rape could violate the safeguards against 
torture found in article 5 of the ACHR.
238
 In support of the inclusion of sexual violence as a form of 
torture, the General Assembly Resolution 63 of 166 calls upon all states to adopt a gender-sensitive 
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interpretation of torture.
239
 Therefore when the commission of acts of sexual violence are used for 
punishment and intimidation then the safeguards against torture are violated. 
Moreover, sexual violence is a form of gender discrimination that violates the right to equality. 
The right to equality and principle of non-discrimination include the prohibition of gender 
discrimination.
240
  General Recommendation No 19 of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (“CEDAW Committee”) interpreted the term “discrimination,” in 
article 1 of CEDAW, to include gender based violence on the basis that it is: 
 
 “[V]iolence that is disproportionately directed against a woman because she is a woman or 
that affects women disproportionately. It includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual 
harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty. Gender 
violence may breach specific provisions of the Women‟s Convention, regardless of whether 
those provisions expressly mention violence.”241  
 
Therefore in order to establish sexual violence as a form of gender discrimination; the use of sexual 
violence as targeting women because they are women and as a result her diminished ability to 
exercise her rights and freedoms, must be established. The inclusion of sexual violence as a form of 
gender discrimination was reiterated by the CEDAW Committee‟s communication in AT v Hungary 
(“AT”) stating that violence against women significantly impacts her ability to exercise her rights 
and freedoms on an equal basis to men.
242
 In 2003, the IACtHR delivered an Advisory Opinion 
stating that the principle of non-discrimination, equality before the law and equal protection before 
the law are ius cogens and have a peremptory character.
243
 Article 53 of the VCLT describes ius 
cogens as:  
 
“[A] peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the 
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is 
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law 
having the same character.”244 
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In addition, the IACtHR in Atala Riffo and daughters v Chile (“Atala”) also found that the 
fundamental principles of equality and non-discrimination are ius cogens.
245
 The equality between 
genders and the prohibition of gender-based discrimination are therefore recognised as a norms that 
cannot be exempted and that give rise to an erga omnes obligation on all states to prohibit and 
prevent such violations. Furthermore, the safeguards against torture, including the prohibition of 
sexual violence, are ius cogens.
246
  
Consequently, when a fundamental human right or freedom is violated the victim is entitled to 
effective remedy and equal access to justice.  The right to effective remedy is entrenched in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”),247 the Women‟s Protocol,248  the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”),249 the ACHR250 
and the ECHR.
251
 Furthermore, the right to equality before law is entrenched in the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples‟ Rights (“ACHPR”).252 In addition, Annex VII to the United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 60 states that the victims‟ rights to remedies for gross violations of 
international human rights and humanitarian law include “equal and effective access to justice”.253 
The rights of the victim translate into obligations of state members to these human rights 
instruments. However, erga omnes obligations arising from ius cogens ie the safeguards against 
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him by the constitution or by law.” 
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 Art 25 of the Women‟s Protocol (2005) CAB/LEG 66.6: “States Parties shall undertake to: (a) provide for 
appropriate remedies to any woman whose rights or freedoms, as herein recognised, have been violated; (b) ensure that 
such remedies are determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent 
authority provided for by law.” 
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 Art 6 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (adopted 21 
December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195. 
250
 Art 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 21 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) 
1144 UNTS 143: “1. Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a 
competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution 
or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention, even though such violation may have been committed by persons 
acting in the course of their official duties.” 
251
 Art 13 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on 
Human Rights, as amended) (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 222: 
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before 
a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.” 
252
 Eriksson (2010) Orebro Studies in Law 297-298 cf the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights (adopted 27 
June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) 1520 UNTS 217, particularly; art 3 ie the right to equality before the 
law and equal protection of the law. 
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 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) “Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights 
Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Adopted and proclaimed by UNGA Res 60 (16 
December 2005)” UN Doc GA/RES/60/147 (2015) United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner for 
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torture and principles of non-discrimination are applicable to all states, irrespective if they are party 
to the human rights instrument or not.
254
 The obligations include the duty to enact prohibitive 
legislation and provide effective remedies including effective prosecution; within the framework of 
equality.
255
 For instance, in MC v Bulgaria (“Bulgaria”), a fourteen year old girl, with mental 
disabilities, was raped by two men while on a date.
256
 The ECtHR found that the failure to provide 
appropriate and effective legislative remedies; for rape amounted to a violation of the state‟s duty to 
protect private and family life in accordance with article 8 of the ECHR.
257
 Additionally, the ICC 
and the ad hoc tribunals have been instituted to prosecute such violations of international 
humanitarian law and international human rights under international criminal law, which will be 
discussed in the subsequent chapter.
258
 
 
2 5 Conclusion 
 
The theories explored in this chapter highlight the long-standing historical, wide-spread, systemic, 
instrumental and intentional use of sexual violence. The intentional use of sexual violence to 
maintain or re-stabilise female subordination, facilitate ethnic cleansing or genocide, 
psychologically manipulate the opposition or gain economic and political power, are historically 
prevalent practices. Arguably, these theories illustrate that the nature of sexual violence indicates 
                                                          
254
 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatments or Punishment (adopted 10 
December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) 1465 UNTS 8 (“CAT”): The prohibition of torture is an ius cogen 
rule, which is a non-derogable norm that places an erga omnes obligation on all states to prohibit and prevent torture 
irrespective of whether they are party to the CAT or not. 
255
 Art 25 of the ACHR (1978) 1144 UNTS 143: “2. The States Parties undertake: (a) to ensure that any person claiming 
such remedy shall have his rights determined by the competent authority provided for by the legal system of the state; 
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remedies when granted;” art 2 of the Women‟s Protocol (2005) CAB/LEG 66.6: “1. States Parties shall combat all 
forms of discrimination against women through appropriate legislative, institutional and other measures. In this regard 
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continues to exist; (e) support the local, national, regional and continental initiatives directed at eradicating all forms of 
discrimination against women. 2. States Parties shall commit themselves to modify the social and cultural patterns of 
conduct of women and men through public education, information, education and communication strategies, with a 
view to achieving the elimination of harmful cultural and traditional practices and all other practices which are based on 
the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes, or on stereotyped roles for women and men.” 
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 Sellers “The Prosecution of Sexual Violence in conflict” Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 32 cf 
MC v Bulgaria, European Court of Human Rights Application No 39272/98 (4 December 2003) 646.  
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 Eriksson (2010) Orebro Studies in Law 336 cf art 8 of the ECHR (1953) 213 UNTS 222; Sellers “The Prosecution of 
Sexual Violence in conflict” Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 32-33 cf MC v Bulgaria, ECtHR 
Application No 39272/98 (2003) para 646. 
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 Art 1 of the ICTR Statue (1994) 33 ILM 1598; art 1 of the ICTY Statue (1993) 32 ILM 1159; the preamble of the 
Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90: “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole 
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the possibility of objective foreseeability of sexual violence in armed conflict and its intentional use 
as part of a larger plan. I submit that courts and tribunals could use these and other theories when 
inferring the accused‟s subjective foresight and intent from the circumstances and facts of a 
particular case. While it is too burdensome and improper to assume that every combatant and 
civilian subjectively foresees the occurrence of sexual violence as a reasonably foreseeable 
consequence of implementing any policies or strategies of armed conflict, these theories can form 
the factual basis from which the court can infer its objective foreseeability. Consequently, the 
judiciary should consider the nature of the crime and the context when determining the accused‟s 
participation, foresight and intent. As discussed above, acts of sexual violence are carried out by 
members of group who hold lower positions in the chain of command yet are supported, planned 
and coordinated by individuals within the highest echelon of officials. In addition, acts of sexual 
violence are usually committed as an implicit part of a criminal plan or as a consequence of 
executing the plan. The nature and context of crime therefore makes it inherently difficult to link 
the high-ranked official to the crime committed by another. Consequently, impeding the ability of 
the prosecution to secure a conviction for acts of sexual violence under international criminal law. 
International criminal law should make provision for these prevalent and intentional criminal 
practices, in order to prevent impunity, by conceptualising the elements of the crime, including; 
commission, individual criminal responsibility, foresight and intent in a gender-sensitive and 
context-sensitive manner. The ability to attribute criminal responsibility for these intentional 
criminal practices is paramount to the pursuit of justice.  
 Furthermore, the commission of acts of sexual violence are a grave violations of humanitarian 
norms and human rights including; privacy, human dignity, sexual autonomy and equality. 
Consequently, the individual whose rights are violated is entitled to effective remedies including 
effective prosecution and equal access to justice, pursuant to international human rights treaties. 
Effective prosecution meaning the ability to secure a conviction. Furthermore, the breach of 
international humanitarian laws and human rights give rise to international criminal law obligations 
to punish and prosecute these violations. Moreover, all of the above theories confirm that sexual 
violence is a manifestation of gender-discrimination because sexual violence is intentionally and 
systematically used to maintain female subordination. This utilitarian character indicates a violation 
of the principle of non-discrimination, which is an ius cogen.  Consequently, all states, irrespective 
of whether party to the relevant human rights treaties or not, are bound to prevent and punish 
discriminatory practices. I can confirm that the international community is obliged to prosecute acts 
of sexual violence and to ensure the reasonable prospect of a conviction, in accordance with my 
second research question. By securing effective legal remedies and ensuring equal access to justice, 
the international community through international criminal law institutions, can begin to challenge 
gender discrimination and thereby gender-based violence as well.  
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
31 
 
CHAPTER 3: THE PROHIBITION AND PROSECUTION OF ACTS OF SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. 
 
3 1 Introduction 
 
Chapter two established that the nature of sexual violence must be considered in the formulation of 
effective measures, including prosecution.  By examining various feminist, legal, socio-political and 
socio-economic theories it is evident that sexual violence has an instrumental nature. It is 
systemically used as a weapon of war, a tool of ethnic cleansing and genocide or a mechanism of 
female subordination, which indicates the existence of intent and the workings of a collective 
enterprise. Furthermore, sexual violence is rarely expressly ordered or expressly mentioned as the 
objective of a common criminal plan, which makes it difficult to link the high-ranked officials and 
masterminds to sexual violence committed by others. Building on the discussion in the previous 
chapter, I set out the duty as I see it, in this chapter, under international criminal law to prosecute 
sexual violence and to ensure the reasonable prospect of a conviction in accordance with my second 
research question. I conduct this discussion by referring to the Rome Statute as well as the ICTR 
and ICTY Statutes. Within this chapter and in pursuit of my third research question, I furthermore 
albeit briefly set out under which international crimes, acts of sexual violence have been prosecuted 
by referring to the above-mentioned international instruments and relevant case law.  
Furthermore, each international crime has its own matrix of elements that need to be established 
beyond a reasonable doubt, before a conviction can be secured. These elements are also set out 
below. Thereafter, I conduct an investigation into the current manner in which the international 
community prosecutes acts of sexual violence through an evaluation of cases from the ad hoc 
tribunals. Subsequently, the presumed difficulties experienced in prosecuting acts of sexual 
violence under international criminal law will be revealed, in pursuit of my fourth research 
question. The aim being to understand how to better secure convictions for acts of sexual violence.  
  
 
3 2 The duty to prosecute acts of sexual violence under international criminal law.  
 
As discussed in chapter two, the prevalence and multiplicity of sexual violence worldwide paints a 
grave picture. Sexual violence is a serious crime that warrants prosecution. The ICC and the ad hoc 
tribunals were created with the specific purpose of prosecuting “serious violations” of international 
humanitarian law.
259
  The preamble to the Rome Statute furthermore states that serious crimes must 
be punished and prosecuted.
260
 In addition, articles 1 and 5 of the Rome Statute create an obligation 
to prosecute serious crimes.
261
 Non-prosecution of sexual violence is therefore damaging to the 
legitimacy of international criminal law because it breaches an international obligation to prosecute 
and punish serious violations. Unsuccessful prosecution, arguably lessens confidence in the 
international justice system.   
Ever since the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (“IMT”) and the IMTFE criminal 
prosecution under international law has mainly focused on the conduct of high-ranked officials and 
masterminds who in some manner contribute to the commission of the crime but who are not the 
physical perpetrators.
262
 The criminal responsibility of the physical perpetrator, the one who carries 
                                                          
259
 Art 1 of the ICTR Statute (1994) 33 ILM 1598; art 1 of the ICTY (1993) 32 ILM 1159. 
260
 The preamble of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90: “[T]he most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured.” 
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 The Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90.  
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 Goy (2012) ICL Rev 2. 
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out the actus reus of crime, will appear in the evaluation of the case law, however it falls beyond 
the scope of this analysis because their criminal responsibility is easier to establish. Instead, I shall 
focus on high-ranked officials and masterminds who did not physically perpetrate act of sexual 
violence yet they could nonetheless be viewed as, at least partly, responsible for the act based on 
their knowledge, intention and contribution. These individuals possess a degree of control over their 
subordinates, wield influence over the circumstances or the general public, plan or contribute to the 
execution of an underlying purpose that includes the commission of an international crime. The 
Rome Statute obligates the international community to hold all those who are responsible for grave 
crimes liable for their involvement even if they did not physically commit the offence 
themselves.
263
 For instance, the ICTY Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v Furundžija (“Furundžija”) 
during a discussion on distinguishing the perpetration of torture from aiding and abetting torture, 
found that in “modern times the infliction of torture typically involves a large number of people, 
each performing his or her individual function”.264  Furthermore, the ICTY found that there is a 
modern trend in State practice where each stage of the torture process is the responsibility of a 
different person, in order to intentionally “compartmentalise and dilute the moral and psychological 
burden of perpetrating torture”.265 I contend that international criminal law therefore has to “take 
account of these modern trends” when attributing individual criminal responsibility, in line with the 
teleological construction of the rules of culpability.
266
 Therefore the nature of the crime, the forms it 
takes and the intensity of the condemnation of such acts require that all who participate in some 
degree and share in the underlying purpose of the torture must be held equally accountable, albeit 
their sentences may differ.
267
 Arguably, a similar approach should apply to the systemic use of 
sexual violence. However, while the collective nature of the commission of international crimes 
must be considered when determining the most suitable remedy, the degree of liability depends on 
the contribution and intent of the particular accused.
268
 
 
3 3 The different international crimes under which acts of sexual violence are prosecuted   
 
Under international criminal law, rape and sexual violence are not prosecuted as sexual offences as 
such but instead are indicted as war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and violations of 
article 3 of the Geneva Convention, as listed under article 5 of the Rome Statute.
269
 The charge 
under which the sexual offence is brought depends on the surrounding circumstances and the intent 
of the accused or a group of accused. The statutes of the ICC and the ad hoc tribunals place specific 
sexual acts under each international crime. The differentiation is important because each 
international crime holds its own set of elements and standards that need to be satisfied in order to 
secure a conviction. For instance, the crime of rape is defined by the ad hoc tribunals as non-
consensual penetration of another person‟s mouth with the penis of the perpetrator or penetration of 
                                                          
263
 Arts 1, 25, 86 and 93 of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90. Particularly, art 86 ie the General obligation to 
cooperate requires that: “States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Statute, cooperate fully with the 
Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.” 
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 Prosecutor v Furundžija IT-95-17/1 (1998) para 250. 
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 Para 253.  
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 Para 254. 
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the vagina or anus with the penis of the perpetrator or an object.
273
 Furthermore, the ICC, in 
accordance with the Elements of Crimes defines rape as being committed when: “[t]he perpetrator 
invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the 
body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the 
victim with any object or any other part of the body.”274 Therefore the objective element (actus 
reus) that amounts to the prima facie criminal conduct is the unlawful and non-consensual 
penetration of a sexual organ of another person. The subjective element (mens rea) is satisfied 
where the person committed the crime with knowledge and intent.
275
 In general mens rea could be 
satisfied by various states of mind; including, knowledge, intent or a combination of the two. 
However, article 30 of the Rome Statute, which sets out the general element of mens rea as it 
applies to all the crimes in the statute, requires that the actus reus must be committed with intent 
and knowledge.
276
 
However, in order for rape and other acts of sexual violence to constitute an international crime, 
additional requirements must be met. For instance, for rape to amount to a crime against humanity; 
the conduct must have been “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population” and the perpetrator must be aware thereof.277 Alternatively, for rape to 
amount to an act of genocide; the perpetrator must have caused serious bodily of mental harm to 
persons belonging to “a particular national, ethnical, racial or religious group” with the specific 
intent to destroy that group as a whole or in part.
278
  Without this specific and additional intent, a 
crime of genocide has not been committed. The accused can then be charged with a lesser crime or 
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 The ICTY Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v Kajelijeli ICTR-98-44A-T (2003) paras 908-909 accepted the Furundžija-
Kunarac definition of rape, following the Prosecutor v Kunarac (Appeal Judgement) T-96-23/1-A (12 June 2002) 
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ICTR in Akayesu (paras 597-598) defined rape as “a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under 
circumstances which are coercive. Sexual violence, which includes rape is considered to be any act of a sexual nature 
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181) accepted a more detailed definition of rape as the “forcible sexual penetration of the human body by the penis or 
the forcible insertion of any other object into either the vagina or the anus”. Furthermore, the ICTR in Musema (para 
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Finally, the ICTY in Prosecutor v Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic (Judgement) IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T (22 February 
2001) para 412 and the Kunarac Appeal (para 128) substantially modified Furundžija definition. 
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 International Criminal Court (ICC), “Elements of Crimes” (adopted on 9 September 2002) pursuant to article 9(1) of 
the Rome Statute ICC Doc ICC-ASP/1/3 108, UN Doc PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000) 8 <www.icc-cpi.int> (accessed 
7-05-2015). 
275
 1 cf art 30 of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90. 
276
 Art 30 of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90. 
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 ICC, “Elements of Crimes” (adopted on 9 September 2002) pursuant to article 9(1) of the Rome Statute ICC Doc 
ICC-ASP/1/3 at 108, UN Doc PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000) 8. The Elements of Crimes is a supplementary document 
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document assists the ICC in interpreting and applying the international crimes as listed in articles 6 through 8 of the 
Rome Statute.  
278
 2. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
34 
 
under national jurisdiction for the rape.
279
  Otherwise, rape and other acts of sexual violence can 
amount to war crimes where the crime was directed against protected persons such as civilians, the 
offence occurred in the context of armed conflict or associated with armed conflict and the accused 
was aware of these factual circumstances.
281
  Consequently, while the latter requires that the act of 
sexual violence be committed during armed conflict, the international crimes of genocide and 
crimes against humanity do not require a nexus to armed conflict.
282
 Nonetheless, all of the 
international crimes, despite their elements, are offences for conduct that are “impermissible under 
generally applicable international law” and the “most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole”.283  
 
3 4 The difficulty in securing a conviction for acts of sexual violence under international 
criminal law 
 
Despite the commission of sexual violence during war being a grave and independent crime, sexual 
violence during war has traditionally been viewed as collateral damage; the conduct of a rogue 
individual.
284
 Chinkin posits that despite its prohibition, incidences of rape have been ignored as 
“unfortunate but inevitable side-effects of conflict”.285 Gardam and Jarvis argue that acts of sexual 
violence that occur during armed conflict are prevalent and prohibited yet not prosecuted.
286
 Obote-
Odora adds that the IMT and IMTFE did not prosecute rape as an independent crime; rapes were 
seen as the “spoils of war” not international crimes.287 According to Chinkin, rape was therefore 
largely invisible during the IMTFE and IMT.
288
 However, in 1998 and 2000, sexual violence was 
recognised as amounting to an international crime by the ICTR and the ICTY respectively. The ad 
hoc tribunals effectively placed sexual violence on the international agenda by establishing that 
sexual violence may constitute various international crimes. Nonetheless, the ICC, the ICTY, the 
ICTR and the ECCC have arguably indicted, successfully prosecuted and upheld very few sexual 
violence convictions on appeal.
289
 Van Schaack referring to the ICC in Prosecutor v Lubanga 
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ICC-ASP/1/3 at 108, UN Doc PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000) 14, 18 and 28.  
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 Haffajee (2006) Harv J L & Gender 204 cf Anonymous “Human Rights Watch Applauds Rwanda Rape Verdict: 
Sets International Precedent for Punishing Sexual Violence as a War Crime” (3 September 1998) Human Rights Watch 
<http://www.hrw.org/news/1998/09/02/human-rights-watch-applauds-rwanda-rape-verdict> (accessed 31-03-2014). 
285
 Chinkin (1994) 5 EJIL 334. 
286
 Haffajee (2006) Harv J L & Gender 203 cf Gardam & Jarvis Women, Armed Conflict, and International Law (2001) 
152–153.  
287
 Obote-Odora (2005) New Eng J Int‟l L & Comp L 143. 
288
 Chinkin (1994) 5 EJIL 334. 
289
 Haffajee (2006) Harv J L & Gender 203 cf Gardam & Jarvis Women, Armed Conflict, and International Law (2001) 
152–153: argue that acts of sexual violence that occurred during armed conflict were prevalent and prohibited yet not 
prosecuted; B van Schaack “Atrocity Crimes Litigation: 2008 Year-In-Review” (2009) 7 Northwestern Journal of 
International Human Rights 170 207 cf Prosecutor v Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-1229-AnxA Written Submissions of 
the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict Submitted in 
Application of Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (18 March 2008) ICC <http://www.icc-
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(“Lubanga”) states that “the absence of gender violence crimes in the Lubanga indictment 
prompted criticism from advocates for gender justice, including Radhika Coomaraswamy, the U.N. 
Special Representative on Children and Armed Conflict”.290  
Haffajee, Van Schaack, Gardam and Jarvis therefore all highlight an existing problem in 
international criminal law ie that very few acts of sexual violence are successfully prosecuted and 
upheld on appeal.
291
 For example, in Katanga the ICC acquitted the accused of all sex-related 
charges.
292
 Usacka J warned, during the charge confirmation, that the evidence was not strong 
enough to establish substantial grounds to believe that the accused were criminally responsible for 
the crimes of rape and sexual violence.
293
 In addition, the ICC stated in the Katanga Confirmation 
Decision that general evidence on the prevalence acts of sexual violence in the area provided an 
insufficient base to infer the accused‟s knowledge or intent (subjective elements).294 Interestingly, 
in what appears to be an attempt to develop the law, the prosecutor of the ICC in the Prosecutor‟s 
Darfur Submission furthermore attempted to establish that the accused acted with a genocidal intent 
by relying on evidence of the scale of the violence and witnesses attesting to staggering proof of 
sexual violence.
295
  However, the issuance of an arrest warrant was denied due to the prosecutor‟s 
inability to reasonably establish that the accused actually committed the crime.
296
 Furthermore, the 
ICTR in Musema, which will be discussed in greater detail below, found that the accused was guilty 
of rape as a crime against humanity, yet the conviction was overturned on appeal due to the inability 
to prove a direct link between the accused and the rape, beyond a reasonable doubt.
297
 The 
prosecution was unable to link Musema to the crime because they could not prove; that the physical 
perpetrator had heard Musema‟s call to commit rape and acted in response to it.298  The prosecution 
were also unable to prove a hierarchical relationship between Musema and the physical perpetrator 
and Musema‟s knowledge that rape was occurring.299 The verdict in Prosecutor v Kajelijeli 
(“Kajelijeli”) moreover shows that it is presently only possible, within the context of the ICTR, to 
secure a conviction where the prosecution can establish a clear link between the accused and the 
sexual offence.
300
  Indicators of such a link include physical perpetration, a direct order given by the 
accused to rape a specific individual or finding a witness who can attest to the high-ranked official‟s 
presence and view of the incident.
301
 As is evident in Musema, Kajelijeli and the Katanga 
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 Katanga Confirmation Decision ICC-01/04-01/07-717 Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Usacka (2008) 
paras 19-22. 
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 Paras 568-569. 
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 Prosecutor‟s Darfur Submission ICC-02/05 21-36 and 45-60. 
296
 Prosecutor v Al Bashir (Pre-Trial Chamber I) ICC02/05-01/09-3 Decision on the Prosecution‟s Application for a 
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Confirmation Decision, the problem is the apparent inability of international criminal law to offer a 
successful way of establishing a legal nexus between a sexual offence, committed by another, and a 
high-ranked official.
302
 Two of the biggest hurdles in obtaining a successful conviction is 
establishing individual criminal responsibility and the requisite intent.  The difficulty in holding 
participants in the crime responsible is worrisome because effective prosecution deters the 
commission of rape.
303
  
Individual criminal responsibility refers to the “direct responsibility” of a principal perpetrator or 
an accessory.
304
 Article 25
305
 of the Rome Statute, article 6
306
 of the ICTR Statute and article 7
307
 of 
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 Prosecution v Musema ICTR-96-13-A (2000) para 968; Katanga Confirmation Decision ICC-01/04-01/07-717 
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 Obote-Odora (2005) New Eng J Int‟l L & Comp L 139 cf Wood (2004) Colum J Gender & L 276. 
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 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cali L Rev 102. 
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 Art 6 of the ICTR Statute (1994) 33 ILM 1598: “1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or 
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present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime. 2. The official position of any accused person, whether 
as Head of State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal 
responsibility nor mitigate punishment. 3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute 
was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had 
reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the 
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 Art 7 of the ICTY Statute (1993) 32 ILM 1159: “1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or 
otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the 
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as Head of State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal 
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the ICTY Statute describe individual criminal responsibility. The modes of liability as well as the 
forms of perpetration and participation are set out under these provisions. The degree of liability 
attributed to the accused depends on the form of participation and the participants‟ subjective state 
of mind. For instance, aiding and abetting are forms of participation that usually indicate accessorial 
liability, while co-perpetration and physical perpetration indicate principal liability.
  
Haffajee, 
referring to Kajelijeli, avers that establishing principal liability is especially difficult when the 
accused was neither present nor the one who carried out the actus reus of the crime.
308
 However, 
the aim of international criminal law is not only to convict those responsible as accessories but 
when warranted, to hold those responsible as principal perpetrators. The conviction and punishment 
should reflect accused‟s criminal responsibility and therefore the distinction between the degrees of 
liability is important. Furthermore principal perpetrators generally receive harsher sentences. For 
example, the Appeal Chamber in the Prosecutor v Krstić (“Krstić Appeal”) overturned Krstić‟s 
conviction as a co-perpetrator and replaced with a conviction as an aider and abettor, which in turn 
decreased his sentencing from forty-five to thirty-five years of imprisonment.
 309 
 
3 5 An analysis of international case law pertaining to rape and other acts of sexual 
violence   
 
3 5 1 Prosecutor v Furundžija 1998 and 2000 
 
The ICTY Trial Chamber in Furundžija, found that Furundžija was the commander of the Jokers, a 
special unity of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia known as the Croatian Defence Council 
(“HVO”). The HVO arrested and detained Witness A, a Moslem civilian.310 The Trial Chamber also 
found that Furundžija was an active combatant who fought against the Muslim community and 
expelled Muslims from their homes.
311
 In addition, Accused B was found to be a commander of one 
of the HVO units.
312
   
On the 15
th
 of May 1993, or there about, at the Jokers Headquarters in Nadioci, Accused B 
allegedly assaulted and caused Witness D severe physical and mental suffering.
313
 In addition, 
Accused B allegedly threatened, raped, sexually and physically assaulted Witness A, while 
Furundžija interrogated Witness A and D.314  The ICTY Trial Chamber found that Furundžija was 
present in the room where Witness A was interrogated while she was naked.
315
 While Furundžija 
was questioning a naked Witness A, Accused B rubbed his knife along her thigh as he threatened to 
cut her and to insert his knife into her vagina if she did not answer Furundžija.316 Furundžija 
continued to interrogate Witness A and threatened her with the visit of Witness D.
317
 Witness A and 
Witness D were friends, therefore seeing each other being injured would be torturous for both of 
them.
318 
 The ICTY Trial Chamber also found that Furundžija was present in the pantry where they 
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311
 Para 262.  
312
 Para 262.  
313
 Para 263.  
314
 Para 263 cf Prosecutor v Furundžija (Amended Indictment) IT-95-17/1-PT (2 June 1998) paras 25-26. 
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later confronted Witness A by bringing Witness D into the same room.
319
 Furthermore, the Trial 
Chamber found that Furundžija interrogated both Witness A and D, while Accused B hit them with 
batons.
320
 In the presence of Furundžija‟s soldiers and other soldiers, Accused B raped Witness A 
orally, vaginally and anally before forcing her to lick his penis clean.
321
  Furundžija‟s interrogation 
of Witness A intensified as Accused B‟s abuse of Witness A intensified.322 The interrogation by 
Furundžija and the abuse by Accused B therefore became one process, according to the ICTY.323 
The physical assault of Witness D together with him being forced to watch the rape and sexual 
assault of a friend, Witness A, caused the severe physical and mental suffering of Witness D.
324 
In 
addition, the ICTY found that the physical attacks and threats to inflict severe injury, caused 
physical and mental suffering to Witness A.
325
  These harmful acts were inflicted with both 
Furundžija and Accused B‟s intent to gain information that would benefit the HVO.326 The intention 
to obtain information satisfies one of the listed purposes of torture.
327
 The Trial Chamber therefore 
found Furundžija, “by virtue of his interrogation of [Witness A] as an integral part of torture”, 
guilty as a co-perpetrator under count thirteen ie torture as a violation of laws or customs of war 
under article 3 of the Statute.
328
 The ICTY Appeal Chamber confirmed these factual findings and 
that Furundžija‟s actions constituted an act of torture because the context within which the 
questioning occurred was intimidating, humiliating and devastating for Witness A and therefore 
amounted to a severe injury that caused severe physical and mental suffering.
329
 
The ICTY found that Witness D‟s evidence supported Witness A‟s evidence with regards to the 
rape and concluded that all the elements of Witness A‟s rape have been satisfied.330 The sexual 
assault and rape were committed publically and therefore the ICTY Trial Chamber found that 
Witness A suffered severe physical and mental harm and endured public humiliation, due to 
Accused B‟s actions, which amounted to outrages upon personal dignity and sexual integrity.331 
Furundžija did not physically rape or co-perpetrate the rape of Witness A, however he did 
encourage Accused B with his presence and continued interrogation, which amounted to a 
substantial contribution to Accused B‟s conduct.332 The ICTY Trial Chamber therefore found that 
Furundžija aided and abetted the rape of Witness A and he was therefore individually criminally 
responsible and found guilty under count fourteen of the indictment ie outrages upon her personal 
dignity, including rape, as a violation of laws or customs of war under article 3 of the ICTY 
Statute.
333
 
Furundžija clearly demonstrates the ICTY‟s understanding of the distinction between aiding and 
abetting versus co-perpetration.  The prosecution proposed criminal responsibility under article 7(1) 
of the ICTY Statute, in the indictment and opening statement, but did not refer to the exact form of 
participation. The prosecution consequentially left the determination to the discretion of the Trial 
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Chamber.
334
 In the absence of treaty law, the ICTY looked to customary international law to 
establish whether the presence of the accused, while Witness A was assaulted by another, satisfied 
the requisite mens rea and amounted to participation by fulfilling the actus reus of aiding and 
abetting.
335 
 Furthermore, the ICTY tried to establish the nature of the assistance and whether this 
form of assistance could amount to principal or accessory liability, by looking at case law and 
international instruments. The ICTY Trial Chamber in Furundžija referred to the the British 
Military Court for the Trial of War Criminals (“British Military Court”) based on the Royal 
Warrant, which is similar to the Control Council Law No 10 and the United States Military Tribunal 
for clarity on the distinction between principal and accessory liability.
336
  The British Military Court 
described an accomplice to murder as one who is “concerned in the killing”.337  The United States 
Military Tribunal in The United States of America v Ohlendorf , Jost, Naumann, Rasch, Schulz, Six, 
Blobel, Blume, Sandberger, Siebert, Steimle, Biberstein, Braune, Haensch, Nosske, Ott, Strauch, 
Haussmann, Klingelhöfer, Fendler, Radetzky, Rühl, Schubert & Graf (“United States v Otto 
Ohlendorf et al”) found that the acts of an aider and abettor need to have a “substantial effect” on 
the actions of the principal in order to constitute an actus reus.
338
 In United States v Otto Ohlendorf 
et al, the United States Military Tribunal found that a menial position per se does not prevent his or 
her liability where the accused knew that the crimes were occurring and the accused could 
somehow “control, prevent or modify” the activities that amount to the commission of the crime.339 
Where the accused‟s silence does not “automatically contribute to the success of any executive 
operation” he is not an accomplice.340 In United States v Otto Ohlendorf et al, Klingelhöfer and 
Fendler were found guilty of aiding and abetting war crimes and crimes against humanity because 
they knowingly and intentionally chose to do nothing, despite being in a position to hinder the 
commission through their actions or words.
341
 Whereas, Ruehl and Graf both possessed the 
requisite knowledge yet they were found not guilty as accessories because they were not in a 
position to protest against the actions of others.
342
  
The ICTY in Furundžija, referring to Tadić, stated that customary international law attributes 
criminal responsibility beyond “primary involvement” as the physical perpetrator where the 
contribution substantially effects the commission of the crime.
343
 In addition, the ICTY Trial 
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Chamber in Tadić found that in order for post-WWII Trials to establish individual criminal 
responsibility; the prosecution had to prove that the accused‟s conduct contributed to the 
commission of the crime and that the accused‟s participation “directly and substantially effected the 
commission of the crime,” which it did.344 In order to further understand these cases, the ICTR in 
Furundžija looked at the Rome Statute and the Draft Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of 
Mankind, 1996 (“Draft Code”); international instruments that at the time were not binding yet shed 
light on customary rules and represented the legal views of qualified publicists.
345
 The Rome 
Statute distinguishes participating in a common purpose or common enterprise as a co-perpetrator 
from aiding and abetting.
346
 A co-perpetrator intentionally contributes towards the commission or 
attempted commission of a crime by a group acting in common purpose, with the aim of furthering 
the common purpose or with knowledge of the group‟s intention to commit the crime.347 An aider 
and abettor provides the means, assists, aids or abets the commission or attempted commission of 
the crime in order to facilitate its commission.
348
 The Draft Code clearly expresses that direct and 
substantial facilitation does not exclude “marginal participation” and does not require that the 
actions of the accused be a conductio sine qua non ie but for the actions of the accused the crime 
would not have occurred.
349
 Both the Draft Code and the Rome Statute agree that physical or moral 
support or encouragement can amount to a direct and substantial contribution or assistance and 
thereby accomplice liability.
350
  
In conclusion, the ICTY Trial Chamber in Furundžija, found that an accused‟s moral support 
and encouragement displayed through his continued presence amounted to complicity where his or 
her presence significantly encouraged or legitimised the commission of the crime.
351
 In addition, the 
ICTY confirmed that “directly” did not require that the accused‟s actions be a conductio sine qua 
non but rather that his or her actions should have a substantial effect on the commission of the 
crime, which may be satisfied by practical assistance, encouragement or moral support depending 
on the circumstances and the accused‟s position.352 However Furundžija was not merely present; he 
also interrogated Witness A, while Accused B simultaneously tortured her, with knowledge of each-
others‟ actions and they both shared in the common purpose to obtain information from Witness 
A.
353
 Therefore Furundžija‟s assistance with knowledge of the torture that would otherwise amount 
to aiding and abetting, amounted to co-perpetration because Furundžija also partook in the “purpose 
behind the torture”.354 The ICTY explains that an interrogator, even if he does not lay a hand on the 
victim, is equally as guilty as the one who physically assaults the victim because they both share in 
the purpose behind the torture.
355
 The criminal law maxim quls per allum facit per se ipsum facere 
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videtur is applicable here; ie “he who acts through others is regarded and acting himself”.356 The 
ICTY Trial Chamber therefore convicted Furundžija as a co-perpetrator for torture.357 The tribunal, 
in cases involving torture, usually attributes liability as a co-perpetrator not complicity to the 
accused, unless the accused was only the driver or the supplier of food.
358
 The broad approach to 
liability for acts of torture is based on the nature of the crime, the forms that torture can take and the 
intense international condemnation of torture.
359
  
 
3 5 2 Prosecutor v Musema 2000 and 2001 
 
The Rwandan genocide took place from the 1
st
 of January to the 31
st
 of December 1994.
360
 During 
this time, the ICTR Trial Chamber found that:  
 
“Musema was a member of the “conseil préfectorial” in Byumba Préfecture and a member 
of the Technical Committee in the Butare Commune. Both positions of responsibility 
involved socio-economic and developmental matters and did not focus on préfectorial 
politics.”361 
 
 The ICTR Appeal Chamber in Prosecutor v Musema (“Musema Appeal”) also found that Musema 
was “a socially and politically prominent person in Gisovu Commune”.362 While holding these 
positions, Musema allegedly ordered and abetted the rape of Annunciata on one day and personally 
raped Nyiramusugi then proceeded to incite her gang-rape, on another day. Musema was therefore 
charged with four different counts for the rape of two different women. The first incident occurred 
on the 26
th
 of April 1994.
363
  Musema allegedly ordered the rape of Annunciata, a Tutsi woman, 
while leading and participating in the attack on Gitwa Hill.
364
 For this crime, Musema was charged 
with genocide and the complicity in genocide for ordering and abetting, in concert with others, the 
rape of Annunciata.
365
 However; the prosecution failed to provide evidence that the order was 
executed to produce rape.
366
 
The second incident was perpetrated on the 13
th
 of May 1994.
367
 On this day, during a large-
scale attack in Muyira Hill against forty thousand Tutsi refugees, Musema allegedly raped 
Nyiramusugi.
368
 At the time that Musema allegedly contributed to the attack in Muyira Hill and 
raped Nyiramusugi, he was also the Director of the Gisovu Tea factory.
369
  Through his position as 
Director, he possessed de jure and de facto power over the factory‟s employees.370 The testimony of 
witnesses evidenced beyond a reasonable doubt that many of the attackers were wearing their 
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Gisovu Tea Factory uniforms and some arrived in Daihatsu vehicles belonging to the Gisovu Tea 
Factory.
371
 In addition, the witnesses testified that Musema was present as one of the leaders of the 
attack and welding a rifle.
372
  Despite his control he failed to take reasonable measures to prevent or 
punish his subordinates.
373
 The ICTR in the Musema Appeal found that Musema was individual 
criminal responsibility, pursuant to article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute, for the non-sexual crimes 
committed by his employees.
374
 During this attack, a policeman told Musema that Nyiramusugi, a 
Tutsi woman and a teacher, had survived to which Musema requested that she be brought to him.
375
 
With the help of four other men, Nyiramusugi was dragged to an armed Musema, they proceeded to 
pin down her limbs and open her legs so that Musema could rape her.
 376
  Before doing so Musema 
said loudly: “[t]he pride of the Tutsi is going to end today”.377  Nyiramusugi struggled against her 
attacker but Musema restricted her breathing and raped her, while the four men watched and 
thereafter each proceeded to rape her before they left her for dead.
378
 Based on Musema‟s 
declaration before raping Nyiramusugi, his authoritative positions and his participation, the ICTR 
inferred his intent to destroy the Tutsi ethnic group, which included rape and sexual violence as an 
integral part of the plan.
379
 The ICTR therefore established that Musema possessed individual 
criminal responsibility and incurred principal liability, pursuant to article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute, 
for the rape of Nyiramusugi, in concert with others.
380
 The rape was classified as an act of genocide 
for its causation of serious bodily and mental harm.
381
 In addition, the ICTR established the 
individual criminal responsibility, pursuant to article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute, of Musema for 
aiding and abetting the other men to rape her by the example he set by carrying out the actus reus of 
rape in front of them.
382
 Musema, however; avoided criminal responsibility for sexual violations 
committed by others, pursuant to article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute, because the prosecution did not 
lead evidence pertaining to an existing superior-subordinate relationship.
383
 However, together with 
evidence pertaining to non-sexual crimes, Musema therefore incurred individual criminal 
responsibility under article 6(1) and (3) of the ICTR Statute for the crime of genocide, a crime 
punishable under article 2(3)(a) of the Statute.
384
 Therefore Musema only incurred criminal 
responsibility, under article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute for the actions of his subordinates, pertaining 
to non-sexual crimes.  
On a separate charge of crimes against humanity, based on the same factual evidence of 
Nyiramusugi‟s rape, the defense admitted that the Tutsi population was a racial or ethnic group who 
were targeted by widespread or systematic attacks throughout Rwanda.
385
 The ICTR therefore 
found that the prosecution was discharged with proving these elements with regards to rape as a 
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crime against humanity.
386
 The ICTR in Musema found that Musema personally raped Nyiramusugi 
on the 13
th
 May 1994, while having knowledge of the widespread or systematic attack against the 
civilian population.
387
 In addition, the ICTR found that the rape fell within the ambit of the systemic 
attack against the Tutsis.
388
  The ICTR therefore established Musema‟s individual criminal 
responsibility and found him guilty of rape as a crime against humanity, pursuant to article 3(g) and 
article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute.
389
 This conviction, based on the contradictory nature of new 
witnesses, was overturned on appeal.
390
 The Trial Chamber also found Musema not guilty of the 
rapes committed by his subordinates, pursuant to article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute.
391
   
The ICTR Trial Chamber stated that when trying to establish superior responsibility under 
article 6(3) of the ICTR statute, the prosecution must prove that the accused; possessed de facto or 
de jure authority amounting to effective control over the physical perpetrators, that despite his 
control he did not take reasonable steps to prevent the crime from occurring or punish those who 
already committed the crime and that he knew or ought to know that said crime was occurring.
 392
  
In addition, the accused must possess the requisite mens rea being his or her own personal criminal 
intent as well as the specific intent required of the international crime under which he or she is 
being charged.
393
 The ICTR in Musema found that the prosecution failed to establish that Musema 
knew or should have known that his subordinates were raping and that he consequently failed to 
take reasonable measure to prevent further rapes or punish the already committed rapes.
394
  The 
prosecution failed to link Musema to the rape committed by others by failing to establish his 
superior responsibility pursuant to article 3(g) and article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute.
395
  
 
3 5 3 Prosecutor v Semanza 2003 and 2005 
 
The prosecution in Semanza alleged that Semanza “organized, executed, directed, and personally 
participated in attacks, which included killings, serious bodily or mental harm, and sexual violence, 
at four locations in Bicumbi and Gikoro communes during the month of April 1994” during the 
Rwandan genocide.
396
 In addition, the prosecution alleged that Semanza acted with the intent to 
destroy the Tutsi population in Rwanda as an ethnic group and his “acts formed part of a 
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widespread or systematic attack against the Tutsi civilian population on political, ethnic, or racial 
grounds and that these acts were committed during and in conjunction with a non-international 
armed conflict in the territory of Rwanda” between its Government and the RPF.397 Semanza was 
charged with fourteen counts of genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious violations of 
Common article 3 and the Additional Protocol I.
398
 I however, have only focused on the counts 
pertaining to sexual violence in the following section. According to the prosecution, Semanza‟s 
responsibility arose from crimes committed at four distinct places and times; the Ruhanga church in 
Gikoro on the 10 April 1994, the Musha church in Gikoro between the 9 and 13 April 1994, the 
Mwulire Hill in Bicumbi between 7 and 20 April 1994 and the Mabare mosque in Bicumbi 
commune on about the 12 April 1994.
399
 These crimes included the rape and commission of other 
outrages upon personal dignity against Tutsi women by militiamen, including the Interahamwe and 
the rape of two women and the death of one of them, in Gikoro commune, between 7 and 30 April 
1994.
400
 The relevant incidences involved two victims, Victim A who was raped
401
 and tortured
402
 
and Victim B who was raped and murdered.
403
 Semanza contributed to these crimes by delivering a 
speech to the militiamen, including the Interahamwe. According to Witness VV, Semanza delivered 
a speech on the 13 April 1994 just prior to departing for the attack on Musha church.
404
  
For all the counts, except for incitement to commit genocide and complicity in genocide, 
Musema was charged cumulatively with persona1 responsibility pursuant to article 6(1) and with 
superior responsibility under article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute.
405
 Semanza was a member of the 
Central Committee of the National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development 
(“MRND”) and elected as the MRND representative to the National Assembly.406 He had also been 
the bourgemestre of the Bicumbe commune for more than twenty years when he was replaced by 
Juvenal Rugambarara in 1993.
407
 Consequently, he was an influential person in his community; 
both in the Bicumbe commune and the neighbouring Gikoro commune. From 1991 to 1994 he 
chaired meetings, during which he allegedly threatened the Tutsi people who were not MRND 
members.
408
 In addition, from 1991 to 1994 Semanza aided and participated in the distribution of 
weapons and training of the MRND Interahamwe.
409
 The ICTR Trial Chamber found that the 
prosecution failed to prove that Semanza held the position of MRND chairperson as well as the 
nature and scope of his appointment to the transitional government therefore the prosecution failed 
to establish de jure authority over the alleged perpetrators.
410
 The Trial Chamber however found 
that Semanza was widely viewed as an influential man.
411
 Nonetheless the Trial Chamber, referring 
to Musema, stated that the accused‟s general influence in the community was insufficient to 
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establish effective control.
412
 Effective control, according to the ICTR Trial Chamber, is only 
established where a formal or informal hierarchy exists between the accused and the direct 
participants.
413
 In addition, the prosecution failed to establish that Semanza possessed the material 
ability to prevent crimes or punish the perpetrators.
414
 The ICTR Trial Chamber concluded that the 
prosecution did not establish a superior-subordinate relationship and therefore Semanza did not 
obtain criminal responsibility under superior liability, pursuant to article 6(3) or for ordering, 
pursuant to article 6(1).
415
  
Semanza was charged with count eight ie rape of civilians as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack against a civilian population political, ethnic or racial grounds and thereby a crime against 
humanity.
416
 In the indictment the prosecution alleged that Semanza instigated, ordered and 
encouraged militiamen, including the Interahamwe, to rape or commit other outrages upon personal 
dignity against Tutsi women in Bicumbi and Gikoro communes, between the 6
th
 and 30
th
 of April 
1994.
417
 The ICTR found that Semanza addressed the crowd, including military authorities, asking 
them how the work of killing the Tutsis was progressing and added that that they must rape the 
Tutsi women before killing them.
418
  Furthermore, the ICTR also found that immediately thereafter, 
as a result of Semanza‟s comments, one of the men knowingly raped Victim A as part of a 
widespread attack against the Tutsi people and two of the men murdered Victim B.
419
 The ICTR 
Trial Chamber found that because insufficient notice was given to the accused pertaining to count 
eight ie the rape in the Bicumbe and Gikoro communes, liability could not be attributed to Semanza 
for rape as a crime against humanity.
420
  
In addition, Semanza was charged with count ten ie instigating rape of Victim A and Victim B as 
part of a widespread systematic attack against a civilian population political, ethnic or racial 
grounds and thereby a crime against humanity.
421
 The ICTR Trial Chamber found that Victim A‟s 
rapist was part of the audience that Semanza addressed.
422
 Due to the factual findings that the rape 
occurred immediately after Musema‟s speech and that the physical perpetrator heard Semanza‟s 
speech, the ICTR Trial Chamber found that Semanza‟s actions were “causally connected and 
substantially connected to the actions of the principal perpetrator”.423 In support of this finding the 
physical perpetrator testified that he thought that Semanza had given him permission to rape.
 424
 
Therefore Semanza‟s words and actions were clearly linked to the commission of the rape.425 
Furthermore the ICTR Trial Chamber found that Semanza made these comments with the intent and 
awareness that they would influence and encourage the commission of rape as part of the 
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widespread attack against the civilian population.
426
 The ICTR Trial Chamber therefore found that 
Semanza instigated the commission of rape by encouraging such conduct and that he was therefore 
guilty of rape as a crime against humanity.
427
 The ICTR Appeals Chamber confirmed the conviction 
for rape as a crime against humanity under count ten.
428
  
Based on the same set of facts as above, Semanza was also charged with count eleven ie torture 
as a crime against humanity.
429
 The ICTR found that the physical perpetrator inflicted “severe 
mental suffering sufficient to form the material element of torture” by raping Victim A in 
circumstances which already cultivated an “extreme level of fear”.430 The rape was committed 
against Victim A because she was a Tutsi woman.
 431
 The pain was therefore inflicted on the basis 
of ethnicity, which is one of the recognised grounds of torture.
432
 The perpetrator acknowledged 
that he acted on the encouragement of Semanza and therefore the ICTR Trial Chamber found that 
Semanza‟s comments “had a substantial effect on the rape and torture,” which amounted to 
instigation.
433
 Furthermore, Semanza‟s societal standing and the presence of authority figures while 
he delivered his speech, legitimised his instigation and gave it greater force.
434
 The ICTR Trial 
Chamber therefore found that Semanza was criminally responsible for instigating the torture of 
Victim A and he was therefore convicted of torture as a crime against humanity.
435
 The ICTR 
Appeals Chamber affirmed Semanza‟s conviction for torture.436  
Additionally, Semanza was also charged with count thirteen ie causing violence to life, health 
and physical or mental well-being of persons, including rape, as serious violation of article 3 
common to the Geneva Conventions, based on the same set of facts as above.
437
 The Trial Chamber 
found that Semanza was responsible for “causing violence to life, health and physical or mental 
well-being of persons” and thereby committed a serious violation of article 3 common to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.
438
 However, no conviction was entered under count 
thirteen because of the concurrence with count ten, eleven and twelve.
439
 Nonetheless, the ICTR 
Appeal Chamber reversed the acquittal under count thirteen. 
 
3 5 4 Prosecutor v Kajelijeli 2003 and 2005  
 
Equally during the Rwandan genocide, due to the circumstances surrounding the commission of 
rape, the ICTR found that the rape of at least four women were committed in the course of a 
widespread attack against the Tutsi population and therefore amounted to crimes against 
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humanity.
440
 However, Kajelijeli‟s individual criminal responsibility for the sexual crimes was in 
dispute. Therefore I shall, in this specific case, first set out the surrounding circumstances of the 
widespread attack and Kajelijeli‟s involvement in the attacks before discussing his criminal 
responsibility for the acts of sexual violence. From 1988 to 1993, Kajelijeli served as the 
bourgmestre of the Mukingo commune.
441
 Thereafter from 1988 to 1993 he served as the 
bourgmestre in the Ruhengeri préfecture and he returned to the Mukingo commune as the 
bourgmestre in June 1994 until mid-July 1994.
442
  The prosecution of Kajelijeli involved the 
murder and attack of the Tutsi people from the 7
th
 to the 14
th
 of April 1994. At a meeting on the 6
th
 
April 1994, in the wake of the death of the President of the Republic of Rwanda, Kajelijeli blamed 
the Tutsi‟s for the death and incited revenge by saying: “what are you waiting for to eliminate the 
enemy?”443 The next morning Kajelijeli reminded those present at the Nkuli commune Office of 
their decision last night “to act”.444 On the 7th April 1994, approximately eighty Tutsis living in the 
Kinyababab cellule were killed.
445
 The ICTR found that this attack was carried out in furtherance of 
the consensus reached the previous night where the accused was present.
446
 Witness GDD and 
others reported back to Kajelijeli after the attack saying that they had “eliminated everything”.447 In 
addition, on the same morning at the Byangabo market, Kajelijeli assembled the Interahamwe and 
ordered them to exterminate the Tutsis in Rwankeri.
448
 Thereafter, Kajelijeli directed the 
Interahamwe from the Byangabo market towards Rwankeri cellule to join the attack in Busogo 
cellule, Mukingo commune.
449
 The attacks in the broader Busogo area killed approximately eighty 
Tutsi families.
450
 The attackers at Busogo Hill formed part of a group of people who were attacking 
the 80 Tutsi families in Busogo.
451
 Due to Kajelijeli‟s direction and liaising with the Mukamira 
camp for military and weapons assistance, the ICTR Trial Chamber found that he participated in the 
attack.
452
  
Furthermore, the ICTR found that Witness GDD, an Interahamwe member, murdered eight 
Tutsis in the Gitwa sector in the Nkuli commune, in furtherance of Kajelijeli‟s order to “fine comb” 
the Nkuli commune for Tutsis.
 453
 Additionally, children, women and men were attacked and killed 
on the 7
th
 of April at Munyemvano‟s compound in Rwankerie cellule, Mukingo commune.454 The 
ICTR found that Kajelijeli was present during the attack and that through his position of authority 
over the Interahamwe he also ordered, supervised and commanded the attack against the Tutsi 
civilians on the 7
th
 of April 1994 in the Mukingo commune.
455
 The ICTR found that a massacre of 
the Tutsi people, involving the Interahamwe, also occurred on the 7
th
 of April 1994, at the Nuns‟ 
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compound at Busogo Parish.
456
  Later, when searching for survivors, Witness GBH heard the 
Kajelijeli say that “it was necessary to continue, look for those or hunt those who had survived”.457 
The ICTR Trial Chamber found that all the attacks in the Mukingo and Nkuli communes were 
systematically directed at killing the Tutsi civilians.
458
 Moreover, the ICTR found that on or near 
the 14
th
 of April 1994, members of the Interahamwe killed approximately three hundred Tutsis at 
the Ruhengeri Court of Appeal.
459
 The ICTR found that Kajelijeli played a “vital role” by 
organizing and facilitating the Interahamwe and other attackers; through the procurement of 
weapons, mobilizing the Interahamwe and providing petrol so that they could get to the Ruhengeri 
Court of Appeal.
460
  
The ICTR Trial Chamber therefore found that mass killings of the Tutsi civilian group took place 
in Mukingo commune, Nkuli commune and Ruhengeri Court of Appeal in Kigombe commune, 
during April 1994.
461
 The Tutsi population were targeted and intentionally destroyed as a civilian 
population and an ethnic group.
462
 Kajelijelis‟s words and actions showed that he participated with 
the intention to destroy the Tutsi group.
463
 The ICTR concluded that Kajelijeli was therefore 
individually criminally responsible for the instigating, ordering, and aiding and abetting the killing 
and extermination of the Tutsi people in the Mukingo, Nkuli and Kigombe communes, pursuant to 
article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute, with the requisite intent.
464
 The ICTR Trial Chamber therefore 
found Kajelijeli guilty of count two ie genocide pursuant to article 2(3)(a) of the ICTR Statute.
465
 In 
addition, these attacks also constituted a widespread attack against the Tutsi civilian ethnic group.
466
 
The ICTR found that Kajelijeli, with full knowledge that his actions forming part of the widespread 
attack based on the circumstances, directed the attacks at areas where large groups of Tutsis had 
gathered.
467
 Consequently, hundreds of Tutsis were therefore exterminated as a result of Kajelijeli‟s 
participation by ordering, aiding and supervising the attacks.
468
 Accordingly, Kajelijeli was also 
guilty of count six ie extermination as crime against humanity.
469
 In addition, the ICTR found that 
the accused was a leader of the Interahamwe, with control over the Interahamwe in the Mukingo 
and Nkuli communes from the 1 January 1994 to July 1994, which resulted in Kajelijeli‟s liability 
as a superior for the actions of his subordinates.
470
  
Kajelijeli was also charged under count seven ie rape as a crime against humanity, pursuant to 
article 3(g) of the ICTR Statute.
471
 The ICTR found that the murder and rape of a woman named 
Joyce, on the 7
th
 of April 1994, by Interahamwe in Rwankeri was as a result of the Interahamwe 
going to the Rwankeri cellule following Kajelijeli‟s order to “exterminate the Tutsis” at the 
                                                          
456
 Para 901.  
457
 Para 827.  
458
 Para 828.  
459
 Para 902.  
460
 Para 902. 
461
 Para 903.  
462
 Paras 828 and 903.  
463
 Para 828.  
464
 Paras 842 and 905. 
465
 Para 845. 
466
 Para 903. 
467
 Para 904. 
468
 Para 904.   
469
 Para 907.  
470
 Para 780. 
471
 Paras 908-909.   
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
49 
 
Byangabo Market the previous day.
472
 In addition, the ICTR found that on the 7
th
 of April 1994 
Interahamwe members; raped Witness ACM, a Tutsi woman, in Bugogo Parish in Kabyaza cellule 
at a roadblock and raped and killed Witness GDO‟s daughter, a handicapped girl, in Rukoma cellule 
Shiringo sector.
473
 The ICTR Trial Chamber found that criminal responsibility ensues where the 
accused physically committed the crime or where the accused participated in the commission of the 
crime in other ways, ranging from planning to execution.
474
 The accused‟s participation must 
however, amount to a “substantial” contribution to the commission of the crime in order for 
criminal responsibility to ensue.
475
 Despite Kajelijeli‟s contributions; his speech on the 6th of April, 
reminding those present at the Nkuli commune Office of their decision to act, his assembly of the 
Interahamwe, his order to exterminate the Tutsis in Rwankeri, the subsequent massacre on the 7
th
 of 
April  and his direction and liaising with the Mukamira camp for military and weapons assistance 
and subsequent feedback to Kajelijeli, the majority of the ICTR found that Kajelijeli was not 
criminally responsible for acts of sexual violence.  
Kajelijeli evaded individual criminal responsibility because the prosecution neither proved that 
he specifically instructed the rape and murder of Witness GDO‟s daughter nor established 
Kajelijeli‟s presence at the scene of the crime.476 However, Ramaroson J, in a dissenting opinion, 
found that Kajelijeli‟s instructions on the 6th and 7th of April included the rape of Tutsi women.477 
Furthermore, the ICTR also found that Witness GDT, a Tutsi woman, was raped and sexually 
mutilated by members of the Interahamwe in the Susa sector, Kinigi commune, on the 7
th
 April 
1994.
478
 The ICTR, Ramaroson J dissenting, yet again found that the prosecution did not prove that 
the accused issued a specific order to rape or sexually assault Tutsi women on that day.
479
  
Moreover, the ICTR found that on the 10
th
 of April 1994, Witness GDF, a Tutsi woman, was raped 
by members of the Interahamwe in the Susa sector, Kinigi commune.
480
 The ICTR yet again was 
not convinced that Kajelijeli was present during the rape of Witness GDF and therefore criminal 
responsibility did not ensue.
481
 Despite the fact that four females were raped, the ICTR found that 
“the Prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Kajelijeli either planned, instigated, 
ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of the 
rapes”.482 The prosecution therefore failed to link Kajelijeli to the crimes. The majority of the ICTR, 
Ramaroson J dissenting, found Kajelijeli not guilty of rape as a crime against humanity.
483
 
On the same set of facts as stated above, the ICTR Trial Chamber found that Interahamwe 
members raped and killed Joyce at the Rwankeri cellule on the 7
th
 of April 1994.
484
 Kajelijeli was 
therefore charged with count nine ie other inhumane acts as a crime against humanity.
485
 The ICTR 
also found that Interahamwe members pierced her side and sexual organs with a spear and 
thereafter covered her dead body with her skirt.
486
 In addition, the ICTR found that a Tutsi girl 
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named Nyiramburanga was mutilated by an Interahamwe member who cut off her breast and then 
proceeded to lick it, at Rwankeri cellule, on the 7
th
 of April 1994.
487
 The Trial Chamber concluded 
that these inhumane sexual acts constitute “a serious attack against human dignity of the Tutsi 
community as a whole”.488 Piercing a woman‟s sexual organs and cutting off her breast were 
“nefarious acts of a comparable gravity to the other acts listed as crimes against humanity, which 
would clearly cause great mental suffering to any members of the Tutsi community who observed 
them”.489 Due to the surrounding circumstances, the ICTR found that the sexually-related acts were 
committed as part of the widespread attack against the Tutsi civilian population.
490
 Despite the 
commission and gravity of the sexual acts, Kajelijeli avoided liability because the prosecution did 
not prove that he was present or that he gave a direct order for its commission, pursuant to articles 
6(1) and 6(3) of the ICTR Statute.
491
 Kajelijeli was therefore not guilty of other inhumane acts as a 
crime against humanity.
492
 In Kajelijeli v The Prosecutor (“Kajelijeli Appeal”), the ICTR Appeals 
Chamber confirmed the Trial Chambers convictions and acquittals, as set out above.
493
 
Ramaroson J, in her dissenting opinion, found that Kajelijeli was guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt of rape as a crime against humanity, pursuant to article 3(g), article 6(1) and article 6(3) of 
the ICTR Statute based on the evidence presented by the prosecution in the indictment and during 
the trial.
494
  Paragraph 5.3 and 5.5 of the indictment, on the events at the Ruhengeri prefecture, 
reads as follows:  
 
“From April to July 1994, many Tutsi men, women and children were attacked, abducted, 
raped and massacred in their residence or at their place of shelter within the Mukingo 
commune or arrested, detained and later murdered. The Accused commanded, organized, 
supervised and participated in these attacks. The Accused ordered and witnessed the raping 
and other sexual assaults on the Tutsi females. At all the times material to this indictment, 
the Accused, as a person in authority over the attackers failed to take any measure to stop 
these nefarious acts on the Tutsi females.”495  
 
According to Ramaroson J, the term “participated” was used in Kajelijeli‟s indictment to explain his 
involvement in the charges brought against him, including under count seven ie rape as a crime 
against humanity.
496
 According to the ICTY in Prosecutor v Celebici (“Celebici”), this term is 
broad enough to include all the forms of participation under article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute.
497
 
Ramaroson J proposes that Kajelijeli was an accomplice to rape as a crime against humanity 
because there was sufficient evidence to establish that Kajelijeli participated in the form of 
instigation and ordering but not to the extent that he planned the perpetration of rape.
498
 Witness 
GDO testified that Kajelijeli ordered the Interahamwe to rape Tutsi women by saying: “it was 
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necessary to look for the Tutsi women, rape them and kill them” and that “they should forcefully 
rape them and then kill them” because there is a need “to separate the good grain from the bad 
ones”.499 Ramaroson J found that these words amounted to instigation by: “prompting and stirring 
up the Interahamwe to commit the crimes of rape and murder”.500 In addition, Ramaroson J found 
that Kajelijeli possessed and exercised effective control over the Interahamwe in Mukingo and 
Nkuli communes.
501
 His words therefore also amounted to an order, which he expected the 
Interahamwe to carry out. Ramaroson J is adamant that the Interahamwe members were acting on 
Kajelijeli‟s orders.502 In addition, Kajelijeli was present with the Interahamwe at the scenes where 
the numerous rapes occurred either at the time or after they were perpetrated because often dropped 
them off or sent them to these locations.
503
  
In addition to ordering, Ramaroson J argued that Kajelijeli aided these rapes by providing 
transport for the Interahamwe and moral support though his presence as an authority figure.
504
 This 
interpretation is consistent with the understanding of participation, discussed above in Furundžija. 
His presence justified and encouraged the rape and therefore amounted to a substantial contribution 
to the commission of rape.
505
 Referring to Akayesu, Ramaroson J stated that Akayesu aided and 
abetted the rape by allowing the attacks to be perpetrated just outside the premises of the bureau 
communal, while he was present and he had reason to know that they were occurring.
506
 Witness 
GBV testified to Kajelijeli‟s presence at the Rudatinya‟s house where Joyce was raped.507 Therefore 
Kajelijeli abetted and supported the rapists through his presence as an authority figure and by 
witnessing the crime.
508
 Thereby Ramasoron J concluded that “there is substantial, specific and 
corroborative evidence to sustain the allegation that Kajelijeli committed the crime” by instigating, 
ordering, aiding and abetting the commission of rape.
 509
 He is therefore criminally responsible for 
the rapes of the women, pursuant to article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute.
510
 Furthermore, the rape of 
Joyce and Kizungu happened simultaneous, at the hand of the Interahamwe, to the killings of Tutsis 
on the 7
th
 of April 1994.
511
 Arguably, the rapes occurred as a result of Kajelijeli‟s order to 
exterminate and kill the Tutsis ie as a result of executing the common criminal plan. 
 
3 6 Conclusion 
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July 2001) paras 114-115 and 134.  
508
 Prosecutor v Kajelijeli ICTR-98-44A-T Dissenting Opinion of Judge Arlette Ramaroson (2003) para 69. 
509
 Paras 73-74.  
510
 Paras 73 and 75.  
511
 Para 60.  
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The field of culpability under international criminal law should arguably be expanded to correctly 
reflect the broad scope for liability as expressed in the Rome Statute and the Statutes of the ad hoc 
tribunals. The ICC, ICTY and ICTR were created for the purpose of prosecuting serious 
international violations including rape, sexual violence, mutilation and other inhume acts as crimes 
against humanity, acts of genocide, war crimes and violations of common article 3 to the Geneva 
Conventions. The constitutive statutes should therefore be purposely interpreted and used. 
However, a conviction should not ensue where the evidence is insufficient. The tribunal or court 
should therefore ensure that all the elements of the crime have been satisfied beyond a reasonable 
doubt before liability ensues. Where charges based on acts of sexual violence are regularly being 
acquitted, it is important to the legitimacy of international criminal law and the pursuit of justice to 
investigate and establish why these prosecutions are unsuccessful. By reading and analysing the 
cases that successfully and unsuccessfully prosecuted acts of sexual violence it became evident  to 
me that where the prosecution fails to sufficiently link the accused to the crime, the charge results in 
acquittal. I confirm that the establishment of individual criminal responsibility and the requisite 
intent are the two difficulties experienced in prosecuting acts of sexual violence, as hypothesised.  
In conclusion, the ICTY Trial Chamber in Furundžija found that an accused‟s presence could 
amount to complicity where his or her presence significantly encouraged or legitimised the 
commission of the crime. In addition, a direct contribution does not require that the accused‟s 
actions be a conductio sine qua non but rather that his or her actions should have a substantial effect 
on the commission of the crime. The prosecution in Furundžija successfully convicted Furundžija, 
as a co-perpetrator, for torture as a violation of the laws and customs of war. Despite not laying a 
hand on Witness A, he was present during her rape and he continued to interrogate her throughout. 
The key to the prosecution‟s success was in establishing that Furundžija and the physical 
perpetrator (Accused B) both partook and shared in the purpose behind the torture. In addition, their 
contributions were made simultaneously with knowledge of each other‟s actions. Therefore despite 
playing different roles they were both guilty as co-perpetrators. The ICTY, in cases involving 
torture, usually attributes liability as a co-perpetrator not complicity. Arguably, this same approach 
should be used against all those who share in the underlying purpose behind the act of sexual 
violence. For instance, where rape is used as a tool to facilitate a widespread or systematic attack 
against a civilian population or the destruction of a particular group as a whole or in part.  However 
Furundžija was only convicted as an aider and abettor for outrages upon personal dignity, including 
the rape of Witness A, as a violation of the laws and customs of war because he did not physically 
penetrate Witness A or co-perpetrate her rape. Instead he encouraged Accused B with his presence 
and continued interrogation, which amounts to a substantial contribution to Accused B‟s conduct.  
ICTR in Semanza found that rape was committed as part of a widespread attack against the Tutsi 
people. Semanza displays how difficult it is to hold an accused responsible for the actions of others. 
However, the prosecution successfully convicted Semanza of instigating rape as a crime against 
humanity and instigating torture as a crimes against humanity for the rape committed by another, 
soon after his speech. Semanza was sufficiently linked to the crime because the physical perpetrator 
was an audience member that heard Semanza‟s incitement, admittedly understood it to be 
permissive and subsequently proceeded to commit an act of sexual violence due to the accused‟s 
encouragement. In addition, the ICTR easily inferred that Semanza foresaw the commission of rape 
as a consequence of his speech. Yet again the basis for linking the accused‟s speech to the physical 
perpetrators commission of rape was their shared underlying purpose to destroy the Tutsi 
population. However, despite satisfying the requirement for commission on the same evidence, 
Semanza was not convicted for committing rape because the accused did not receive sufficient 
notice of this particular charge. Arguably, the fact that the accused and the physical perpetrator 
shared in the purpose behind the sexual offence, ie the desire to destroy the Tutsi people as an 
ethnic group, should favour a broadly inclusive approach to equal liability for certain participants, 
similar to the approach for participation in torture as described in Furundžija. Semanza, also 
demonstrated how difficult it is to incur liability as a superior. The accused must possess effective 
control of the physical perpetrator, stemming from a hierarchical position, and have the material 
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ability to prevent or punish the commission. In this case, it is clear that the accused‟s influential 
standing in the community, alone, did not amount to effective control and therefore did not result in 
superior liability. 
The ICTR in Musema furthermore found that the accused‟s intent can be inferred from the 
surrounding circumstances ie the accused‟s declarations, authoritative positions and participation. 
Moreover, rape and sexual violence can be an integral part of the plan to destroy the Tutsi ethnic 
group. In addition, Musema illustrates that establishing individual criminal responsibility is the 
biggest hurdle in attributing guilt to an accused for acts of sexual violence. Where the prosecution 
can prove that the accused physically carried out the actus reus, he is liable as a principal 
perpetrator, however where the actus reus of rape was physically carried out by others, it is difficult 
to link the accused to the crimes. For example, Musema was convicted on two counts for the serious 
bodily and mental harm as an act of genocide for the multiple rape of Nyiramusugi. Firstly, he 
incurred liability as a principal for personally raping her, in concert with others, and secondly, for 
aiding and abetting others in raping her; through his position, presence, comments and his example. 
In addition, the ICTR found that Musema was individual criminal responsibility for personally 
raping Nyiramusugi and found him guilty of rape as a crime against humanity, however this 
conviction was overturned on appeal based on the contradictory testimonies of new witnesses. 
While successfully attributing individual criminal responsibility for Musema raping Nyiramusugi 
and his contribution to the rape of Nyiramusugi by others, the prosecution failed to link Musema to 
the rape of Nyiramusugi and Annunciata that were committed by others. Musema was acquitted of 
the charges of genocide and complicity in genocide for the rape of Annunciata despite a witness‟s 
testimony that the Musema ordered the rape of Annunciata because the prosecution could neither 
establish that the order to rape was heard by the physical perpetrator who actually executed the 
sexual violence nor Musema‟s knowledge of their actions. Furthermore, Musema was acquitted of 
superior-liability for the rape of Nyiramusugi because the prosecution failed to establish a superior-
subordinate relationship between Musema and the physical perpetrator of her rape as an act of 
genocide and failed to link the accused to the rape as a crimes against humanity. A person‟s social 
and political prominence in a community is not enough to establish his or her control over the 
physical perpetrators within that community. Conversely, Musema was convicted under superior 
liability, for the non-sexual genocidal crimes committed by his subordinates at Muyira Hill that 
same day. When the physical perpetrators are the accused‟s employees, who arrive in his marked 
vehicles and in their uniforms, it is enough to establish the accused‟s control and thereby his 
liability as a superior for his failure to prevent or punish his subordinates from engaging in the 
attack on Muyira Hill.  
Arguably, instead of unsuccessfully using superior liability the prosecution in Musema could 
have used the JCE doctrine, which will be discussed in the subsequent chapter, to establish the 
individual criminal responsibility of the accused, for the sexual crimes committed by others. The 
facts used to establish Musema‟s liability for non-sexual crimes such as murder as an act of 
genocide and a crime against humanity already established the existence of a common plan to 
destroy the Tutsi civilian population, Musema‟s contribution to the common purpose and his intent.  
Moreover, the ICTR already found that rape formed an integral part of the plan to destroy the Tutsis 
based on Musema‟s humiliating and racist comments. With this approach, the prosecution could 
have established Musema‟s responsibility as a principal perpetrator by establishing that the other 
physical perpetrators were either members of the JCE or used by members of the JCE to further the 
common purpose and that Musema subjectively foresaw that sexual violence would occur as a 
result of executing the common purpose. The latter should be easy to infer based on the fact that 
Musema himself raped a Tutsi women, after the attack at Muyira Hill where thousands of Tutsis 
were killed. This proposed solution shall be discussed further in chapter three. 
The ICTR in Kajelijeli clarified that international criminal law provides for the attribution of 
criminal responsibility to those who make a substantial contribution to the crime despite not carry 
out the actus reus themselves. The prosecution successfully established Kajelijeli‟s individual 
criminal responsibility for non-sexual crimes committed by others. His individual criminal 
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responsibility was evinced by his presence and participation; instigating, ordering, and aiding and 
abetting the killing and extermination of the Tutsi people in the Mukingo, Nkuli and Kigombe 
communes as an act of genocide and ordering, aiding and supervising the widespread attacks and 
extermination of the Tutsi civilian ethnic group as crimes against humanity. Despite Kajelijeli‟s 
overwhelming encouragement, contributions and involvement in the attacks on the Tutsi people 
throughout April 1994, including speeches and conversations where he directly yet broadly 
instructed and encouraged sexual violence, the ICTR found that there was not sufficient evidence to 
link him to the rape of Witness ACM, the rape and sexual mutilation of Witness GDT, the rape of 
Witness GDF, the mutilation of Nyiramburanga, the inhumane acts against Joyce and the rape of 
Witness GDO‟s daughter, who is handicapped. Therefore, while the ICTR found that the acts of 
sexual violence did in fact occur, the prosecution did not prove that the specific physical perpetrator 
was acting on Kajelijeli‟s instruction. In essence, the ICTR explained that the prosecution failed to 
prove that Kajelijeli‟s previous speeches and actions had caused the specific rape of those women 
because they did not prove that the physical perpetrators had heard him and thereafter acted 
accordingly. Furthermore, they were unable to prove his presence when the crimes were committed 
and, or, that he specifically ordered the sexual assault of that specific victim on that day.  However, 
as found in Furundžija, the contribution does not have to be a conductio sine qua non for liability as 
an aider and abettor to ensue; it need only have a substantial effect on the commission of the crime. 
In addition, the ability of the prosecution to establish incitement or superior liability was therefore 
difficult despite the existence of proof that the rape actually occurred and that Kajelijeli had 
contributed to the underlying purpose of destroying the Tutsi people on numerous occasions.  
Ramaroson J, in her dissenting opinion, opposed these acquittals and found that Kajelijeli was 
responsible for the rape of Joyce because the commission was a result of the Interahamwe going to 
the Rwankeri cellule following Kajelijeli‟s order to “exterminate the Tutsis” at the Byangabo 
Market the previous day. Further in her dissenting opinion, Ramaroson J stated that based on the 
evidence, Kajelijeli‟s presence, actions and instructions to rape Tutsi women amounted to ordering 
and instigation and therefore his liability as an accomplice to the acts of sexual violence. In 
addition, Ramaroson J found that Kajelijeli possessed effective control over the Interahamwe yet 
failed to prevent or punish the commission of sexual violence and is therefore also liable as a 
superior for ordering the acts of sexual violence.  
As discussed in chapter two, the distance created by the chain of command together with the 
absence of a direct order to commit rape makes it difficult to establish the individual criminal 
responsibility of the high-ranked officials.  The nature and context of crime therefore makes it 
inherently difficult to link the accused to the crime that is committed by another. It is easier to 
establish criminal responsibility where the prosecution can prove that the accused carried out the 
actus reus himself, expressly ordered the commission of the crime and was present when the crime 
was committed. However, where the accused‟s contribution is more removed from the commission 
of the crime it is more difficult for the prosecution to establish the link. Furthermore, I conclude that 
prosecution of sexual violence is more difficult than the prosecution of non-sexual acts because the 
prosecution was unable to establish the high-ranked official direct involvement in the commission. 
However I propose that if the ICC approaches rape like the ICTY in Furundžija approached torture 
then accused can be sufficiently linked to crime committed by another. In Furundžija the physical 
perpetrator who raped and assaulted Witness A was linked to the accused who interrogated Witness 
A by their common criminal purpose of exacting information from Witness A. In the same way, an 
accused can be linked to the physical perpetrator of rape where they both share in the underlying 
criminal purpose of genocide or attacks against a civilian population in a widespread or systematic 
manner. In these instances rape would either have to be used as a weapon to facilitate these 
underlying criminal purposes or accepted as a reasonably foreseeable consequence of implementing 
these underlying criminal purposes.  
 Individual criminal responsibility and liability should ensue where the accused‟s degree of intent 
and contribution in its entirety warrants its attribution. Therefore the criminal court or tribunal 
should consider how the nature of the crime is making it inherently difficult to secure a conviction 
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for acts of sexual violence. Arguably, exceptional yet necessary measures should be adopted or 
developed to ensure prosecutorial efficacy. These include specialised prosecutorial and evidentiary 
tools, which have the ability to ensure the greatest prospect of successful prosecution. The JCE 
doctrine is one such measure, which is discussed and evaluated in chapters four and six.   
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CHAPTER 4: THE THEORY AND APPLICATION OF THE JOINT CRIMINAL 
ENTERPRISE DOCTRINE 
 
4 1 Introduction 
  
In this chapter, I attempt to set out the theory and application of the JCE doctrine in pursuance of 
my fifth research question. The aim is to understand the JCE doctrine and discover if and how it can 
be used to establish criminal responsibility of an accused who did not physically perpetrate acts of 
sexual violence in accordance with my sixth research question. Case law from the ICTY and ICTR 
is utilised to demonstrate the origin of the JCE doctrine as well as the various characteristics and 
tests of each category. Academic articles written by Haffajee, Goy, Danner and Martinez are 
utilised to form a foundation for a discussion about the proposed utilisation of the JCE doctrine in 
establishing criminal responsibility for acts of sexual violence and its conceptualisation as a form of 
commission. The first sub-chapter aims at establishing what the JCE doctrine is and its origin. 
Thereafter the manner in which each of the three categories can be used to construct criminal 
responsibility and the difference between principal and accessory liability is briefly discussed. 
Subsequently the application of the JCE is explored. Case law from the ad hoc tribunals illustrate 
the application of the JCE doctrine with regards to acts of sexual violence. The aim is to establish 
whether the JCE doctrine can be used to address the systematic use of sexual violence and establish 
the individual criminal responsibility, under international criminal law, of high-ranked officials who 
did not carry out the actus reus of the crime. In addition, I aim to discover which category of the 
JCE doctrine is most suited to the prosecution of acts of sexual violence. The investigation might 
also indicate if and where the doctrine is falling short.  
 
4 2 The JCE doctrine and its origin 
 
JCE is a form of “common purpose or common plan liability”.512 The JCE doctrine is therefore an 
“individual criminal responsibility theory in international criminal law”513 that enables the 
attribution of liability for participation in a JCE ie a “form of crime commission”.514 The JCE 
doctrine is only applicable to crimes with multiple perpetrators who participate in the same criminal 
conduct, under a common purpose, and who share the same intent. In Martić Appeal the ICTY 
stated that “crimes contemplated in the [ICTY] Statute mostly constitute the manifestations of 
collective criminality and are often carried out by groups of individuals acting in pursuance of a 
common criminal design or purpose”.515 This doctrine considers each member of the common plan 
responsible for the crimes committed by other members.
516
  
There is uncertainty as to the origin and legitimacy of the JCE doctrine.
517
 With regards to the 
latter, a contribution to a JCE is neither expressly mentioned as a form of participation nor a mode 
                                                          
512
 Haffajee (2006) Harv J L & Gender 212. 
513
 212 cf Prosecutor v Furundžija IT-95-17/1-A (2000); Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A (1999); Prosecutor v KvoČka et 
al IT-98-30/1-T (2001); Prosecutor v Krstić IT-98-33-T (2001); Prosecutor v Furundžija IT-95-17/1-T (1998); 
Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-T (1997); Prosecutor v Karemera ICTR-98-44-I (2005). 
514
 Haffajee (2006) Harv J L & Gender 212. 
515
 Prosecutor v Martić IT-95-11-A (2008) para 82.  
516
 Goy (2012) ICL Rev 28 cf Prosecutor v Vasiljević IT-98-32-A (2004) para 111.  
517
 Haffajee (2006) Harv J L & Gender 219. 
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of liability in the Rome Statute or the Statutes of the ICTY or the ICTR.
518
 Yet the Appeal Chamber 
of the ICTY in the Tadić Appeal and the Appeal Chamber of the ICTR in Prosecutor v 
Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana (“Ntakiruitmana Appeal”) read participating in a JCE into the 
respective articles concerning individual criminal responsibility.
519
 In addition, both ad hoc 
tribunals found that participating in a JCE is also a form of liability that exists in customary 
international law.
520
  On that note, the ICTY in Prosecutor v Milutinović, Ojdanić & Sainovic 
(“Milutinović Appeal”) argued for the general use of the JCE doctrine, within the context of the 
individual criminal responsibility, because it finds its origin in customary international law.
521
 
Cassese also finds authority for the use of JCE in customary international law, pre-dating 1975.
522
 
His opinion is based on the use of common purpose in case law since WWII and the use of JCE 
liability in the domestic law of France and Cambodia.
523
 In addition, Goy cites the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber in the Tadić Appeal,524 Prosecutor v Brđanin525 (“Brđanin Appeal”) and the Prosecutor v 
Krajišnik 526 (“Krajišnik Appeal”) as well as the ICTR Appeals Chamber in Karemera & 
Ngirumpaste v The Prosecutor
527
 (“Karemera Appeal”) as support for the JCE doctrine‟s origin in 
customary international law.
528
 This finding gives the JCE doctrine legitimacy because customary 
international law, although not codified is “evidence of general practice accepted as law” and is 
therefore legally binding.
 529
  
    
  
                                                          
518
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cali L Rev 103. See also Prosecutor v Karemera & Ngirumpatse (Judgement and 
Sentencing) ICTR-98-44-T (2 February 2012) para 1433. 
519
 Prosecutor v Karemera & Ngirumpatse ICTR-98-44-T (2012) para 1433 cf Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A (1999) 
paras 188 and 195-226; Prosecutor v Ntakirutimana & Ntakirutimana ICTR-96-10-A and ICTR-96-17-A (2004) paras 
461-462, 466 and 468.  
520
 Prosecutor v Karemera & Ngirumpatse ICTR-98-44-T (2012) para 1433 cf Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A (1999) 
paras 188 and 195-226; Prosecutor v Ntakirutimana & Ntakirutimana ICTR-96-10-A and ICTR-96-17-A (2004) paras 
461-462, 466 and 468.  
521
 Prosecutor v Ojdanić et al IT-99-37-AR72 Separate Opinion of Judge David Hunt on Challenge by Ojdanić to 
Jurisdiction Joint Criminal Enterprise (2003) 6; S Powles “Joint Criminal Enterprise: Criminal Liability by 
Prosecutorial Ingenuity and Judicial Creativity?” (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 606 614–615. 
522
 Haffajee (2006) Harv J L & Gender 223 cf Prosecutor v Kaing Guek Eav Invitation to Amicus Curiae 001/18-07-
2007-ECCC/OCIJ (23 September 2008) 4. 
523
 Haffajee (2006) Harv J L & Gender 223 cf Prosecutor v Kaing Guek Eav 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (2008) 4. 
524
 Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A (1999) paras 194-220. 
525
 Prosecutor v Brđanin (Appeal Judgement) IT-99-36-A (3 April 2007) paras 363 and 410. 
526
 Prosecutor v Krajišnik (Appeal Judgement) IT-00-39-A (17 March 2009) paras 290 and 659. 
527
 Karemera & Ngirumpaste v The Prosecutor (Appeals Decision) ICTR-98-44-AR72 51, ICTR-98-44-AR72 6 
Decision on Jurisdictional Appeals: Joint Criminal Enterprise (12 April 2006) para 16. 
528
 Goy (2012) ICL Rev 27. 
529
 RMM Wallace & O Martin-Ortega International Law (2009) 1 8-9 cf art 8(1)(b) of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice Annexed to the Charter of the United Nations 59 Stat 1055 1060 TS No 993 (18 April 1946): Over 
time, the interactions between states and practices of states have “crystallised into rules of customary international law”. 
A rule of custom exists where both state practice (usus) and the subjective conviction that compliance is mandatory not 
discretionary (opinio juris sive neccessitatis), can be established.  See also Wallace & Martin-Ortega International Law 
(2009) 10: State practice should therefore be “extensive and virtually uniform” and should occur in a manner that shows 
“as general recognition” that a “rule of law or legal obligation is involved”.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
58 
 
4 3 The different categories of the JCE doctrine 
 
There are three main categories within the JCE doctrine.
530
 Each applies to different circumstances. 
Danner and Martinez sourced the origin of the three categories of the JCE doctrine in customary 
international law derived from the case law of post-WWII military courts.
531
 The three categories, 
discussed below, were later set out in the separate opinion of Hunt J in the Milutinović Appeal.532 
These categories have different requirements and differ in the scope of the involvement required. 
Category one (the basic form) is the most widely used and accepted construction.
533
 In order to 
incur liability under category one, the accused is required to participate in implementing the group‟s 
common objective that includes the commission of a crime under the ICTY Statute.
534
 In 
Haradinaj, the ICTY concluded that liability ensues when “[a]n individual intentionally acts 
collectively with others to commit international crimes pursuant to a common plan.”535 The ICTY 
in the Tadić Appeal stated that: 
 
“The first such category is represented by cases where all co-defendants, acting pursuant to 
a common design, possess the same criminal intention; for instance, the formulation of a 
plan among the co-perpetrators to kill, where, in effecting this common design (and even if 
each co-perpetrator carries out a different role within it), they nevertheless all possess the 
intent to kill. The objective and subjective prerequisites for imputing criminal 
responsibility to a participant who did not, or cannot be proven to have, effected the killing 
are as follows: (i) the accused must voluntarily participate in one aspect of the common 
design (for instance, by inflicting non-fatal violence upon the victim, or by providing 
material assistance to or facilitating the activities of his co-perpetrators); and (ii) the 
accused, even if not personally effecting the killing, must nevertheless intend this 
result.”536 
 
Category one is therefore used to attribute liability to an accused for crimes that fall within the 
common purpose of the JCE yet are committed by another. 
In Haradinaj, the ICTY concluded that category two “provides for liability for individuals who 
contribute to the maintenance or essential functions of a criminal institution or system, such as a 
concentration or detention camp”.537 Category two falls beyond the scope of this research as it 
applies in contexts where criminal responsibility can easily be established by the control and 
responsibility of the official exercised during captivity. In the same case, the ICTY concluded 
further that category three “provides for extended liability, not only for crimes intentionally 
                                                          
530
 Prosecutor v Haradinaj IT-04-84-T (2008) paras 135-139. 
531
  Danner & Martinez (2005) 93 Cal L Rev 105. 
532
 Prosecutor v Ojdanić et al IT-99-37-AR72 Separate Opinion of Hunt J on Challenge by Ojdanić (2003). 
533
 Prosecutor v Zigiranyirazo ICTR-01-73-T (2008) paras 407-408 and 468: The accused was convicted for 
participating in JCE to commit genocide, using category one. The ICTR found that “[t]he implementation of the 
massacre was possible due to prior planning, which gave rise to the inference that a common criminal purpose existed.” 
Furthermore, they “inferred that the accused shared the common purpose due to his conduct and circumstances; his 
stature, well-received speech and his presence while the massacre was underway.” He was sentenced to twenty years 
imprisonment.
 
 
534
 Bostedt (2007) 6 CJIL 417 cf Prosecutor v Krajišnik IT-00-39-T (2006) para 4. 
535
 Prosecutor v Haradinaj IT-04-84-T (2008) paras 135-139.  
536
 Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A (1999) para 196. 
537
 Prosecutor v Haradinaj IT-04-84-T (2008) paras 135-139. See also Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A (1999) paras 202-
203. 
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committed pursuant to the common design, but also for crimes that were the natural and foreseeable 
consequence of implementing the common design”.538  
Consequently, those who participate in the JCE risk criminal responsibility for the undesired yet 
foreseeable crimes that result from implementing the JCE ie the common plan or purpose.
539
 The 
ICTR, in the Karemera Appeal refers to these crimes as “deviatory crimes” because they do not 
form part of the common purpose yet they are a natural foreseeable consequence of executing the 
common purpose (executing the actus reus).
540
  Furthermore, Cassese refers to these crimes as un-
concerted crimes.
541
 According to the interpretation found in Haradinaj of JCE category three, the 
crime for which the accused is being tried, need therefore not be the crime as desired by the 
common objective of the group. Haffajee sets out a test to secure criminal responsibility under 
category three.
542
 In the circumstances where “[o]bjectively the crime is part of the natural and 
foreseeable consequence of the execution of the JCE” and the accused was subjectively aware of 
the possible consequence yet he or she reconciled himself or herself with the possibility and 
participated nonetheless, the accused is individually criminally responsible.
543
 Furthermore, Cassese 
describes liability under JCE category three as “incidental criminal liability based on foresight and 
voluntary assumption of risk”.544 The accused must have subjectively been privy to information or 
be in “a position to expect with reasonable certainty” that the deviant or incidental crime might 
occur.
545
 Cassese explains that although the accused did not share the mens rea of the physical 
perpetrator, he or she foresaw the event and willingly took the risk that it might come about.
 546
 The 
accused‟s subjective knowledge and foresight should be established or at least inferred from the 
facts of the case.
547
  Alternatively, the accused should at least be “in a position, under the „man of 
reasonable prudence‟ test, to predict the rape”.548 For instance, the ICTY in the Tadić Appeal found 
that all members can incur criminal responsibility for the deviatory crime if he or she foresaw that 
the crime was a predictable consequence of executing the common plan and thereafter acted 
recklessly or “indifferent to that risk”.549 The ICTR in the Karemera Appeal, in addition to the 
requirements set out in Haradinaj, also required that the accused make a significant contribution to 
the common purpose of the JCE, with the intention to further the common purpose, before criminal 
responsibility and liability can ensue.
550
 In line herewith, the ICTY in the Tadić Appeal found some 
members responsible for crimes within the common purpose only, while others were deemed 
responsible for the deviatory crimes as well as the crimes within the common purpose.
551
 The ICTY 
                                                          
538
 Prosecutor v Haradinaj IT-04-84-T (2008) paras 135-139.  
539
 Paras 135-139. See also Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A (1999) para 204:  Category three “concerns cases involving a 
common design to pursue one course of conduct where one of the perpetrators commits an act which, while outside the 
common design, was nevertheless a natural and foreseeable consequence of the effecting of that common purpose”. 
540
 Prosecutor v Karemera & Ngirumpatse (Appeal Judgement) ICTR-98-44-A (29 September 2014) para 623. 
541
 Cassese (2007) J Int'l Crim Just 113. 
542
 Haffajee (2006) Harv J L & Gender 214 cf Prosecutor v Ojdanić et al IT-99-37-AR72 Separate Opinion of Hunt J 
on Challenge by Ojdanić (2003) 11. 
543
 Haffajee (2006) Harv J L & Gender 214 cf Prosecutor v Ojdanić et al IT-99-37-AR72 Separate Opinion of Hunt J 
on Challenge by Ojdanić (2003) 11. 
544
 Cassese (2007) J Int'l Crim Just 113.  
545
 113.  
546
 113.  
547
 113.  
548
 113.  
549
 Prosecutor v Tadić ICTY IT-94-1-A (1999) para 204.  
550
 Prosecutor v Karemera & Ngirumpatse ICTR-98-44-A (2014) para 634. 
551
 Prosecutor v Tadić ICTY IT-94-1-A (1999) para 213. 
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Appeal Chamber reiterated that it is important to determine guilt based on the accused‟s particular 
role, for instance; the accused‟s status, conduct, role and his or her ability to foresee the deviatory 
crime.
552
 Arguably, both the Karemera and the Tadić Appeals preserve the principle of personal 
culpability when applying JCE category three. The principle of culpability, in this context, is 
discussed in greater detail in chapters five and six.  
 
4 4 Participation in a common purpose as a form of commission 
  
The participation in a common purpose as a form of commission is central to the understanding the 
JCE doctrine. As discussed in chapter three, article 25 of the Rome Statute, article 6
 
of the ICTR 
Statute and article 7 of the ICTY Statute describe the forms of participation that give rise to 
individual criminal responsibility.
 553
 The ICTY in Prosecutor v KvoČka, Omarska, Keraterm & 
Trnopolje (“KvoČka Appeal”)554 and in the Milutinović Appeal555 as well as the ICTR Appeals 
Chamber in the Ntakiruitmana Appeal
556
 stated that participation in a JCE is recognised as a form of 
commission. Goy, referring to the ICTY in the Tadić Appeal, clarifies that committing could 
include physical perpetration, participation in a JCE or playing an integral part, while carrying out 
the crime with others.
557
 Furthermore, the ICTY found that participating in the implementation of 
the JCE (common purpose or plan) could amount to a commission of war crimes, genocide, crimes 
against humanity and violations of the Geneva Conventions.
558
 Moreover, the ICTR in Prosecutor v 
Karemera and Ngirumpatse (“Karemera”) makes it very clear that direct participation, as provided 
for by article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute, includes but is not limited to physical perpetration.
559
 Any 
act that is as integral to the commission of the crime as the physical perpetration itself amounts to 
direct participation and, where the other elements have also been satisfied, principal liability.
560
 
According to the ad hoc tribunals, a person‟s involvement in a JCE is therefore a form of direct 
criminal responsibility.
561
 Haffajee therefore correctly notes that the ICTY Appeals Chamber found 
that article 7 provides a “sufficient base for JCE as a form of criminal liability”.562  
The ICC recognises three forms of commission, which amount to principal perpetration; 
committing an act as an individual, committing an act jointly with another and committing an act 
                                                          
552
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553
 Art 25 of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90; art 6 of the ICTR Statute (1994) 33 ILM 1598; art 7 of the ICTY 
Statute (1993) 32 ILM 1159. 
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Enterprise (2003) para 20. 
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 Goy (2012) ICL Rev 8 cf Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A (1999) para 188: “This provision covers first and foremost 
the physical perpetration of a crime by the offender himself, or the culpable omission of an act that was mandated by a 
rule of criminal law.  However, the commission of one of the crimes envisaged in Articles 2, 3, 4 or 5 of the Statute 
might also occur through participation in the realisation of a common design or purpose.” 
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 Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A (1999) para 188. 
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 Para 1607.  See also Prosecutor v Furundžija IT-95-17/1-T (1998) para 252: To be convicted as a co-perpetrator, the 
accused “must participate in an integral part” of the crime. This was reiterated in Prosecutor v Furundžija IT-95-17/1-A 
(2000) para 118. 
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through another.
563
 Goy, by referring to Prosecutor v Lubanga (“Lubanga Confirmation Decision”), 
explains that article 25(3) of the Rome Statute divides individual criminal responsibility into 
principal and accessory liability.
564
 Article 25(3)(a) amounting to the former and article 25(3)(b)-(d) 
relating to the latter.
565
 This is known as the differentiation model, which will be discussed in 
greater detail in chapters five and six.
566
 Article 25(3)(d)(i)-(ii) of the Rome Statute attributes 
criminal responsibility to individuals for contributing to the commission or attempted commission 
of a crime by a group with a common purpose. Additionally, the crime must be prohibited by the 
Rome Statute and the contribution must be intentional and with the aim of “furthering a criminal 
activity or purpose”567 or with the knowledge that the group intended to commit a crime.568 In the 
following sub-chapter I dully investigate how the ad hoc tribunals have given content to these 
provisions through their interpretations and application of the law.  
 
4 5 The application of the JCE doctrine  
 
Against the background provided in chapter three, it is clearly challenging to establish the 
criminal responsibility of high-ranked officials and masterminds for sexual crimes committed by 
others. The law therefore, in my opinion, needs to develop in order to attribute the relative degree of 
liability to all individuals who contribute towards the commission of international sexual crimes. 
The JCE doctrine is the proposed solution to this problem. Haffajee argues that the prosecution in 
Prosecutor v Furundžija (“Furundžija Appeal”) used the JCE doctrine to resolve “the main 
evidentiary problem” ie the inability “to directly link the accused to committing the crime”.569 
However, the Appeal Chamber did not expressly mention the JCE doctrine pertaining to Furundžija 
and Accused B. Instead it used the terms “common purpose” and “co-perpetrator” and “acting in 
concert.”570 Interestingly, van Schaack argues that the ad hoc tribunals are still experimenting with 
the scope of the JCE doctrine.
571
 According to Obote-Odora, the JCE doctrine, especially category 
three, is even more useful for the prosecution of rape than the prosecution of murder as a crime 
against humanity or an act of genocide.
572
 Danner and Martinez state that “[t]he use of JCE theory 
could offer wide discretion to prosecutors and judges in determining the scope of wrongdoing 
attributed to high-level defendants in terms of rape and sexual violence crimes”.573 The JCE 
doctrine is able to do so because it “more completely capture[s] the reality of the commission of 
                                                          
563
 Goy (2012) ICL Rev 8 cf Prosecutor v Lubanga (Pre-Trial Chamber I) ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN (29 January 2007) 
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 Werle (2007) J Int‟l C J 953. See also G Werle & B Burghardt “Establishing Degrees of Responsibility: Modes of 
Participation in Article 25 of the ICC Statute” in E van Sliedregt & S Vasiliev (eds) Pluralism in International Criminal 
Law (2014) 13. 
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 Art 25(3)(d)(i) of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90. 
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 Haffajee (2006) Harv J L & Gender 202 cf Prosecutor v Furundžija IT-95-17/1-A (2000); Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-
1-A (1999); Prosecutor v KvoČka et al IT-98-30/1-T (2001). 
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 Prosecutor v Furundžija IT-95-17/1-A (2000) paras 116 and 120. See also Prosecutor v Furundžija IT-95-17/1-T 
(1998) paras 112, 256 and 267-269. 
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 van Schaack (2009) Nw J Int‟l Hum Rts 218.  
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 Obote-Odora (2005) New Eng J Int‟l L and Comp L 139. 
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complex crimes involving numerous acts”.574 Haffajee proposes that the use of the JCE doctrine 
acknowledges rape as part of the master plan.
575
 In order to build on the potential that Haffajee, 
Obote-Odora, Danner and Martinez see in the JCE doctrine, I proceed to examine the application 
thereof within ICTR and ICTY case law, pertaining to sexual violence, below.  This investigation 
explores which form of JCE is best suited to establish criminal responsibility for acts of sexual 
violence as a central part of my research. 
  
4 5 2 Prosecutor v Krstić 2001 and 2004 
 
After Srebrenica in Bosnia and Herzegovina had fallen under Bosnian Serbian forces control in 
1995, thousands of Bosnian Muslim residents fled to Potočari in order to find protection within the 
United Nations (“UN”) compound.576  On the 11 of July 1995, approximately 20 000 to 25 000 
Bosnian Muslim refugees were gathered in Potočari; some within the UN compound and others 
seeking refuge at nearby factories and fields.
577
 The outcome of the number of refugees in this area 
at this time and the lack of resources can only be described as a humanitarian crisis.
578
 The 
refugees‟ suffering in the July heat, was aggravated by the lack of food and water.579 Furthermore, 
they were scared; over-crowding and panic even caused some to be trampled.
580
 During the 
humanitarian crisis in Potočari, crimes were committed by Serbian soldiers. The ICTY found that, 
after the take-over of Srebrenica, the Bosnian Serbs planned and implemented the transfer of 
Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly out of the enclave.
581
 In addition, the ICTY found 
that on the 12
th
 of July 1995, the Serbian soldiers engaged in an active campaign of terror by setting 
houses and haystacks on fire within view of the Bosnian Muslim refugees, which made them panic 
and want to flee.
582
 Over the course of the week, spanning from the 11
th
 to the 16
th
 of July; Bosnian 
Muslims were terrorised by the Serbian forces; Bosnian Muslim women were raped by Serbian 
forces, women, children and the elderly were separated from the men and forcibly transported to 
Tišca by bus, while the males were hunted, captured, detained and executed.583  
In Potočari, on the morning of the 12th of July 1995, the Bosnian Muslim men were separated 
from their families and taken to the “White House” by the Bosnian Serbs.584 The ICTY found that 
the separation of the men from their families was traumatic.
585
 On the 12
th
 and the 13
th
 of July the 
women, children and elderly were bussed out of Potočari to Kladanj, under the supervision of the 
Army of Republika Srpska (“VRS”) soldiers.586  As they boarded the bus they were beaten by 
Bosnian Serb soldiers.
587
 The busses were hot and over-crowed and the civilians felt fearful because 
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the villages threw stones at the busses and taunted them with the three-fingered Serb salute.
588
 Most 
of the civilians arrived safely in Tišca but then they were forced to travel on foot for several 
kilometers to Kladanj.
589
 The Dutch Bat soldiers, serving under the UN flag, successfully 
accompanied the first convoy of busses carrying the women, children and elderly; however on the 
second trip their vehicles were taken at gunpoint by Bosnian Serbs.
590
  Throughout the 12
th
 of July 
the Serb soldiers mingled through civilian crowds threatening them with death if they did not leave 
Serb country, committing acts of assault and murder.
591
 That same day a witness testified to having 
found 20 to 30 dead bodies behind the Transport Building in Potočari and another witness saw a 
child being killed with a knife and the execution of more than a 100 men behind the zinc factory by 
Bosnian Serbs.
592
 On the same day, approximately 1000 men were separated from the women, 
children and elderly at Potočari and transported to Bratunac, where they met the men who had been 
captured after attempting to reach Bosnian Muslim-held territory in the north.
593
 During their 
detention in Bratunac, individual men were called out during the night and the others could hear 
their cries and gunshots.
594
 After waiting a few days for the busses that were used to transport the 
women and children, all the men were transported to a new destination.
595
  
On the evening of the 12
th
 of July 1995, cries, screaming and shots could be heard throughout 
Potočari.596 Soldiers would take males and female away and some would not return.597 For instance, 
Witness T saw three boys being taking away and when they did not return their mother went to 
search for them only to find their throats slit.
 598
  That same night, Dutch Bat medical orderly saw 
two soldiers raping a Bosnian Muslim woman; one was standing guard while the other raped her.
599
 
The mattress and her legs were covered in blood.
600
 Some of the Bosnian Muslims saw her being 
raped but could not do anything to help because of the soldier standing guard.
601
 Additionally, they 
saw women being carried away and heard their screams.
602
 The stories of the rapes and murders 
transmitted terror throughout the communities, to the extent that some committed suicide.
603
 
Meanwhile, in Kladanj that evening, no men arrived on the busses with the women and children 
because the busses were checked on route for men.
604
 For example, Witness D was removed from 
the bus and separated from his family at a bus stop in Tišca.605  
On the 13
th
 of July, another Dutch Bat officer, saw an unarmed man being executed by Serb 
soldiers with a single gunshot to the head.
606
  This officer also heard gunshots 20-40 times every 
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hour throughout the afternoon.
607
 By 20H00 on the 13
th
 of July, all the Bosnian Muslim civilians 
had been removed from Potočari.608 During a UN visit to Potočari, on the 14th of July, not one 
living Bosnian Muslim was found.
609
 Thousands of Bosnian Muslim men were executed; some 
when and where they were captured and others after they had been detained.
610
 However, most 
“were slaughtered in carefully orchestrated mass executions,” commencing on the 13th of July 
1995.
611
  The Army of the Republika Srpska (“VRS”) soldiers participated in the mass execution on 
the 16
th
 of July 1995.
612
  
 The ICTY in Prosecutor v Krstić (“Krstić”) found that the humanitarian crisis, crimes of terror 
and the forcible transfer of women, children and the elderly, at Potočari, constituted crimes against 
humanity such as persecution and inhumane acts.
613
 Once the commission of these crimes had been 
established as fact, the prosecution set out to link Krstić to the crime by establishing his criminal 
responsibility. In this case, the ICTY recalled and confirmed that the accused‟s participation in a 
JCE, amounted to a commission under article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute that determines criminal 
responsibility as a principal perpetrator.
614
  
The ICTY concluded that due to the accused‟s presence at Potočari on the day of the evacuation 
and his presence at meetings, on the 11
th
 and 12
th
 of July 1995, where the situation was discussed 
and forcible transfer was organised “he could not but be aware of the piteous condition of the 
civilians and their mistreatments by VRS soldiers on that day”.615 The ICTY therefore inferred the 
accused‟s awareness from the circumstances. On the 12th of July 1995 General Krstić organised the 
transportation of the civilians from Potočari, he later inquired as to the number of busses in transit 
and ordered that the road they were travelling be secured.
 616
 Krstić was therefore a “key 
participant” in the transfer.617 Throughout this process he was aware that the transfer was 
involuntary.
618
 The Trial Chamber concluded that these actions amounted to the forcible transfer of 
civilians from Potočari.619 Due to factual situation, Krstic‟s awareness and his significant 
contribution to the crimes committed in Potočari against the civilian population of Srebrenica, the 
Trial Chamber agreed that his criminal responsibility was “most appropriately determined under 
article 7(1)” of the ICTY Statute.620  
Thereafter, by using the elements as laid out in the Tadić Appeal, the Trial Chamber set out to 
determine whether Krstić participated in the JCE to forcibly cleanse the Srebrenica area of Bosnian 
Muslims.
621
 The ICTY in Krstić stated that the facts of the case “compel the inference that the 
political and/or military leaders of the VRS formulated a plan to permanently remove the Bosnian 
Muslim population from Srebrenica”.622 The objective of the JCE, implemented from the 11th to the 
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13
th
 of July 1995, was to forcibly remove the Bosnian Muslims from the Srebrenica area, 
constituting ethnic cleansing.
623
 In addition, the humanitarian crisis was so closely linked to the 
forcible transfer that it also formed part of the common purpose of the JCE.
624
 The actus reus 
requirements for JCE liability had therefore been met.
625
 Consequently due to the seriousness of his 
contribution to the existing common purpose and his awareness the ICTY deemed Kristć‟s liability 
as a principal most suitable. 
The ICTY moreover stated that Krstić‟s “intent for this crime is indisputably evidenced by his 
extensive participation in it”.626 On the 11th of July 1995, Krstić visited Srebrenica and saw for 
himself that it was deserted. He found out that a huge number of civilians had fled to Potočari.627  
He later admitted that he had organised the military operation in Srebrenica yet he did not take any 
measures to ensure the basic needs and safety of the transferred civilians.
628
 The Trial Chamber 
therefore concluded that the “only plausible inference” from Krstić‟s conduct is that he knowingly 
and intentionally contributed to the creation of the humanitarian crisis that arose due to the forced 
transfer that he helped plan and implement.
629
 While determining Kristć‟s criminal responsibility 
for the humanitarian crisis and crimes of terror committed at Potočari and the subsequent forcible 
transfer of the women, children and elderly, his criminal responsibility for rape was importantly 
investigated.  
The ICTY stated that rape and sexual abuse can could serious bodily and mental harm.
630
  
During the trial, credible witnesses reported rape and killings as forms of cruel and inhumane 
treatment, which is an element of the crime of persecution under crime against humanity.
631
 
However, rape was not included in the objective of the JCE.
632
  Nonetheless the Trial Chamber 
found that rape was undoubtedly a natural and foreseeable consequence of executing the common 
purpose ie the ethnic cleansing campaign.
633
 Therefore JCE category one was not applicable, 
however category three was suitable. In addition, the Trial Chamber inferred from the 
circumstances at the time and his physical presence at the scene that Krstić “must have been aware” 
that rape was a natural and foreseeable consequence of implementing the common purpose and 
despite the risk he participated anyway.
634
 The ICTY found that the commission of rape was 
“inevitable” because there was a lack of shelter, not enough UN soldiers to provide protection, 
many regular and irregular military and paramilitary units present, the vulnerability of the refugees 
as well as the density of the crowds.
635
 The mens rea requirement for JCE liability has therefore 
been met.
636
   
The ICTY Trial Chamber therefore found Krstić guilty as a member and participant of the JCE, 
aimed at forcibly transferring the Bosnian Muslim civilians, which was catalysed by the 
humanitarian crisis.
637
 Finally, Krstić knew that the crimes were related to a widespread or 
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systematic attack against a civilian population which indicated that the accused‟s additional 
subjective awareness of the circumstances within which the crimes was committed, as an element of 
crimes against humanity, was satisfied.
638
 He intended to discriminate against the Bosnian Muslims 
and was therefore liable for inhumane acts and persecution as crimes against humanity.
639
 Krstić 
therefore incurred liability for the deviatory or un-concerted murders, rapes, beatings and abuses 
committed in the execution of the JCE at Potočari.640 In summation, the ICTY Trial Chamber found 
Krstić guilty of genocide, persecution (for murders, cruel and inhumane treatment, terrorising the 
civilian population, forcible transfer and destruction of personal property of Bosnian Muslim 
civilians) and murder as a violation of the Laws and Customs of War.
641
 The ICTY Appeal 
Chamber in the Krstić Appeal set aside his convictions as a principal and replaced it with aiding and 
abetting genocide ie count one, aiding and abetting murder as a violation of the laws or customs of 
war ie count five as well as aiding and abetting extermination and persecution committed between 
13 and 19 July 1995 ie counts three and six, respectively.
642
  
In conclusion, inferences as to the accused‟s awareness, knowledge and intent are integral to a 
successful conviction under the extended form of the JCE doctrine. The circumstances, the 
accused‟s position, his or her access to information and the notoriety and expanse of the crime can 
legitimately be used by the court to establish mens rea if it is the only reasonable conclusion. In 
addition, the significance of the accused‟s contribution to the common purpose, and other 
foreseeable yet deviatory crimes warrants criminal responsibility under article 7(1) and thereby 
liability as a principal perpetrator. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber did not find that sexual violence 
was included in the common purpose, effectively eliminating JCE category one as a means to 
establish criminal responsibility. It however, had no doubt that sexual violence was a natural 
foreseeable consequence of executing the common purpose and therefore JCE category three was 
the appropriate means to establish criminal responsibility, which it did successfully. The ICTY even 
described the commission of rape as inevitable. In addition to the objective foreseeability, the Trial 
Chamber inferred that the accused must have subjectively foreseen the possibility of rape occurring 
due to his visit to the scene of the crimes and the totality of surrounding circumstances. Therefore 
Krstić was convicted as an aider and abettor for persecution, including rape, as a crime against 
humanity pursuant to JCE category three for his intentional and significant contribution to the JCE 
despite rape being a natural foreseeable consequence of its execution.   
 
4 5 3 Prosecutor v Karemera & Ngirumpatse 2012 and 2014 
 
During the Rwandan genocide, as referred to in Musema, Semanza and Kajelijeli in sub-chapter 3 5 
above, attacks against the Tutsis occurred in the Bisesero Hills, resulting in a massacre of the Tutsi 
people.
643
 The ICTR Trial Chamber in Karemera, found that both Karemera and Ngirumpatse were 
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involved leading up to and during the massacre. On the 10
th
 of April 1994, Karemera and 
Ngirumpatse instructed the Provisional National Committee of the Interahamwe to patrol the 
roadblocks; Karemera drafted a radio broadcast and Ngirumpatse gave a radio address.
644
 On the 
11
th
 of April 1994 weapons were distributed at the Hôtel des Diplomates to the Interahamwe, with 
the consent of Ngirumpatse and Nzirorera and in the presence of Colonel Bagosora.
645
 On the 12 of 
April 1994, Nzirorera
646
 arranged with Colonel Bagosora
647
 that the weapons be issued to the 
people manning the roadblocks.
648 
Thereafter the Interim Government drafted and sent directives 
and instruction to the prefects that incited the continued killings of Tutsis and sent Karemera and 
other party leaders on “pacification tours” to address the population under the Interim 
Government‟s control.649 On or near the 18th of April 1994, Karemera ordered a search and sweep 
operation against the Tutsis in Bisesero, which was carried out and resulted in the death of many 
Tutsi civilians.
650
 Furthermore, several Interim Government ministers met at the Murambi Training 
School on the 18
th
 of April 1994 where Karemera and Ngirumpatse “instigated” the Gitarama 
delegation to stop protecting the Tutsis and to allow the killings.
651
 On the 19
th
 of April 1994, 
Interim President Sindikubwano‟s speech in Butare “urged the population of Butare to kill 
Tutsis”.652 In addition, Karemera‟s decision to replace prefect Nsabinmana with Nteziryayo was 
based on the latter‟s support for the implementation of the genocidal policy.653  
 The ICTR in Karemera, found that all the members of the JCE shared the common purpose of 
destroying the Tutsi population.
654
  The common purpose, during April of 1994 in Rwanda, 
included the direct and public incitement to commit genocide as well as the encouragement of non-
members to commit murders.
655
 The Appeal Chamber confirmed that the destruction of the Tutsi 
population was the common-criminal purpose.
656
 The Appeal Chamber also confirmed that the JCE 
materialised on the 11
th
 of April 1994 when Ngirumpatse, Nzirorera and Bagosora agreed to 
distribute weapons to the Interahamwe in Kigali.
657
 The Trial Chamber found that both Karemera 
and Ngirumpatse had made a significant contribution to further the common purpose of the JCE.
658
 
For example, the Appeal Chamber reiterated that Ngirumpatse made a significant contribution when 
he consented to the distribution of weapons to the Interahamwe in Kigali on the 11
th
 of April 1994 
and when he intimidated the local officials, who protected the Tutsi population, during a meeting at 
                                                          
644
 Para 1333.  
645
 Para 745. 
646
 Nzirorera was Ngirumpaste‟s successor and co-accused, however the proceeding against him were terminated. Paras 
745-746: Nzirorera attended the meeting at the Hôtel des Diplomates and consented to the distributions of the weapons 
to the Interahamwe.  
647
 Para 274: Colonel Bagosora was the Directeur de cabinet for the Minister of Defence, Augustin Bizimana. They 
both decided to provide training to, and visited, the military camps in Kigali, Byumba, Gisenyi and Ruhengeri. 
Karemera, Nzirorera and Ngirumpaste were aware of and complicit in, their decisions.  
648
 Para 745. 
649
 Para 946. 
650
 Para 1234.  
651
 Para 860.  
652
 Para 892.  
653
 Para 892.  
654
 Paras 1455 and 1600.  
655
 Paras 1455 and 1600.  
656
 Prosecutor v Karemera & Ngirumpatse ICTR-98-44-A (2014) paras 136-137.  
657
 Para 136. 
658
 Prosecutor v Karemera & Ngirumpatse ICTR-98-44-T (2012) paras 1455, 1457, 1458 and 1600. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
68 
 
the Murambi Training School in Gitarama prefecture on the 18
th
 of April 1994.
659
 According to the 
Appeal Chamber, Karemera also made a significant contribution by; intimidating local officials in 
Gitarama, delivering a speech in Kibuye after the Interahamwe had recently massacred over two 
thousand Tutsis in the area, his connection to the Interim Government who issued documents that 
planned and encouraged the destruction of the Tutsi population as well as his order to “mop up the 
operation” in Bisesero.660 Furthermore, the positions of the accused and their involvement in 
government meetings and actions indicated a concerted action with government officials and 
therefore amounted to a significant contribution to the common purpose.
661
  
By making a significant contribution to the JCE, Karemera and Ngirumpatse opened themselves 
up to liability for the foreseeable actions of others that fell outside of the common purpose and for 
the actions of others; members or non-members, who acted in furtherance of the common 
purpose.
662
 For example, Ngirumpatse initially consented to the distribution of weapons yet after 
leaving Rwanda his successor, Nzirorera, distributed additional weapons without Ngirumpatse‟s 
consent, which facilitated the murder of Tutsis.
663
 The ICTR found that Ngirumpatse was equally 
responsible for the killings that flowed from Nzirorera‟s distribution, because they had both 
intentionally and significantly contributed to the execution of the common purpose of the JCE and 
were therefor liable for each-others‟ actions during such execution.664 Ngirumpatse was convicted 
of genocide, under article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute, for the distribution of weapons that took place 
on the 11
th
 and 12
th
 of April 1994.
665
 However, the ICTR in the Karemera Appeal overturned 
Ngirumpatse‟s conviction under article 6(1) as an aider and abettor of genocide and a member of 
the JCE, based on the distribution of weapons in Kigali.
666
 The Appeal Chamber did nevertheless 
confirm the conviction for genocide and extermination as a crime against humanity and murder as a 
serious violation Common article 3 of the Geneva Convention and the Additional Protocol II 
pursuant to article 6(3) for the killings committed by the Interahamwe on the 12 of April 1994.
667
 
Additionally, the Appeal Chamber found that Karemera and Ngirumpatse bear superior 
responsibility for the distribution of weapons by Bagosora and therefore reversed the Trial 
Chamber‟s finding.668 The Appeal Chamber granted the prosecution‟s third ground of appeal and 
found that Ngirumpatse incurred superior responsibility for the “mopping-up” operation and the 
resulting killings in Bisesero Hills.
669
  Furthermore, the Appeal Chamber reversed the Trial 
Chambers acquittal of Karemera and conviction of Ngirumpatse for conspiracy to commit genocide, 
ie count one, by convicting Karemera and acquitting Ngirumpatse.
670
   
During the massacre of the Tutsi people in April 1994, acts of sexual violence against the Tutsi 
women were also perpetrated by the Interahamwe and soldiers on a large scale in the Kigali-ville 
prefecture, by the gendarmes in the Ruhengeri prefecture and by other militias and civilians on a 
large scale in the Gitarama prefecture, during the same time period.
671
  The ICTR found that it was 
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clear from the sheer number of incidences of sexual violence that it qualified as widespread.
672
 The 
prosecution did not lead any evidence pertaining to the physical involvement of Karemera and 
Ngirumpatse or that either had given a direct instruction to commit rape and other acts of sexual 
violence.
673
 In addition, ICTR found that sexual violence did not form part of the common purpose 
of the JCE to destroy the Tutsi population.
674
 Rather, sexual violence was committed “in the context 
of a campaign to destroy the Tutsi population”.675 Therefore JCE category one was not 
applicable.
676
 Alternatively, JCE category three offered the ability to hold members of the JCE 
criminally responsible for the crimes of other members and non-members even when those crimes 
did not form part of the common purpose if they were a natural and foreseeable consequence of 
executing the common purpose. The ICTR in the Karemera Appeal confirmed that a conviction for 
deviatory crimes is possible under JCE category three.
677
 In order to establish liability under JCE 
category three, the prosecution had to prove that the accused subjectively foresaw the possibility of 
acts of sexual violence being committed in the execution of the common purpose and despite the 
risk the accused significantly and intentionally contributed to the common purpose, nonetheless. As 
discussed above, Karemera and Ngirumpatse made numerous significant contributions in 
furtherance of the JCE. The Appeal Chamber clarified that the Trial Chamber did not need to 
establish that the accused had contributed to each crime but rather that he had made a significant 
contribution to the common purpose.
678
  
In order to establish awareness, the ICTR in Karemera looked at the position of the accused, the 
accused‟s presence, actions and comments as well as his access to information.679 Ngirumpatse and 
Karemera held the position of Minister of Defence and Minister of Interiors, respectively, within the 
MRND; a political party which was operating as Interim Government.
680
 Due to their authoritative 
positions they were privy to the information concerning the security and administration of the area.  
Karemera was present in Rwanda during the genocide, while Ngirumpatse was absent during 
certain periods yet this did not disrupt his access to information. In addition, Karemera travelled to 
the Kibuye prefecture where he addressed the public.
681
 Karemera also admitted that “soldiers rape 
women so it would be ridiculous to think that they do not rape during war”.682 In doing so he 
admitted that rape was foreseeable and that he was personally aware of the possibility of rape 
occurring. The ICTR agreed with Karemera stating that there is a “heightened risk that the strong 
will abuse the weak during a war when law and order is suspended”.683 The ICTR added that: 
“soldiers and other combatants, if not restricted by superiors, will commit rapes against women and 
girls of the opposite party to the conflict”. 684 In addition, because the very people who were 
exterminating the Tutsi were also committing acts of sexual violence, the ICTR concluded that 
sexual violence is a natural and foreseeable consequence of executing the campaign to destroy the 
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Tutsi population.
685
 The ICTR in the Karemera Appeal found that the Trial Chamber‟s 
determination that rape was a natural foreseeable consequence of executing the JCE was 
reasonable.
686
  
The Trial Chamber also established that the accused were aware that acts of sexual violence 
would be perpetrated by non-members while implementing the common purpose of the JCE.
687
 The 
Appeals Chamber confirmed that in order for a member to incur liability for the actions of non-
members, one of the members must use the non-member to carry out the actus reus of a crime that 
furthers the common purpose of the JCE.
688
 Despite Karemera and Ngirumpatse‟s awareness, 
neither submitted evidence with regards to the efforts to stop and punish the perpetrators of sexual 
violence.
689
 Therefore the ICTR concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Karemera and 
Ngirumpatse were aware that widespread sexual violence was a possible consequence of executing 
the JCE, ie the extermination of the Tutsi population, yet they “willingly took a risk by continuing 
to participate in the campaign despite widespread occurrences”.690   
The Appeals Chamber recalled that knowledge of the deviatory crime, followed by continued 
participation in the JCE, allows the court to infer the physical perpetrator‟s intent.691 The Appeal 
Chamber explained that the shared intention (mens rea) and purpose was established by looking at 
the scale of the attacks, systematic nature and public targeting, of the Tutsi population.
692
  This 
conclusion was based on; the systematic nature of the attacks against predominantly Tutsi women 
and girls, the identity of perpetrators for sexual violence and extermination of the Tutsi civilians 
overlapped, the attacks were large scale and many women were killed after being sexually assaulted 
or raped.
693
 Furthermore, the ICTR inferred from the horrific surrounding circumstances that the 
acts of sexual violence lacked consent and that the perpetrator would have been aware of this.
694
 In 
addition, the Appeals Chamber found that the rape and sexual assault were used to amplify the level 
of suffering experienced by the victims, their families and their communities.
695
 Therefore sexual 
violence was found to be “intricately linked” to killing the Tutsi population and inflicting additional 
suffering to the group.
696
 The Appeal Chamber thus concluded that the Trial Chamber had 
“adequately explained and reasonably concluded” that the perpetrators of rape and sexual assault 
possessed genocidal intent.
697
 
The ICTR in the Karemera Appeal, found that the indictment did not need to identify all the 
physical perpetrators of the crimes yet must identify the members of the JCE.
698
 Therefore the broad 
terms “Interahamwe” and “militia”, used in the indictment, were acceptable terms to identify the 
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physical perpetrators who were non-JCE members.
699
 Furthermore, the indictment had to be 
specific enough to notify the accused and enable him or her to prepare his or her defence.
700
 The 
degree of specificity required was relaxed where the crime has been committed over a large scale, 
over a large area and a set period of time by numerous perpetrators.
701
 The ICTR had to balance the 
difficulty of obtaining specifics with the accused‟s right to be informed.702 This is supported by the 
findings of the MICT in Prosecutor v Ngirabatware (“Ngirabatware Appeal”). In this case, the 
MICT stated that when determining whether the notice is sufficient one must look at the indictment 
as a whole.
703
  The ICTR Appeal Chamber in the Karemera Appeal similarly found that the notice 
of the use of JCE in the indictment was not defective.
704
  
The Trial Chamber found that Karemera and Ngirumpatse were responsible for the commission 
rape and sexual assault against Tutsi women in Ruhengeri préfecture during early-mid April 1994, 
Kigali-ville préfecture during April 1994, Butare préfecture during mid-late April 1994, Kibuye 
préfecture during May-June 1994, Gitarama préfecture during April and May 1994, and elsewhere 
throughout Rwanda as a crime against humanity ie count five, pursuant to JCE category three.
705
 
Furthermore, they both incurred superior responsibility, pursuant to article 6(3), for the rape and 
sexual assault committed throughout Rwanda by the Kigali and Gisenyi Interahamwe during the 
genocide.
706
 Their conviction for rape as a crime against humanity also characterised their 
contributions to the JCE as a form of direct participation under article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute, 
which amounts to liability as a principal perpetrator not an accessory.
707
 The Appeal Chamber 
found that Karemera and Ngirumpatse incurred liability, under JCE category three, for rape and 
sexual violence that occurred after the 11 April 1994.
708
 In addition, both incurred liability, under 
JCE category one, for crimes committed after the 18
th
 of April 1994 by the Interahamwe, soldiers 
and militias.
709
 Rape and other sexual acts became part of the common purpose after the 18
th
 of 
April 1994. They were both convicted of crimes against humanity and genocide as principal 
perpetrators, pursuant to article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute, for the acts of rape and sexual violence 
committed by others.
710
 This liability could not exist if it were not for the prior substantial 
contributions they had both made in furtherance of the common purpose of the JCE. Furthermore, 
the Trial Chamber‟s attribution of superior liability for the rape and sexual assault committed by the 
Kigali and Gisenyi Interahamwe outside of Kigali from April to June 1994 was overturned on 
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Appeal, while superior liability for rape and sexual committed by the Kigali Interahamwe in Kigali 
was confirmed.
711
  However the conviction remained the same due to the conviction being based on 
JCE liability that impacts the degree of the liability, whereas superior responsibility, only played an 
aggravating role in sentencing.
712
  
Karemera established that the common purpose of the group can be inferred from the 
surrounding circumstances and that sexual violence did not fall within the common purpose yet it 
was a natural foreseeable consequence of executing the common purpose. In addition, there was no 
evidence that the accused physically perpetrated any acts of sexual violence or ordered their 
commission. The use of JCE category three was therefore necessary to attribute liability to the 
accused for the deviatory crime. The criminal responsibility of the accused was based on their 
significant contributions in furtherance of the JCE by consorting with the government who 
orchestrated the attacks against the Tutsis and their intimidation of opposing forces. The Karemera 
Appeal provides authority for the court‟s inference of awareness and intent where it is the only 
reasonable inference from the facts. Furthermore, the ICTR in Karemera and the Karemera Appeal 
inferred the physical perpetrators specific intent from the scale of the attacks and the systematic 
attack of the Tutsi population, which are objective facts.  In addition, the ICTR in Karemera and the 
Karemera Appeal inferred that the accused was aware that rape was a natural and foreseeable 
consequence of implementing the common purpose, based on his comments, position and actions. 
For example, due to his position Karemera was privy to information and the perpetrators of the 
common criminal purpose and the sexual violence were one and the same. Karemera also admitted 
that rape occurs during armed conflict which established his subjective awareness of the risk. 
Despite his awareness Karemera still participated in the common purpose and did nothing to deter 
non-members from committing acts of sexual violence. Members can therefore clearly incur JCE 
liability, in the extended form, for acts of sexual violence committed by members and non-members 
when their awareness, foresight and their contribution despite the risk can be proven or reasonably 
inferred.  
 
4 5 4 Prosecutor v Ngirabatware 2012 and 2014 
 
During the Rwandan genocide, Ngirabatware was the Minister of Planning for the Interim 
Government in Rwanda and a member of the Prefecture Committee of the MRND in Gisenyi 
Prefecture, a member of the National Committee of the MRND as well as the technical committee 
of Nyamyumba Commune.
713
 While holding these positions Ngirabatware participated in the JCE 
by distributing weapons and addressing the local officials and Interahamwe, at roadblocks in the 
Nyamyumba Commune, on the 7
th
 April 1994.
714
 The prosecution argued that the JCE was aimed at 
killing and destroying the Tutsi population and rape was a natural and foreseeable consequence of 
the implementation thereof.
715
 Ngirabatware was charged with genocide ie count two and 
extermination as a crime against humanity for his participation in a JCE ie count five and rape as a 
crime against humanity for his participation in a JCE where rape was a natural and foreseeable 
consequence of executing the JCE ie count six.
716
 Both count five and six alleged “that 
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Ngirabatware participated in a joint criminal enterprise with a common purpose of exterminating 
Tutsis”.717 
This case involved the rape of a Tutsi women named Chantal Murazemariya by specific 
Interahamwe members, namely; Juma and Makuze.
718
 According to the prosecution, this act of 
sexual violence formed part of a widespread and systematic attack against the Tutsi population 
based on ethnic grounds.
719
 Allegedly Ngirabatware was linked to these sexual crimes by willingly 
engaging in a JCE, despite the risk, with the Interahamwe who acted in concert with Bagango, the 
bourgmestre and Interahamwe chairman for Nyamyumba commune.
720
  
Witness ANAG testified that Chantal Murazemariya, a Tutsi fled to her father‟s relatives house 
four days after the President Habyarimana‟s plane was shot down.721 She added that ten days after 
the President‟s death, Juma and Makuze took Chantal Murazemariya to a banana plantation and 
raped her.
722
 They returned three days later and yet again took her to “a banana plantation” and 
raped her.
723
 Witness ANAM testified that she saw Chantal Murazemariya being removed from her 
house, a month after the President‟s death, by Juma and Makuze and that Chantal Murazemariya 
told her that she had been raped by the Interahamwe.
724
  Witness ANAO, a Hutu and former 
Interahamwe, testified that he together with other Interahamwe; including Juma and Makuze, went 
to Chantal Murazemariya‟s uncle‟s house to find hiding Tutsis.725 Witness ANAO was then called 
away, while Makuze and Juma stayed behind and entered the home, which led Witness ANAO to 
believe that they attacked Chantal Murazemariya.
726
 Witness DWAN-2 testified that Chantal was 
fearful of the Interahamwe, especially Juma, because he knew that her mother was a Tutsi.
727
  
Nonetheless, Witness DWAN-2 concluded that Chantal had not been raped because she did not see 
or hear that she was raped.
728
 The ICTR found that just because they did not see or hear does not 
mean that it did not happen.
729
 Moreover, the ICTR found that Witness ANAG was a generally 
reliable source due to her “unique position to testify to these events and she provided direct and 
credible evidence that Murazemariya was raped”.730 The ICTR acknowledged the differences in the 
testimonies yet deemed the discrepancies minor that thus insufficient to warrant reasonable 
doubt.
731
 In addition, the testimony of Witnesses ANAG and ANAM established the rape of 
Murazemariya and Witness ANAO provided circumstantial evidence that Juma and Makuze were at 
the house and that they asked her uncle to turn over Tutsis.
732
  Therefore the ICTR found that the 
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prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Chantal Murazemariya was abducted from her 
uncle‟s house and raped twice by the Interahamwe, namely; Juma and Makuze, in Rushubi secteur 
in April 1994.
733
 The ICTR also considered the evidence on the general occurrence of the rape 
“relevant to its determination of Ngirabatware‟s responsibility in relation to the rape of Chantal 
Murazemariya” because the prosecution submitted that the rape occurred as a natural and 
foreseeable consequence of a JCE to destroy the Tutsi population.
734
  
The ICTR in Prosecutor v Ngirabatware (“Ngirabatware”), found that the prosecution‟s 
witnesses “consistently and corroboratively testified that Tutsi women were raped amidst a context 
of violence and killings perpetrated against Tutsis by Hutus”.735 The ICTR concluded, based on 
specific evidence and the general occurrence of rape, that Chantal Murazemariya was abducted 
from her uncle‟s home and raped by Interahamwe named Juma and Makuze in Nyamyumba 
commune in April 1994, in the context of a larger attack directed specifically against the Tutsi 
population.
736
  
 Furthermore, Witness ANAK saw that Bagango, assisted by Karemera, called the Interahamwe 
and split them into groups that started killing Tutsis and committed rapes in the Nyamyumba 
commune.
737
 Witness ANAK testified that Ngirabatware appointed Bagango as bourgmestre for 
Nyamyumba commune between 1992 and 1993.
738
 Bagango, who was also the leader of the 
Interahamwe and chairman of the MRND, was seen carrying out “unjust acts” by Witness ANAK 
and his Interahamwe murdered Tutsis, raped Tutsis and looted their belongings in Bagogwe and the 
Nyamyumba commune.
739
 Consequently, the ICTR found beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Ngirabatware participated in a JCE with the common criminal purpose of destroying, in whole or in 
part, the Tutsi ethnic group and exterminating the Tutsi population.
740
 The ICTR also found that 
Juma and Makuze were also members of this JCE and that the circumstances clearly indicated that 
Ngirabatware was subjectively aware that rape was a possible consequence of implementing the 
JCE.
741
 Furthermore, by significantly contributing by means of distributing weapons, Ngirabatware 
accepted the risk.
742
 The ICTR therefore convicted Ngirabatware of direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide, instigating and aiding and abetting genocide.
743
 These convictions were upheld 
on appeal.
744
 However, due to the prosecution‟s retraction of evidence from the indictment they 
were unable to “prove beyond reasonable doubt any of the remaining allegations pleaded in support 
of the charge of extermination,” ie count five.745 The Trial Chamber therefore acquitted 
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Ngirabatware of count five ie extermination as a crime against humanity.
746
 The sentence of 35 
years in prison was reduced on appeal to 30 years.
747
   
However, the Trial Chamber did convict Ngirabatware on count six, ie rape as a crime against 
humanity for his participation “in a joint criminal enterprise with the common purpose of (…) 
exterminating the Tutsi civilian population in Nyamyumba Commune”.748 His conviction arose 
from his participation in a JCE, where rape was a natural and foreseeable consequence of executing 
the common purpose of the JCE.
749
  His conviction “was pursuant to the extended form of JCE 
enterprise, in relation to the repeated rape of Chantal Murazemariya by Juma and Makuze, two 
members of the JCE, in the Nyamyumba Commune in April 1994,” as discussed above.750 This 
conviction was reversed on appeal.
751
 Due to Ngirabatware‟s acquittal on count five ie 
extermination as a crime against humanity, the Trial Chamber could not use the facts presented in 
support of this charge; including all the evidence supporting that the accused participated in the 
extermination of the Tutsis, to support the charge for sexual violations.
752
 Consequently, the ICTR 
looked to evidence supplied in support of count two ie genocide, to establish the accused‟s 
contribution to the common purpose of the JCE. The prosecution‟s use of evidence under one 
charge to support a different charge formed the basis for Ngirabatware‟s appeal. The Appellant 
challenged the conviction because the indictment did not include his contribution to the common 
purpose, as required by JCE liability, under count six ie rape as a crime against humanity.
753
 
Ngirabatware correctly alleged that the facts, which established his significant contribution to the 
common purpose of the JCE, in paragraph sixteen of the indictment, only pertained to count two 
and three ie the charge of genocide and complicity in genocide.
754
 In addition, Ngirabatware 
challenged the conviction of rape as a crime against humanity because his liability stemmed from 
his contribution to a specific common purpose ie the exterminating the Tutsi people, for which he 
was acquitted.
755
 The Appeal Chamber explained that because counts five and six of the indictment, 
pertaining to crimes against humanity, stated that the nature and purpose of the JCE was the 
extermination of the Tutsi civilian population, the ICTR erred in relying on the evidence under 
count two, which asserts a genocidal purpose.
756
 The Appeal Chamber referred to the ICTR‟s 
inclusion of Ngirabatwara‟s conduct, pleaded under count two ie genocide, in count six as 
                                                          
746
 Prosecutor v Ngirabatware MICT-12-29-A (2014) paras 244 and 251 cf Prosecutor v Ngirabatware ICTR-99-54-T 
(2012) paras 1377-1379 and 1394. 
747
 Prosecutor v Ngirabatware MICT-12-29-A (2014) paras 3 and 278 cf Prosecutor v Ngirabatware ICTR-99-54-T 
(2012) paras 1419-1420. 
748
 Prosecutor v Ngirabatware MICT-12-29-A (2014) para 245 cf Prosecutor v Ngirabatware ICTR-99-54-T (2012) 
paras 1305, 1322 and 1392-1394.  
749
 Prosecutor v Ngirabatware MICT-12-29-A (2014) paras 242-252 and 278-279 cf Prosecutor v Ngirabatware ICTR-
99-54-T (2012) paras 1305, 1322 and 1392-1394.  
750
 Prosecutor v Ngirabatware MICT-12-29-A (2014) para 242 cf Prosecutor v Ngirabatware ICTR-99-54-T (2012) 
paras 1393-1394. 
751
 Prosecutor v Ngirabatware MICT-12-29-A (2014) paras 242-252 and 278-279.  
752
 Para 244 cf Prosecutor v Ngirabatware ICTR-99-54-T (2012) para 1378. 
753
 Prosecutor v Ngirabatware MICT-12-29-A (2014) para 246. See also para 248 cf Simba v The Prosecutor (Appeal 
Judgement) ICTR-01-76-A (27 November 2007) para 63; Prosecutor v Simić (Appeal Judgement) IT-95-9-A (28 
November 2006) para 22: The ICTY found that where the Prosecution wishes to rely on JCE as the form of liability, it 
must plead the nature and purpose of the enterprise as well as which form of JCE shall be used, in the indictment. 
754
 Prosecutor v Ngirabatware MICT-12-29-A (2014) para 246. 
755
 Para 246.  
756
 Para 243. 
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“impermissibly expanding the charge of rape as a crime against humanity”.757 The accused‟s 
contribution to the common purpose, as pleaded in the indictment, was “essential for establishing 
his responsibility” for deviatory crimes.758 Therefore the inability of the prosecution to establish 
Ngirabatware‟s contribution to the extermination of the Tutsi population, as a crime against 
humanity, resulted in the conviction being overturned on appeal.
759
 The Appeals Chamber reversed 
his conviction and acquitted Ngirabatware of rape as a crime against humanity.
760
 
The Appeals Chamber found that counts five and six of the indictment were narrowly tailored to 
extermination being the common purpose of the JCE.
761
 Therefore the reversal of the conviction 
under count six ie rape as a crime against humanity could have been avoided if the prosecution had 
pleaded that the common purpose of the JCE was the murder of the Tutsi people as; an act of 
genocide and, or extermination as a crime against humanity. The conviction was overturned based 
on insufficient evidence in the indictment to support the accused‟s participation in the common 
purpose, which is the basis of JCE liability. Ngirabatware‟s conviction for rape but for the 
incomplete indictment would have resulted in his principal liability, pursuant to JCE category three.  
 
4 6 Conclusion 
 
As is clear from the cases, as discussed above, the MICT, ICTR and ICTY have established a link 
between an accused and sexual violence by using JCE category one and three. This doctrine has 
recognised that participation in a JCE gives rise to liability when all the elements have been 
satisfied. The JCE doctrine has been successfully used by the ad hoc tribunals in the Karemera 
Appeal, Ngirabatware and the Krstić Appeal to establish the criminal responsibility of high-ranked 
officials and masterminds as contributory members of a JCE, for acts of sexual violence physically 
perpetrated by others in accordance with my sixth research question. The conviction for sexual 
violence was however overturned in the Ngirabatware Appeal due to insufficient evidence in the 
indictment to establish the accused‟s contribution to the common purpose ie extermination as a 
crime against humanity.  As concluded in chapter two, it is difficult to establish the criminal 
responsibility of an accused who; was not present at the scene of the crime, did not personally carry 
out the actus reus of the crime or did not order the commission of the crime. Despite the difficulty, 
there is a duty to provide effective remedies, including the prosecution, when serious humanitarian 
violations are perpetrated, as discussed in chapters one and two. The JCE doctrine clearly provides 
a solution to this problem by attributing criminal responsibility to those who contributed to a group 
(JCE) in furtherance of a common criminal purpose. In most of the cases above, sexual violence 
was not part of the common purpose of the group. Therefore JCE category one could not be utilised 
in those circumstances. Consequently, category three of the JCE is usually best suited in 
establishing criminal responsibility for acts of sexual violence as hypothesised. 
The ad hoc tribunals have made it clear that the accused must subjectively foresee the possibility 
of sexual violence occurring in the execution of the JCE and despite the foresight, he or she must 
accept the risk and make a significant contribution to the JCE.  These two elements safeguard the 
principle of individual culpability. Furthermore, these cases have established that the accused‟s 
subjective awareness of the possibility of rape occurring and their intent to further the common 
purpose of the JCE can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances; their position, access to 
information, presence and the notoriety of the events, as long as it is the only reasonably inference. 
                                                          
757
 Para 250 cf Prosecutor v Muvunyi I (Appeal Judgement) ICTR-2000-55A-A (29 August 2008) paras l54-157. 
758
 Prosecutor v Ngirabatware MICT-12-29-A (2014) para 251 cf Prosecutor v KvoČka et al IT-98-30/1-A (2005) para 
83 cf Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A (1999) paras 203, 220 and 228. 
759
 Prosecutor v Ngirabatware MICT-12-29-A (2014) para 251. 
760
 Para 252.  
761
 Para 250. 
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All ad hoc tribunals accepted that the accused‟s awareness of the risk of sexual violence occurring 
could be inferred from the surrounding circumstances.  
In addition, the ad hoc tribunals found that before the JCE category three can be utilised, the 
prosecution must establish the existence of a common purpose. For example, in Krstić the ICTY 
stated that the facts compelled the inference that a common purpose existed between military and 
political leaders, with the common purpose to transfer all non-Serbians out of the area. Furthermore, 
the ICTR in Karemera found that a common purpose to destroy the Tutsi population materialised 
on the 11
th
 of April 1994 when weapons were distributed to the Interahamwe in Kigali and the 
ICTY in Krstić found that forcible transfer of the Bosnian Muslims was the common purpose of the 
group. Moreover, these cases have established that common purpose can therefore be inferred from 
the surrounding circumstance; for instance, where a plurality of persons working together to commit 
a crime over a period of time. Additionally, it can arise extemporaneously and expand. For instance, 
ICTR in Karemera found that rape and other sexual acts became part of the common purpose after 
the 18
th
 of April 1994. 
Also, the membership of the accused and the accused‟s significant contribution to the JCE must 
be established. By significantly contributing to the JCE, the accused opens him or herself up to 
criminal responsibility for all the actions of members or non-members committed in furtherance of 
the common purpose or as a natural foreseeable consequence of implementing the common 
purpose. For example, in Krstić the ICTY established that the accused was a key participant in the 
common purpose because he organised and supervised the forcible transportation of civilians. In 
addition, the ICTR found that Karemera and Ngirumpatse significantly contributed to the common 
purpose by distributing weapons to the Interahamwe, intimidating those who opposed the attack of 
the Tutsis and by holding governmental positions. Furthermore the MICT confirmed that 
Ngirabatware made a significant contribution by distributing weapons and addressing the 
Interahamwe at roadblocks.   Liability, however, can only ensue where the accused possesses the 
requisite mens rea. 
The accused, as a principal, must possess the direct intent to further the common purpose as well 
as the specific intent or knowledge of the circumstances as required by the international crime under 
which the crime is categorised. For example, in Krstić, the ICTY inferred that the accused was 
aware of the humanitarian crisis based on his presence at the scene of the crimes after the forcible 
transfer and his presence in meetings leading up to the forcible transfer. His intent was therefore 
evidenced by his extensive participation in the forcible transfer. Furthermore, the ICTR in 
Karemera also inferred the accused‟s awareness from his position, comments and actions because 
as a political leader within the Interim Government he was privy to relevant information regarding 
national security and he also visited the Kibuye Commune where he could see the devastation 
himself. Moreover, the Trial and Appeal Chamber in the Karemera Appeal inferred that the 
physical perpetrators of rape and sexual assault possessed genocidal intent. 
In addition, the crime he or she is charged must have been a natural foreseeable consequence of 
implementing the common purpose and despite the risk, the accused contributed nonetheless. The 
various ad hoc tribunals have acknowledged that sexual violence is objectively a natural foreseeable 
consequence of implementing or executing the common purpose of the JCE. For example, in Krstić, 
the ICTY found that rape was undoubtedly a natural foreseeable consequence of implementing the 
forcible transfer. The ICTY inferred the objective foreseeability by looking at the myriad of 
circumstances that made rape inevitable, such as the vulnerability of the uprooted women and girls, 
the prevalence of militia, the lack of shelter and not enough UN personnel. In Karemera the ICTR 
inferred that sexual violence was a natural foreseeable consequence of implementing the common 
purpose because the identity of the perpetrators were the same for both crimes. In addition, the 
accused must also have subjectively foreseen the possibility of sexual violence, which is determined 
on a case to case basis. For example, Karemera admitted during his testimony that it would be 
ridiculous to think that soldiers do not rape during war, therefore he subjectively foresaw the risk 
and reconciled himself. 
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Additionally, Danner and Martinez state that all the criminal tribunals since the ICTY and ICTR 
have included a command responsibility and a form of JCE liability.
762
 For example, despite the 
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”) not containing any provision that refers to 
common plan liability or JCE liability, the SCSL and the Special Panel for Serious Crimes 
established by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (“UNTAET”) have 
applied the JCE theory liberally.
763
 Therefore, most of the indictments that Danner and Martinez 
have “located from the newest generation of international criminal courts, namely those in Timor 
Leste and Sierra Leone, rely (at least in part) expressly or implicitly on the theory of JCE 
liability”.764 They add that these “developments provide evidence that the concept of JCE will 
continue to play an important role in international criminal law and heighten the stakes of the 
ICTY‟s jurisprudence in this area”.765 
Every conviction, by the ad hoc tribunals, for sexual violence under JCE category one and three, 
established criminal responsibility under either article 6(1) of the ICTR Statue or article 7(1) of the 
ICTY Statute. The attribution of superior responsibility did not hold on appeal. The degree of 
liability attributed ranges from liability as a principal in Karemera to liability as an accessory in 
Krstić. Arguably, the ICC‟s interpretation of individual criminal responsibility should be consistent 
with the ICTY and ICTR‟s interpretation, as established above. In order to encourage the ICC to 
accept an accused‟s contribution to a JCE can amount to a form of commission that results in 
principal liability under article 25 of the Rome Statute, I will attempt to establish that the 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals is a source of international law that the ICC must consider 
when making its own decisions. This evaluation, in pursuance of my seventh research question, 
takes place in the next chapter, chapter five.  By analysing and utilising the JCE doctrine to satisfy 
the objective (actus reus) and subjective (mens rea) elements of the crime as set out in the 
judgements discussed above, the ICC should arguably secure convictions for acts of sexual violence 
as war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and violations of Common article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions.  What follows in the penultimate substantive chapter is a discussion about the 
difference and similarities between the ICC and the Tribunals‟ understanding of individual criminal 
responsibility, the modes of participation and the forms of liability that ensues from each.  
  
                                                          
762
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cal L Rev 154. 
763
 155 cf art 6 of the United Nations Statute Of The Special Court For Sierra Leone UN Doc S/2002/246 appendix 11 
(2000) <http://www.rscsl.org/documents.html/scsl-statute.pdf> (accessed 16-06-2015): It states that “a person who 
planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a 
crime referred to in Articles 2 of 4 of the present Statute shall be individually responsible for the crime”. 
764
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cal L Rev 156. 
765
 156. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE AD HOC TRIBUNAL’S JURISPRUDENCE AS A SOURCE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
5 1 Introduction 
 
Thus far the ICC has not used the JCE doctrine in order to secure liability for international crimes of 
a sexual nature. Instead, the ICC has used accessorial liability and principal liability as a co-
perpetrator, to establish individual criminal responsibility for contributing to a group that commits a 
crime as recognised by the Rome Statute. For example, the ICC in Katanga convicted the accused 
as an accessory for contributing to the commission or attempted commission of a crime by a group 
with a common purpose.
766
 Katanga was convicted, under article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute, of 
one count of crimes against humanity and four counts of war crimes, yet the ICC acquitted him of 
all sex-related charges.
767
 In addition, the ICC in Lubanga convicted the accused, as a co-
perpetrator for his involvement in a common purpose, for war crimes based on recruiting and 
enlisting children under the age of fifteen to take part in warfare.
768
 Furthermore, the ICTY in the 
Furundžija Appeal stated that article 25(3)(d)(i)-(ii) of the Rome Statute attributes criminal 
responsibility and liability to those who contribute to the commission or attempted commission of a 
crime, by persons acting in common purpose, if they possess the requisite knowledge and shared 
intent to further the common purpose of the group and participate willingly.
769
 It is therefore clear, 
from Katanga, Lubanga and the Furundžija Appeal that contributing to a group, which results in the 
commission of a crime under the Rome Statute, is a form of participation from which liability 
ensues.  
However, according to my pre-study, it appears that the ICC and the ad hoc tribunals disagree as 
to the form of participation and the degree of liability that should ensue from contributions to a 
group who share common criminal purpose. The ICC in the Lubanga Confirmation Decision found 
that principal perpetrators included those who physically carried out the actus reus and those who 
were absent from the scene yet who controlled or masterminded the commission.
770
 Arguably, the 
principal perpetrators includes members of a JCE who intentionally and significantly contribute to 
the execution of the common criminal purpose. However, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber (“PTC”) in 
Lubanga found that participation under article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute, which sets out the 
contribution to a group as a form of participation, neither amounts to a commission nor liability as a 
principal; but rather a subsidiary form of criminal responsibility.
771
  
According to Goy, the distinction between the ICC‟s and the ad hoc tribunals‟ approach towards 
attributing liability for contributors to group therefore stands as follows; the ICC only attributes 
principal liability as a co-perpetrator to contributors who have made an essential contribution to the 
commission of the crime, any lesser form of contribution amounts to accessorial liability.
772
 
Accessorial liability is a lesser form of liability that warrants more lenient sentencing. Whereas the 
ad hoc tribunals have attributed principal liability where the JCE member has willingly and 
knowingly made a significant contribution in furtherance of the common purpose.773
 
The ad hoc 
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 Prosecutor v Katanga & Chui ICC-01/04-01/07-717 (2014). 
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 Prosecutor v Katanga & Chui ICC-01/04-01/07-717 (2014). 
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 Prosecutor v Lubanga (Pre-Trail Chamber I) ICC-01/04-01/06-1049 Decision Regarding the Practices Used to 
Prepare and Familiarise Witnesses for Giving Testimony at Trial (30 November 2007). 
769
 Prosecutor v Furundžija IT-95-17/1-A (2000) para 117. 
770
 Lubanga Confirmation Decision ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN (2007) para 330. 
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tribunals attribute liability equally to all members that contribute in a significant way, where the 
requisite mens rea has been satisfied.
774
 Goy‟s arguments form the basis of the comparison in this 
chapter between the different understandings of commission and principal liability before the ICC 
and the ad hoc tribunals. Considering the differences in approaches between the judicial forums the 
following questions, as set out in the introduction, become relevant: whether the ICC is bound, or at 
least permitted, to consider the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals in its interpretation of 
individual criminal responsibility and principal liability pursuant to my seventh research question 
and if so, whether their respective tests that distinguish principal from accessorial liability are 
theoretically reconcilable. The consolidation of these two tests could arguably support the 
successful prosecution and punishment of sexual offences under the Rome Statute by ascribing 
principal liability consistently, which ensures predictability and fairness for both parties. 
In answering these questions I firstly undertake, a brief theoretical examination of the value of 
precedent in international law. Thus I hope to discover whether the jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
tribunals amounts to precedent and whether the ICC is bound by, or should at least be persuaded to 
refer to, the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals for its instructive and persuasive value when 
interpreting article 25 of the Rome Statute.  Secondly, I examine article 21 of the Rome Statute to 
determine whether the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals is a source of “applicable law” in the 
interpretation of the Rome Statute. Thirdly, I evaluate the provisions within article 31 of the VCLT 
that sets out the general rules for interpreting treaties in order to ascertain whether the jurisprudence 
of the ad hoc tribunals should be used in interpreting the Rome Statute. Lastly, I refer to the human 
rights standard pursuant to article 21(3) of the Rome Statute and case law, to establish whether it 
supports the inclusion of jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals as an applicable source. If legal 
authority for the inclusion of jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals as an applicable source is 
unearthed, I can proceed to determine, based on the elements and tests, whether article 25 of the 
Rome Statute and article 7 of the Statute for the ICTY Statute and the article 6 of the ICTR Statute 
are compatible for comparison. If so, the jurisprudence on JCE liability, for contributing to a 
common purpose that results in the commission of sexual violence, could influence the ICC‟s 
interpretation of commission and principal liability, pursuant to article 25 of the Rome Statute.  
 
5 2 The position and use of precedent in international law 
 
5 2 1 International law doctrine 
 
Cohen explains that according to international law doctrine, judicial decisions do not possess 
special force because they are not themselves law.
775
  The ICTY Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v 
Kupreśkić (“Kupreśkić”) stated that judicial precedent is not a distinct source of law in international 
criminal adjudication.
776
 Nerlich adds that the ICTY may not rely on a set of cases or on a single 
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 28 cf Prosecutor v Vasiljević IT-98-32-A (2004) para 111. 
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 HG Cohen “Theorising Precedent in International Law” in A Bianchi, D Peat & M Windsor (eds) Interpretation in 
International Law (2014) Forthcoming UGA Legal Studies Research Paper No 2014-2013 2. See also V Nerlich “The 
Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent in Proceedings Before the ICC” in C Stahn and G Sluiter The Emerging Practice of 
the International Criminal Court (2009) 305 315: Nerlich specifies that the jurisprudence of the tribunal‟s is not a 
source of law in its own right. 
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 Nerlich “The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent” in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
309-310 cf Prosecutor v Zoran Kupreśkić, Mirjan Kupreśkić, Vlatko Kupreśkić, Drago Josipoć & Dragan Papić (Trial 
Chamber) IT-95-16-T (14 January 2000) para 540.  
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precedent to establish a principle of law.
777
 Furthermore, the ICTY is neither bound by precedents 
established by other international criminal courts such as IMT or IMTFE nor the adjudication of 
international crimes brought before national courts.
778
 Cohen adds that the decisions of the 
international tribunals are also denied doctrinal force and are not given precedential weight.
779
 
Wallace and Martin-Ortega argue that there is “no rule of stare decisis in international law whereby 
the Court is obliged to follow its previous decisions”.780 In international law, judicial decisions are 
not binding on anyone else except the parties to the particular case. They are furthermore not 
binding on future cases, or on future parties.
781
 For example, article 59 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ Statute”) states that: “[t]he decision of the Court has no binding 
force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case”.782  
Despite the absence of an international rule, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) and 
international tribunals have taken previous decisions into consideration during subsequent cases.
783
  
Cohen explains that “denying the force of precedent, while nonetheless arguing from it, may be a 
way of calibrating precedent‟s exact weight”.784 By not giving the judicial institution the express 
precedential authority yet still referring to case law in support of ones arguments; the states “take 
advantage of the predictability of precedent, while still retaining some room to argue against a 
precedent‟s relevance in a particular case”.785 Cohen suggests that the state parties to the regime 
prefer an “optimal level of clarity and predictability” over “a system of de novo review,” ie starting 
each case a new, but less than one of stare decisis.
786
 Furthermore, article 38(4) of the Statute of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ Statute”) states that judicial decisions are a 
“subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law”.787 Judicial decisions can therefore 
determine rules of law, albeit as subsidiary means. Additionally, the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the 
Prosecutor v Aleksovski (“Aleksovski Appeal”) found that the Trial Chamber is bound by the 
decision of the Appeal Chamber.
788
 In principle, it would follow its own previous jurisprudence, 
unless there are “cogent reasons” for a departure.789 Arguably, this creates authority for the use of 
precedent within the ICTY.
790
 Moreover, article 21(2) of the Rome Statute states that the ICC “may 
apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions”.791 The Separate Opinion 
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 Cohen “Theorising Precedent in International Law” in Interpretation in International Law 15. 
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 15 (My own emphasis added).  
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 Cohen “Theorising Precedent in International Law” in Interpretation in International Law 2 cf art 38(4) of the 
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (16 December 1920) 6 LNTS 380 (“ PCIJ Statute”). 
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 Nerlich “The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent” in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
309 cf Prosecutor v Aleksovski (Appeal Judgement) IT-95-14/1-A (24 March 2000) para 113.  
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 Nerlich “The status of ICTY and ICTR precedent” in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
309 cf Prosecutor v Aleksovski IT-95-14/1-A (2000) para 107.  
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 One must note however, that if the tribunals do not have the authority to establish principles of law as stated by 
Nerlich above, then the Trial Chamber would not be bound by this decision of the Appeal Chamber. 
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of Pikis J of the ICC Appeal Chamber in Prosecutor v Kony (“Kony Appeal”) confirmed that the 
ICC may “afford a degree of precedential value to its own decisions”.792  Arguably, the state parties 
to the constitutive document of the PCIJ and the Rome Statute electively bestowed the PCIJ and the 
ICC with precedential force. 
It is clear that judicial decisions are not a source of law, however according to Cohen, Nerlich, 
Daillier and Pellet; they may be used to determine or support the existence of an international rule; 
including rules of customary law.
793
 Wallace and Martin-Ortega explain that over time, the 
interactions between states and the practices of states have “crystallised into rules of customary 
international law”. A rule of custom exists where both state practice (usus) and the subjective 
conviction that compliance is mandatory not discretionary (opinio juris sive neccessitatis), can be 
established.
794
  State practice should therefore be “extensive and virtually uniform” and should 
occur in a manner that shows “as general recognition” that a “rule of law or legal obligation is 
involved”.795 According to Nerlich, the jurisprudence of a court may; show the existence of opinio 
iuris sive necessitates and thereby provide evidence of a customary rule, display an international 
practice on a certain matter and
 
indicate the emergence of a general principle of international law.
796
 
Principles and rules of international law as well as general principles of law are listed as “applicable 
law” in article 21 of the Rome Statute, which sets out the sources to use when interpreting the Rome 
Statute. In addition, Goy refers to the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals as an “expression of 
international law”.797 Furthermore, Goy argues that the jurisprudence of the tribunals may be used 
to compare and guide similar forms of liability, albeit with caution out of respect for the distinct 
legal systems.
798
 The ICTY in Tadić found, and the Appeal Chamber confirmed, that the 
jurisprudence of the tribunals is an expression of international law because the ICTY applied 
customary international law and referred to general principles of law.
799
 While the jurisprudence of 
the ad hoc tribunals does not amount to binding precedent, the ICC may have to consider the 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals when interpreting the Rome Statute because the jurisprudence 
displays applicable sources for interpretation.  
 
5 2 2 The emergence of precedent through state practice  
 
                                                          
792
 Nerlich “The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent” in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
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According to Cohen, international judicial bodies, interpretative and expert bodies as well as state 
practice are possible sources of precedent.
800
 Nerlich argues that the decisions of international 
courts develop international criminal law.
801
 In addition, the decisions of the tribunals create new 
norms and therefore impact the development of international law.
802
 Nerlich proposes that the 
decisions of a judicial body bear persuasive authority.
803
 Therefore the force of the decision arises 
out of the “desirability of the rule reflected” in the decision and the “resultant compromise” not the 
power of the institution or its reasoning.
804
  The Trial Chamber of the ICTY in Kupreśkić cited the 
Justinian maxim “non exemplis, sed legibus iudicandum est” meaning that the persuasive value of 
another court‟s finding should be decided on the law not the case.805 Therefore the judges are not 
bound to follow the findings of another court based on the authority of that court but they may elect 
to accept the interpretation of another court as correct, based on the strength of the law or the 
desirability of the outcome ie the court agrees with the logic and rational of the other court in 
coming to the finding and therefore elects to follow it. For example, Nerlich argues that the ICC is 
not bound to accept the ad hoc tribunal‟s interpretation that its jurisprudence amounts to principles 
and rules of international law.
806
 However, Danner and Martinez argue that the jurisprudence of the 
ad hoc tribunals is an important source when determining the scope of liability doctrines because it 
displays the varying propositions and supportive authorities made by the prosecution, defense and 
judges in trying to establish the warranted criminal responsibility and corresponding form of 
liability for the accused‟s part in the crime.807 In addition, Damgaard argues that, despite not being 
bound, the ICC should try to adhere to the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals.
808
   
Furthermore, Cohen argues that the decision of an impartial yet authoritative third party is useful 
because it provides a solution where the two parties are unable agree and thereby facilitates 
harmony.
809
 A system of precedent is therefore a beneficial tool for dispute resolution.
810
 Wallace 
                                                          
800
 Cohen “Theorising Precedent in International Law” in Interpretation in International Law 10. See also M Reisman 
“International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the Study of International Law” (1984) 10 Yale Journal of 
International Law 1. 
801
 G Werle & F Jessberger Principles of International Criminal Law 3 ed (2014) 63-64. 
802
 Nerlich “The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent” in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
315 cf BB Jia “Judicial Decisions as a Source of International Law and the Defence of Duress in Murder or Other Cases 
Arising from Armed Conflict” in S Yee and W Tieya (eds) International Law in Post-Cold War World/Essays in 
Memory of Li Haopei (2001) 77.  
803
 Nerlich “The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent” in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
310. 
804
 Cohen “Theorising Precedent in International Law” in Interpretation in International Law 6. However, Cohen warns 
that the rationalist approach does not explain decisions that go against the state‟s desire.  
805
 Nerlich “The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent” in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
310 cf Prosecutor v Kupreśkić et al IT-95-16-T (2000) para 540.  
806
 Nerlich “The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent” in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
313.  
807
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cali L Rev 144-145. 
808
 C Damgaard Individual Criminal Responsibility for Core International Crimes (2008) 1 176. 
809
 Cohen “Theorising Precedent in International Law” in Interpretation in International Law 6. 
810
 6-7 cf KJ Pelc “The Politics of Precedent in International Law: A Social Network Application” (2013) APSA Annual 
Meeting Paper <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2299638> (accessed 22-03-2014): in describing 
the WTO Japan–Alcoholic Beverages II panel‟s reading of the Dispute Settlement Agreement, Pelc “argues that 
member states of the [WTO] bring disputes under the Dispute Settlement Understanding for a favorable precedent 
rather than the value of their claim”. 
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and Martin-Ortega add that the use of a previous case in subsequent decisions of the same judicial 
forum promotes judicial consistency, which provides a welcome degree of certainty for participants 
of the legal system.
811
 A system of precedent also provides the presiding officer with access to 
decisions and rationales on which to build his or her own findings instead of starting each case 
anew.  
The weight attached to the jurisprudence of the tribunals depends on: the ICC judges‟ views of 
the persuasiveness and the solidity of the legal argumentation of the decision, the reoccurrence of 
the same finding; ie a reoccurring finding will have greater weight than a once off case,
812
  and the 
type of court; ie a finding of the Appeal Chamber usually carries more weight than a the finding of 
a Trial Chamber.
813
 A precedent is dynamic and therefore the more it is cited the more authority it 
accrues.
814
 Moreover, the weight depends on the availability of the source.
815
 For example, it is 
easier to access the ICJ opinion on the rules of customary law then to look at evidence of usus and 
opinion juris that are not codified.
816
 Cohen argues that in its “weakest form, precedent simply 
supplies an argument that one must respond to; one cannot make an argument about the rule‟s 
meaning without some reference to why the prior decision is right, wrong, or distinguishable”.817 
Whereas: “[i]n its strongest form, precedent creates a strong presumption that the prior 
interpretation of the rule is in fact the rule.”818 Where prior interpretations do not exist, an 
interpreter has free reign in choosing a particular interpretation of a rule. However, as a matter of 
“reasoned legal argument,” the existence of prior interpretations cannot be ignored.819 Depending 
on a variety of factors that might give the prior interpretation greater weight, as discussed above, 
that decision might be replaced, “distinguished, narrowed, adopted, or extended, but it must be dealt 
with”.820 Failing to acknowledge the prior interpretation “might be seen as arbitrary and a violation 
of rule of law norms”.821  According to Cohen, precedent is the burden a prior interpretation of a 
rule places on future arguments about that rule.
822
 
In addition, Cohen argues that precedent may be cited with regards to the area of law, 
irrespective of the current forum.
823
 For example, Nerlich argues that the decisions of the ICTY 
might be invoked with regard to an international criminal case in before the ICJ.
824
 Arguably, 
                                                          
811
 Wallace & Martin-Ortega International Law 26.  
812
 Nerlich “The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent” in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
314 cf Daillier and Pellet Droit International Public 396.  
813
 Nerlich “The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent” in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
314. 
814
 Cohen “Theorising Precedent in International Law” in Interpretation in International Law 8 and 11. 
815
 11. 
816
 11-12. 
817
 8 cf M Jacob “Precedents: Lawmaking Through International Adjudication” (2011) 12 German Law Journal 1005 
1019: Jacob suggested that “deliberately ignoring relevant prior decisions is so arbitrary and artificial a suggestion as to 
verge on farce”.  
818
 Cohen “Theorising Precedent in International Law” in Interpretation in International Law 8 cf Jacob (2011) German 
L J 1019. 
819
 Cohen “Theorising Precedent in International Law” in Interpretation in International Law 15.  
820
 15 
821
 15-16 cf Jacob (2011) German L J 1019. 
822
 Cohen “Theorising Precedent in International Law” in Interpretation in International Law 15. 
823
 11.  
824
 9 and 11 cf AC Arend “International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force” (2003) 26 Washington 
Quarterly 89; AD Sofaer “On the Necessity of Pre-emption” (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law 209. For 
example, “the invocation of the 1837 Caroline incident between the United States and the United Kingdom as evidence 
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because the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC both adjudicate on international criminal law, the ICC 
may refer to the jurisprudence of the tribunals.  
Moreover, Cohen posits that state practice might be the original source of international 
precedent.
825
  States are autonomous and sovereign within their respective territories.
826
 Yet they act 
in an international arena, which means that their actions impact other states and relationships 
between states.
827
 Legal arguments are therefore inherently relational because the user tries to 
manipulate and predict another‟s behaviour by moderating its own actions and responses.828 Cohen 
brings to our attention that states might regulate their own behaviour in line with the findings of 
international courts and tribunals as if they were bound by them.
829
 While the actions of one state do 
not bind others, they do create behavioural and legal expectations, which I refer to as “peer 
pressure”. A state‟s obligations are therefore defined by its impression of the expectations of other 
international actors regarding lawful and unlawful behaviour.
830
 Cohen describes this strategic 
understanding of the use of precedent as soft law.
831
  
According this conceptualisation: “[p]recedent becomes a prediction of what other states might 
expect a rule to require.”832 By acting, states are interpreting the rules they follow.833 The manner in 
which states act or react “customarily” may reveal the rule‟s proper interpretation.834 Cohen 
therefore posits that state practice is an indication of precedent.
835
 Proof thereof, lies in the 
embodiment of state practice in the ICJ Statute‟s definition of customary international law, which is 
an applicable source for interpretation, and the VCLT‟s inclusion of “subsequent practice as an 
interpretive tool for understanding treaties”.836 Therefore, while a prior decision of a legal body is a 
collection of objective facts, the weight attached to the decision in the future, depending on how 
actors perceive it,  is an institutional fact.
837
 The weight of precedent therefore lies in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
of the standard for legal anticipatory self-defense” in the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia & Herzegovina v Serbia & Montenegro) (Judgment) [2007] ICJ 43 
<http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf> accessed 22 March 2014 [223] (“ICJ, Application of Genocide 
Convention”). 
825
 Cohen “Theorising Precedent in International Law” in Interpretation in International Law 10. 
826
 Wallace & Martin-Ortega International Law 72.  
827
 Cohen “Theorising Precedent in International Law” in Interpretation in International Law 4.  
828
 14.  
829
 7.  
830
 7.  
831
 7 cf AT Guzman & TL Meyer “International Common Law: The Soft Law of International Tribunals” (2009) 9 
Chinese Journal of International Law 515. 
832
 Cohen “Theorising Precedent in International Law” in Interpretation in International Law 7.  
833
 10.  
834
 10 cf HG Cohen “International Law‟s Erie Moment” (2013) 34 Michigan Journal of International Law 249, 256-257 
and 270-271. 
835
 Cohen “Theorising Precedent in International Law” in Interpretation in International Law 10-11.  
836
 10-11 cf art 31(3)(c) of the VCLT (1969) 1115 UNTS 331: “There shall be taken into account, together with the 
context: … (b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation”.  
837
 Cohen “Theorising Precedent in International Law” in Interpretation in International Law 12 cf FV Kratochwil 
Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and 
Domestic Affairs (1989) 22-28. See also J Ruggie “Epistemology, Ontology, and Regimes” in JG Ruggie ed 
Constructing the World Polity (1998) 90-91. 
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relationship between states.
838
 According to Cohen, precedent is therefore understood as “the 
practice of international law”.839 International law is therefore an on-going dynamic practice shaped 
by the state actors themselves.
840
    
In conclusion, the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, do not in itself create international rules 
and it does not bind the ICC. However, the jurisprudence might acknowledge and correctly identify 
a pre-existing states practices or rules of international law including customary international law. 
Nerlich argued, in the previous sub-chapter, that the jurisprudence of a court displays the existence 
of opinio iuris sive necessitates. Furthermore, the fact that international judicial bodies and parties 
continue to cite case law in support of their findings and perspectives, displays the emergence of the 
use of precedent in international law in the form of state practice (usus). Together usus and opinion 
juris make up a rule of customary international law which is binding.
841
  Arguably, the ICC, in 
interpreting the Rome Statute should use the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals. Not because the 
Rome Statute assigns it precedential power (which is does not) but because in spite of the lack of 
authority to do so, a practice of doing so has emerged in international law. Rules and practices of 
international law; including customary international law are applicable sources for interpretation.
842
 
In addition, the repetition and the availability of a particular finding, for instance; the origin of JCE 
liability within customary international law and its use by the ad hoc tribunals, warrants an 
acknowledgement. Arguably, the ICC should therefore take the time to acknowledge and 
understand the arguments of the ad hoc tribunals and thereafter provide reasons for agreeing or 
disagreeing with it.  
 
5 3 Article 21 of the Rome Statute: “Applicable sources” for interpreting the Rome Statute 
 
The ICC PTC II in Prosecutor v Kony, Otti & Odhiambo (“Kony”) stated that the law and practice 
of the ad hoc tribunals “cannot per se form a sufficient basis for importing into the Court‟s [ICC] 
procedural framework remedies other than those enriched in the [Rome] Statute”.843   The ICC Trial 
Chamber I in Lubanga added that the “[ICTY and ICTR] precedent [on the proofing of witness] is 
in no sense binding on the Trial Chamber at this Court [ICC]”. 844 Furthermore, Lubanga echoed 
that the procedural rules and jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals are not “automatically applicable 
to the ICC without detailed analysis”.845 Arguably, Lubanga acknowledges an occasion, after 
detailed analysis, where the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals may be applicable. On the one 
hand, Nerlich doubts the relevance of the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals because the ICC has 
its own jurisdiction, which usually impedes the guidance that other texts could offer.
846
 Article 13 
                                                          
838
 Cohen “Theorising Precedent in International Law” in Interpretation in International Law 7. 
839
 4.  
840
 4.  
841
 Wallace & Martin-Ortega International Law (2009) 8-9 cf art 8(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute 59 Stat 1055 1060 TS No 
993 (1946). 
842
 Art 21 of the Rome Statute (1998) 2187 UNTS 90. 
843
 Prosecutor v Kony, Otti & Odhiambo (Pre-Trial Chamber II) ICC-02/04-01/05-60 Decision on the Prosecutor‟s 
Position in the Decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber II to Redact Factual Descriptions of Crimes in the Warrants of Arrest, 
Motion for Reconsideration, and Motion for Clarification (28 October 2005) para 19.  
844
 Nerlich “The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent” in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
308 cf Prosecutor v Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-1049 (2007) para 44.  
845
 Nerlich “The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent” in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
308 cf Prosecutor v Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-1049 (2007) para 44.  
846
 Nerlich “The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent” in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
317.  
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of the Rome Statute states that “[t]he Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime 
referred to in article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute.”847 Moreover, the Rome 
Statute from article 22 through article 33 “provides for relatively refined rules on participation in 
crime” including the requisite subjective elements, unlike the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals that 
forced the judges to develop the details.
848
 Consequently, rendering additional sources generally 
unnecessary. On the other hand, the ICC PTC II in Kony stated that the relevance of jurisprudence 
of the ad hoc tribunals must be assessed against the applicable law provision in article 21 of the 
Rome Statue.
849
  While the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals is not binding, it may be useful 
when interpreting the Rome Statute, depending on the understanding of article 21 of the Rome 
Statute. Arguably, article 21 of the Rome Statute is therefore the point of departure for the “detailed 
analysis” required by Lubanga. 
The plain reading of a provision, supported by Fulford J and Van den Wyngaert J, is the first step 
in interpreting any provision of the Rome Statute.
850
  Firstly, article 21 of the Rome Statute sets out 
the sources that the ICC must refer to when interpreting the Rome Statute.
851
 Secondly, according to 
Nerlich, article 21(1) of the Rome Statute sets out the order in which the applicable sources must be 
applied when interpreting the Rome Statute.
852
 With this understanding, the Rome Statute, Elements 
of Crimes and the RPE must be applied first.
853
 Thereafter, the principles and rules of international 
law should be applied second and the general principles of law, should be applied last.
854
 Goy 
argues that one may only look to the secondary sources if, after applying the primary sources, a 
lacunae exists.
855
 Should any conflict between the sources arise, the Rome Statue prevails.
856
 The 
Rome Statute is therefore the primary source that sets out the powers, competencies and limitations 
of the ICC. However, the maxim lex specialis derogate legi generali requires that the Regulations 
                                                          
847
 Art 13 of the Rome Statute (1998) 2187 UNTS 90 (My own emphasis added).  
848
 Nerlich “The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent” in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
322-323 cf Werle Principles of International Law mn 266. 
849
 Prosecutor v Kony et al ICC-02/04-01/05-60 (2005) para 19.  
850
 Werle & Burghardt “Establishing Degrees of Responsibility” in Pluralism in International Criminal law 24. 
851
 Art 21 of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90: “1. The Court shall apply: (a) In the first place, this Statute, 
Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence; (b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable 
treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law of 
armed conflict; (c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the 
world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, 
provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and internationally 
recognized norms and standards. 2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous 
decisions. 3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with internationally 
recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender as defined in 
article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social 
origin, wealth, birth or other status.” 
852
 Nerlich “The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent” in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
311-312. 
853
 312 cf art 21(1)(a) of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90.  
854
 Nerlich “The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent” in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
312 cf arts 21(1)(b) and 21(1)(c) of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90. 
855
 Goy (2012) ICL Rev 5 cf Prosecutor v Al Bashir ICC02/05-01/09-3 Decision on the Prosecution‟s Application for a 
Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (2009) para 126. 
856
 Nerlich “The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent” in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
312. 
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and Rules of the Court that contain more detailed provisions, be applied before the general 
provisions as contained in the Rome Statute.
857
 
The jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals is not expressly listed as an applicable source. Werle 
and Burghardt find that according to the plain reading of article 21 of the Rome Statute: “the case 
law of the ad hoc tribunals, as such, has no immediate relevance for the interpretation of the ICC 
Statute”.858 However Werle and Burghardt add that the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals is, “so 
far, the most important enunciation of International Criminal Law on this issue” and that “it is 
telling that the ad hoc tribunals are approximating the ICC Statute‟s approach, and it makes sense to 
interpret the ICC Statute in accordance with this body of law, as long as the Statute allows it”.859 
Furthermore, Nerlich states that “principles and rules of international law”, as listed in 
article 21(1)(b) of the Rome Statute, includes customary international law
860
 and principles of 
international criminal law.
861
 Nerlich therefore concludes that the ICC may use the jurisprudence of 
the tribunals to ascertain the existence of rules and principles despite the jurisprudence itself not 
being binding.
862
 In addition, Goy argues that principles and rules of international law and the 
general principles of law include the jurisprudence of the tribunals.
863
 Werle and Burghardt argue 
that the interpretation may not stop at the plain reading of the provision; judges must, according to 
article 31(1) of VCLT, also consider the context, object and purpose of the provision.
864
 
 
5 4 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
 
                                                          
857
 312. 
858
 Werle & Burghardt “Establishing Degrees of Responsibility” in Pluralism in International Criminal Law 17.  
859
 17.  
860
 Nerlich “The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent” in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
313 cf M McAuliffe de Guzman “Article 21 Applicable Law” in O Triffterer ed Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (1999) mn 14. 
861
 Nerlich “The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent” in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
313 cf A Cassese International Criminal Law (2003) 31: “Principles of international criminal law” is a term use by the 
ICTY.  
862
 Nerlich “The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent” in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
313-314.  
863
 Goy (2012) ICL Rev 5. 
864
 Werle & Burghardt “Establishing Degrees of Responsibility” in Pluralism in International Criminal Law 24 cf art 31 
of the VCLT (1969) 1115 UNTS 331: “1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 2. The context 
for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and 
annexes: (a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty; (b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion 
of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 3. There shall be taken into account, 
together with the context: (a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or 
the application of its provisions; (b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties. 4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so 
intended.”  
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Article 31 of the VCLT sets out the general rules for interpreting treaties, including the Rome 
Statute.
865
 It requires that the text be interpreted “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose”.866 The context stems from; the text, any agreement made between parties to the treaty in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty or the interpretation and application of the provisions 
within the treaty, any agreement between parties that arises from practice ie the subsequent 
application of the treaty and any relevant rules of international law applicable in relation between 
the parties.
867
 Nerlich argues that it is possible that the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals could 
be deemed part of the context in which one interprets the Rome Statue as they both operate within 
the international criminal law sphere.
868
 However, article 31(2) of the Rome Statute defines context 
narrowly; as arising from the text, its preamble or agreements made with regards to the conclusion 
of the treaty, only.
869
 In addition, Ohlin argues that ICTY‟s jurisprudence on JCE in the Tadić 
Appeal cannot be used as a precedent to help interpret article 25 of the Rome Statute.
870
 The 
interpretation of the Rome Statute rests with the ICC whereas the ICTY in the Tadić Appeal 
developed the JCE doctrine within the bounds of article 7 of the ICTY Statute.
871
 Therefore Ohlin 
finds that the Tadić Appeal is not a meaningful precedent for the interpretation of article 25 of the 
Rome Statute because its “provisions were born from an entirely different process and its provisions 
must be interpreted within that context”.872 
Alternatively, the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals could fall within “any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in relation between parties” as stated in article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT.873 
As established above, the jurisprudence may very well display rules of international law, 
specifically customary international law, through state practice. Goy argues that article 31(3)(c) 
requires that general customary international law, which is reflected and applied in the 
jurisprudence of the tribunals,  be considered when interpreting the conventional text.
874
 Also, that 
the text should be interpreted in harmony with customary international law unless it indicates an 
express departure.
875
  However it is unclear who the “parties” would be in this context. The ICTY 
and ICTR Statutes were drafted to apply to the persons responsible for serious violations within the 
ambit of the ad hoc tribunals not the ICC.
876
 In addition, the ICTY and ICTR Statutes are 
constitutional documents of international judicial institutions therefore Nerlich doubts that they 
                                                          
865
 Art 31 of the VLCT (1969) 1115 UNTS 331. 
866
 Art 31 of the VLCT (1969) 1115 UNTS 331. 
867
 Nerlich “The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent” in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
317 cf art 31(2) of the VLCT (1969) 1115 UNTS 331. 
868
 Nerlich “The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent” in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
317 cf art 31(1) of the VCLT (1969) 1115 UNTS 331.  
869
 Nerlich “The status of ICTY and ICTR precedent” in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
318.  
870
 Ohlin (2007) J Int'l Crim Just 77. 
871
 77. 
872
 77. 
873
 Art 31(3)(c) of the VLCT (1969) 1115 UNTS 331. 
874
 Goy (2012) ICL Rev 4 cf ME Villiger Customary International Law and Treaties, A Manual on the Theory and 
Practice of the Interrelation of Sources 2 ed (1997) 265. 
875
 Goy (2012) ICL Rev 5 cf R Bernhardt “Interpretation” in Bernardt ed Encyclopedia of Public International Law vol 
2 (2005) 1421. 
876
 Nerlich “The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent” in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
319; art 1 of the of the ICTY Statute (1993) 32 ILM 1159; art 1 of the ICTR Statute (1994) 33 ILM 1598. 
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quality as “applicable rules”.877 Nerlich therefore finds that the literal and plain reading of 
articles 31(2) and 31(3)(c) of the VCLT do not support the ICC judges looking to the jurisprudence 
of the tribunals for guidance when interpreting the Rome Statute and its subsidiary instruments.
878
   
However, Nerlich reminds us that the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR as well as their subsidiary 
instruments were used when drafting the ICC‟s legal texts “therefore it would appear consistent to 
consider their jurisprudence as part of the context for the purpose of interpreting the Rome 
Statute”.879 Bernhardt suggests that: “[i]n a broader sense systematic interpretation can also include 
the consideration of texts and events outside the framework of the treaty.”880  The purpose of the 
VCLT after all, specifically article 31(3)(c), is to “foster coherency between several sources of 
international law”.881 Therefore a purposive interpretation, ie the avoidance of inconsistencies and 
fragmentation within international judicial institutions, supports the inclusion of the jurisprudence 
of the ad hoc tribunals.
882
 Nerlich concedes that the doctrinal basis for relying on the jurisprudence 
of the tribunals when interpreting the Rome Statute is weak, however; the purposive interpretation 
of article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT that accepts a broader understanding of context, provides a 
methodical basis for its inclusion.
883
  
A methodical basis does however has its limits. Because the jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
tribunals is based on the ICTY and ICTR Statutes, the ICC can only look to their jurisprudence for 
guidance where the text of the Rome Statute is either similar or identical to the provision in the 
tribunal‟s statutes otherwise where a lacunae exits.884 This supports yet qualifies Nerlich‟s 
statement above, where he argues that there is no need to look to other statutes because the ICC has 
its own jurisdiction.   Furthermore, where the procedural or systematic differences between the ICC 
and the tribunals differ greatly the ICC cannot look to their jurisprudence for guidance because it 
would be inappropriate.
885
 While the judges of the ad hoc tribunals might have correctly identified 
the customary international rules and principles of general international, due to the lex specialis 
principle the actual provisions within the Rome Statute take preference according to article 21 of 
the Rome Statute.
886
 Therefore, in accordance with a broader systemic and purposive interpretation 
of article 31 of the VCLT treaty, the ICC can look to the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals for 
guidance where the texts are similar or identical. A comparison of the texts in greater detail follows, 
below.  
                                                          
877
 Nerlich “The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent” in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
319.  
878
 319.  
879
 319.  
880
 320 cf Bernhardt “Interpretation” in Encyclopedia of Public International Law 1420.  
881
 Nerlich “The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent” in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
318. See also C Brown A Common Law of International Adjudication (2007) 49.  
882
 Nerlich “The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent” in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
320 cf Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights Application No 35763/97 (21 November 2001) 
para 55: The ECtHR used art 31(1)(c) “as a means of achieving harmony with other rules of international law, even 
though the wording of the provision did not give the occasion to do so, the customary rules of state immunity were 
invoked by the UK to restrict access to courts in relation to a civil claim of torture brought against Kuwait in English 
Courts. Kuwait is not party to the [European Convention] and therefore cannot be considered a „party‟ to the litigation 
between the applicant and the UK before the [ECtHR]”.   
883
 Nerlich “The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent” in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
320.  
884
 320-322.  
885
 322.  
886
 323.  
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5 5 The human rights standard  
 
As discussed in chapter two, the commission of sexual violence violates numerous human rights 
such as: human dignity, the protection against gender discrimination, equality, the protection 
against torture, sexual autonomy, bodily integrity, and privacy. Which in turn gives rise to 
obligations on the part of state parties and the international community to ensure access to justice 
and provide effective remedies for those who have been violated.
887
 However, in addition to 
establishing the gravity of the offence and the obligations that arise when they are violated, human 
rights provide an addition interpretative function.  A human rights standard, which developed 
through jurisprudence of international and regional human rights forums, is important because it 
“informs the prosecution of crimes”.888 According to Sellers, the opinions of the regional human 
rights courts “enlighten the purview of human rights standards that inform the prosecution of 
gender-based violence.”889 For instance, Sellers interprets Bulgaria as the first case to recognise that 
the right to sexual autonomy and non-discrimination (equality) are relevant to the states obligation 
to investigate and prosecute sexual violence in order to comply with the substantive and procedural 
aspects of human rights.
890
 In referring to Bulgaria, Sellers avers that the state‟s responsibility to 
adopt measures which will secure respect for the right to privacy must fall within the broader 
human right‟s framework of non-discrimination.891 For example, the ECtHR in Bulgaria interpreted 
the law in a manner that was sensitive to the surrounding circumstances of the case instead of 
focusing on the elements of the crime.
892
 Arguably, the regional human rights courts have adopted a 
gender-conscious and non-discriminatory lens through which all rights and obligations are 
interpreted. In addition, Annex XI to the UN Resolution 60 of 147 requires non-discrimination in 
the application and interpretation of remedies.
893
   
Furthermore, Sellers notes that the law should and does reflect the changing values in society, 
which have become enlighten to the fundamental worth of sexual autonomy and equality.
 894
 For 
instance, the ECtHR and the IACtHR have established that “human rights treaties are living 
instruments, whose interpretation must go hand in hand with evolving times and current living 
                                                          
887
 Art 8 of the UDHR (1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III); art 25 of the Women‟s Protocol (2005) CAB/LEG 66.6; art 6 of 
the CERD (1969) 660 UNTS 195; art 25 of the ACHR (1978) 1144 UNTS 143; art 13 of the ECHR (1953) 213 UNTS 
222. 
888
 Sellers “The Prosecution of Sexual Violence in conflict” Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 33. 
889
 33.  
890
 33 cf MC v Bulgaria, ECtHR Application No 39272/98 (2003). 
891
 Sellers “The Prosecution of Sexual Violence in conflict” Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 33 cf 
MC v Bulgaria, ECtHR Application No 39272/98 (2003). 
892
 Sellers “The Prosecution of Sexual Violence in conflict” Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 33 cf 
MC v Bulgaria, ECtHR Application No 39272/98 (2003). 
893
 OHCHR UNGA Res 60 (16 December 2005)” UN Doc GA/RES/60/147 and its Annex United Nations Human 
Rights Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
894
 Sellers “The Prosecution of Sexual Violence in conflict” Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 33.  
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conditions”.895  According to the IACtHR in Atala, this evolving interpretation is consistent with 
interpretive provisions in the ACHR and the VCLT.
896
  
Additionally, Sellers proposes that the progressive interpretation by the regional human rights 
courts can influence the interpretation by the judges of the ICC.
897
  She affirms that the international 
courts and tribunals need to be alert and “even handed” when applying and interpreting sex-based 
crimes and their associated forms of liability.
898
 She argues that: “[d]ue diligence on the part of the 
judges to resist any sexist interpretations of laws, elements, procedural rules and evidence remains 
critical to the endeavour of constructing a non-discrimination international justice system”.899 Thus 
she posits that the rights that guarantee effective legal remedy and equal access to justice can be 
used to address discrimination and gender-based violence.
900
  
Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute requires that the ICC‟s interpretation of all its provisions must 
be consistent with internationally recognised human rights.
901
 Pellet describes the interpretive 
requirements of article 21(3) of the Rome Statute as “a system of super legality” because an 
interpretation that is consistent with human rights trumps the plain reading of the Roman 
Statute.902 
Therefore the ICC‟s interpretation and application of the Rome Statute including: the definition of 
the crime, the elements of the crime, types of criminal responsibility, the forms of liability and 
remedies must be consistent with the human rights framework based on equal access to justice, 
sexual autonomy and non-discrimination 
For instance, as discussed in chapters two and three, it is difficult to establish the individual 
criminal responsibility of high-ranked officials and masterminds for acts of sexual violence 
committed by another. Thus impairing the ability of the court of ad hoc tribunal to effectively 
prosecute acts of sexual violence. Furthermore, because civilian women are the predominate victims 
of sexual violence the prosecution of sexual violence, becomes an informal yardstick to assess 
whether the female community actually has the ability to access justice.
903
 A context-sensitive and 
gender-conscious interpretation of the Rome Statute consistent with the human rights standard, 
including the provisions on individual criminal responsibility, commission and principal liability, is 
therefore critical in ensuring that the prosecution of sexual violence has a reasonable prospect of 
                                                          
895
Atala Riffo and daughters v Chile, IACtHR Series C No 239 (2012) para 83 cf Tyrer v United Kingdom, European 
Court of Human Rights No 5856/72 (25 April 1978) para 31; The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the 
Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights Series A No 16 (1 October 1999) para 114 (“Advisory Opinion OC-16/99”).  
896
 Atala Riffo and daughters v Chile, IACtHR Series C No 239 (2012) para 83 cf Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, 
IACtHR Series A No 16 (1999) para  114.  
897
 Sellers “The Prosecution of Sexual Violence in conflict” Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 33.  
898
 38.  
899
 38.  
900
 38.  
901
 Nerlich “The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent” in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
324; art 21(3) of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90: “The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this 
article must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction founded 
on grounds such as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or 
other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status.” 
902
 Nerlich “The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent” in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
324 cf A Pellet  “Applicable Law” in A Cassese, P Gaeta and JRWD Jones (eds) The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, A Commentary (2002) vol 2 1079.  
903
 Haffajee (2006) Harv J L & Gender 204; Sellers “The Prosecution of Sexual Violence in conflict” Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights 38. 
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success. Hence, article 25 of the Rome Statute, must be interpreted in a manner that is consistent 
with internationally recognised human rights. Arguably, exceptional yet necessary measures should 
be developed and used to attribute criminal responsibility. As established in chapter four, the JCE 
doctrine has been successfully used by the ad hoc tribunals to attribute criminal responsibility to an 
accused who significantly contributed to a common purpose that resulted in the commission of 
sexual violence. Consequently, the JCE doctrine has enabled access to justice, particularly for 
women as the predominate victim of sexual crimes, and facilitated effective prosecution as a 
remedy. In furtherance of the human rights standard, the ICC should arguably look to the 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals because it has developed and applied an effective remedy that 
facilitates the victim‟s access to justice.  
Moreover, according to the human rights standard, the law should be applied without 
discrimination. The like treatment of similar situations is a “core principles” of law.904 The 
principles of legality also requires that like cases be treated alike.
905
 The human rights of the 
accused and the principles of legality will be discussed in greater detail in chapter six.  
  In conclusion, any interpretation of the provisions within the Rome Statute and the RPE, must 
be checked against internationally recognised human rights norms; including the principle of non-
discrimination.
906
  As displayed in chapter four, the JCE doctrine has been used by the ad hoc 
tribunals to resolve the difficulties with establishing criminal responsibility for rape or other acts of 
sexual violence. Specifically establishing the criminal responsibility of high-ranked officials who 
contributed to the common purpose of a group that either included, or reasonably foresaw, the 
commission of sexual violence. It has therefore minimised the number of acquittals for acts of 
sexual violence, which predominately affects women and therefore satisfies the duty to provide 
effective remedies for human rights violations together with ensuring greater access to justice. 
Arguably, the inclusion of JCE liability, as a form of commission that results in the principal 
liability has diminished gender discrimination and improved access to justice by recognising the 
unique nature of sexual violence as an international crime and developing an effective remedy.  If 
looking to the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals will assist the ICC in developing an 
understanding of participation in a group as a form of commission in order to provide an effective 
remedy for the prevalence of sexual violence, then arguably it should. So long as the inclusion of 
JCE liability respects the text of the Rome Statute and is not contrary to the general principles of 
criminal law and the accused‟s right to a fair trial. The application of the JCE doctrine will be tested 
against the general principles of criminal law and the accused‟s right to a fair trial in chapter six.  
 
5 6 Application: Is article 25 of the Rome Statute comparable to article 6 and article 7 of 
the ICTR and ICTY Statutes, respectively?  
 
5 6 1 The differentiation model within article 25(3) 
 
Due to its detail and primacy, the ICC is most likely to use the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals 
to interpret the Rome Statute, where the provision in the ICTY or ICTR Statute is identical or 
similar to the provision in the Rome Statute.
907
 It therefore becomes essential to determine whether 
article 25 of the Rome Statute and article 6 and 7 of the ICTY Statute and ICTR Statute, 
respectively, bears a resemblance or not. Article 25 of the Rome Statute lists the forms of 
                                                          
904
 Cohen “Theorising Precedent in International Law” in Interpretation in International Law 16. 
905
 16.  
906
 Nerlich “The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent” in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
324. 
907
 316.  
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participation that amount to individual criminal responsibility. Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute 
refers to forms of commission, (b) to inducement, (c) to assistance, (d) to contributions in any other 
way to the commission of a crime by a group of persons acting in common purpose and article 28 
describes superior liability.
908
 According to Werle, the modes of participation are divided into four 
levels by the letters (a) to (d), which create a hierarchy of seriousness that corresponds to two 
degrees of individual criminal responsibility ie principal or accessorial liability.
909
 For instance, the 
ICC in the Lubanga Confirmation Decision found that “„committing‟ constitutes principal liability, 
whereas the other forms of liability under [a]rticle 25(3)(b)-(d) [of the Rome] Statute constitute 
accessorial liability”.910 Furthermore, according to Werle and Burghardt, article 25(3)(a) establishes 
“a higher threshold than assistance under [a]rticle 25(3)(c)” of the Rome Statute.911 Additionally, 
ordering and instigating “yield a higher degree of individual criminal responsibility than aiding and 
abetting”.912 In summation, article 25(3) of the Rome Statute recognises criminal acts such as 
planning, ordering and instigating yet it places a higher level of individual criminal responsibility 
on those who commit.
913
 Each level of responsibility has its own test and requirements but the 
objective and subjective elements are stricter for commission than other acts.
914
 The actus reus and 
mens rea of the accused therefore determines his or her degree of criminal responsibility.
915
 The 
form of participation therefore has “normative implications for the degree of individual criminal 
responsibility” that in turn impacts sentencing.916 The ICC Trial Chamber in Lubanga and the 
Prosecutor v Chui (“Chui”) confirmed that the different modes of participation establish a hierarchy 
of blameworthiness.
917
 Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute therefore introduces a systematisation of 
modes of participation referred to as the differentiation model.
918
 The jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
tribunals also reveals a distinction between principal and accessorial liability.
919
 Therefore Goy 
argues that the jurisprudence of the tribunals may be useful when interpreting the modes of liability 
before the ICC.
920
 
 
                                                          
908
 Werle & Burghardt “Establishing Degrees of Responsibility” in Pluralism in International Criminal law 23 cf art 25 
of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90. 
909
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 953. See also Werle & Burghardt “Establishing Degrees of Responsibility” in 
Pluralism in International Criminal law 11, 21 and 23. 
910
 Goy (2012) ICL Rev 40 cf Prosecutor v Lubanga Dyilo ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN (2007) paras 320 and 323. 
911
 Werle & Burghardt “Establishing Degrees of Responsibility” in Pluralism in International Criminal law 20. 
912
 16-17 cf Prosecutor v Lubanga (Trial Chamber I) ICC-01/04-01/06-2842 Separate Opinion of Judge Adrian Fulford 
(14 March 2012) 10.  
913
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 964.  
914
 Werle & Burghardt “Establishing Degrees of Responsibility” in Pluralism in International Criminal law 25-26. 
915
 15. 
916
 14-15 cf Prosecutor v Ndindabhizi (Appeals Chamber) ICTR-01-71-A (16 January 2007) 122: the ICTR found that 
“modes of liability may either augment [for example], the commission of the crime with direct intent or lessen [for 
example], aiding and abetting a crime with awareness that a crime will probably be committed the gravity of the crime”.  
917
 Werle & Burghardt “Establishing Degrees of Responsibility” in Pluralism in International Criminal law 24-25 cf 
Prosecutor v Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-2842 Separate Opinion of Judge Adrian Fulford (2012) para 9; Prosecutor v 
Chui (Trial Chamber II) ICC-01/04-02/12-4 Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert (18 December 
2012) paras 6, 22 and 63. 
918
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int‟l Crim Just 953. See also Werle & Burghardt “Establishing Degrees of Responsibility” in 
Pluralism in International Criminal law 13. 
919
 Goy (2012) ICL Rev 6. 
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5 6 2 The principle of individual culpability 
 
As stated in chapters one and two, sexual crimes are sometimes committed by large groups of 
people, who operate collectively within an organized network.
921
 The ICTY in the Tadić Appeal 
stated that “[m]ost of these crimes do not result from the criminal propensity of single individuals 
but constitute manifestations of collective criminality”.922 The ICTY continued by stating that “the 
crimes are often carried out by groups of individuals acting in pursuance of a common criminal 
design”.923 The accused can participate in the commission of such crimes in many different ways, 
“contributing on various levels and at different stages of the crime”.924 Therefore due to the nature 
of armed conflict, “the difference between the multiple roles individuals may play in the 
commission of international crimes, and thus their degree of individual criminal responsibility for 
these crimes, is enormous”.925 A distinction in the degree of criminal responsibility depending on 
the accused‟s mode of participation is therefore important.926 According to Werle, the “degree of 
criminal responsibility does not diminish as distance from the actual act increases; in fact, it often 
grows”.927 According to Fisher, physical perpetrators commit heinous acts yet they are less 
blameworthy than instigators and masterminds because in the circumstances they are also 
victims.
928
 The greatest degree of responsibility rests with those whose original proposal or design 
generated the violence.
929
  
However, individual criminal responsibility still needs to be established individually, in order to 
comply with the principle of individual culpability.
930
 Werle and Burghardt explain that “the 
principle of culpability requires that the sentence imposed must not exceed individual guilt for the 
commission of the crime”.931  The distinction between the different degrees of criminal 
responsibility is therefore “essential from a normative perspective”.932  The ICTY in the Tadić 
Appeal stated that while certain members of the JCE physically perpetrate the criminal act, “the 
participation and contribution of the other members of the group is often vital in facilitating the 
commission of the offence in question”.933 Consequently, “the moral gravity of such participation is 
often no less - or indeed no different - from that of those actually carrying out the acts in 
question”.934 While it is important to hold individuals responsible for serious crimes that “threaten 
the peace, security and well-being of the world” and concern the international community we cannot 
compromise on the principle of individual culpability.
935
 Therefore, when interpreting commission 
                                                          
921
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 953. See also Werle & Burghardt “Establishing Degrees of Responsibility” in 
Pluralism in International Criminal law 17 cf Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A (1999) para 191. 
922
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 954 cf Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A (1999) para 191.  
923
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 954 cf Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A (1999) para 191.  
924
 Werle & Burghardt “Establishing Degrees of Responsibility” in Pluralism in International Criminal law 17.  
925
 18.  
926
 17.  
927
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 954.  
928
 KJ Fisher Moral Accountability and International Criminal Law: Holding Agents of Atrocity Accountable to the 
World (2012) 68 81.   
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 Fisher Moral Accountability and International Criminal Law 81.  
930
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 953. 
931
 Werle & Burghardt “Establishing Degrees of Responsibility” in Pluralism in International Criminal law 18.  
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 18.  
933
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 954 cf Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A (1999) para 191.  
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and principal liability, under article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, the ICC must pay attention to the 
actual contribution and mens rea of the accused. 
 
5 6 3 Principal liability in the ICC versus the ad hoc tribunals  
 
The ICC Trial Chamber in Lubanga stated that commission in article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute 
are “the only independent and non-derivative modes of participation”.936 While the forms of 
participation in sub-articles 25(3)(b) to 25(3)(d) attribute criminal responsibility for resultant crimes 
and attempted crimes, article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute only attributes criminal responsibility for 
crimes actually committed.
937 
As stated above, only “committing” gives rise to principal liability; 
any other form of participation results in a derivative form of liability.
938
 Werle explains that 
because commission entails a higher degree of criminal responsibility, article 25(3)(a) of the Rome 
Statute, including the actus reus and mens rea, must be construed strictly.
939
 As discussed above, 
the ICC has attributed principal liability, as a co-perpetrator, for Lubanga‟s involvement in common 
purpose, for war crimes based on recruiting and enlisting children under the age of fifteen to take 
part in warfare.
940
 In addition, the ICC convicted Katanga, under article 25(3)(d) of the Rome 
Statute, of one count of crimes against humanity (murder) and four counts of war crimes (murder, 
attacking civilian populations, destruction of property and pillaging) yet acquitted him of all sex-
related charges, for contributing to the commission or attempted commission of a crime by a group 
with a common purpose.
941
  
The ICTY Appeal Chamber in the Tadić Appeal found that participation in a JCE is a form of 
joint commission in customary international law that results in principal liability.
942
 Werle explains 
that the ad hoc tribunals attribute liability as a principal either where the accused is the physical 
perpetrator of the crime or where the commission is “ascribed to one‟s own conduct”.943 Cassese 
argues that the ICC is generally authorised to rely upon the JCE doctrine.
944
 In addition, Goy argues 
that the ICC may consider customary international law and general principles of law, including the 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, where a lacunae exists in article 25(3) of the Rome Statute.
 945
 
Alternatively, when interpreting the scope of the forms of perpetration and participation in 
article 25(3).
946
 For example, the ICC in the Lubanga Confirmation Decision, found that neither the 
Rome Statute nor the Elements of Crimes provided a definition for “international armed 
conflict”.947 The ICC PTC therefore looked to article 21(1)(b) of the Rome Statute, with due regards 
for article 21(3), to fill the lacunae.
948
 Thereby, the ICC relied on the applicable treaties and 
                                                          
936
 13-14.  
937
 13-14 cf Prosecutor v Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-2842 (2012) paras 996-997. See also FZ Giustiniani “The 
Responsibility of Accomplices in the Case-Law of the ad hoc Tribunals” (2009) 20 Criminal Law Forum 441. 
938
 Goy (2012) ICL Rev 40 cf Prosecutor v Lubanga Dyilo ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN (2007) paras 320 and 323. 
939
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 957 and 961.  
940
 Prosecutor v Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-1049 (2007). 
941
 Prosecutor v Katanga & Chui ICC-01/04-01/07-717 (2014). 
942
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 955 cf Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A (1999) para 185.  
943
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 955.  
944
 Cassese (2007) J Int'l Crim Just 132. 
945
 Goy (2012) ICL Rev 5. Goy‟s argument pertained to liability for an omission, which is not referred to in article 25 of 
the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90.  
946
 Goy (2012) ICL Rev 5.  
947
 6 cf Lubanga Confirmation Decision ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN (2007) para 205. 
948
 Goy (2012) ICL Rev 6 cf Lubanga Confirmation Decision ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN (2007) para 205. Goy argues 
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principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law 
of armed conflict.
949
  In doing so the ICC Pre-Trail Chamber referred to the jurisprudence of the 
ICTY, namely; Prosecutor v Bemba Gombo (“Bemba Gombo Confirmation Decision”).950  
According to Goy‟s interpretation of the case law, the ICC can recognise participation in a JCE 
as a form of criminal responsibility under article 25(3)(d) as both forms of liability are based on a 
subjective criterion of shared intent.
951
 However, without referencing authority, Goy argues that 
article 25(3)(d) “appears” to provide solely for accessorial forms of liability.952 Moreover, Goy 
suggests that the wording of article 25(3)(d) creates the impression that the contributions listed are 
residual forms of accessorial liability.
953
 Furthermore, Goy interprets the Lubanga Confirmation 
Decision to mean that the JCE doctrine is not included in article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute 
because a significant contribution does not amount to an essential contribution.
954
 According to 
Goy, a contribution to a JCE cannot amount to a commission and consequently the accused cannot 
qualify as principal perpetrator in terms of article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute.
955
 Arguably, Goy 
limits the degree of liability for making a contribution to a JCE to accessorial liability, a derivative 
form of liability.   
Arguably, article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute is not comparable to JCE liability as construed by 
the case law of the ad hoc tribunals because it is a catch all provision that does not require intent. 
According to Damgaard, article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute does not include JCE category 
three.
956
 Werle states that: “[t]his catch-all provision applies to indirect forms of assistance - such as 
financing the group - that do not warrant liability for either co-perpetration or aiding and abetting, 
as they have no substantial effect on the commission of the crime under international law.”957 
Furthermore, the ICC PTC in Lubanga describes contributions under article 25(3)(d) of the Rome 
Statute as a “subsidiary form of participation” and “the weakest form of liability”.958 According to 
the differentiation model, a lower degree of guilt ensues from a contribution to a group as described 
by article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute than aiding and abetting as described by article 25(3)(c) of 
the Rome Statute. Alternatively, the ad hoc tribunals attribute accessorial liability where the 
accused‟s contribution had a substantial effect on the commission of a crime by someone else.959 
The ICTY Appeal Chamber in the Prosecutor v Vasiljević (“Vasiljević Appeal”),960 Krstić and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
same outcome, however article 31 of the VCLT “respects the hierarchy of sources better and the systematic 
interpretation allows for taking into consideration the structure of article 25(3) of the Rome Statute”. 
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 8-9 cf Lubanga Confirmation Decision ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN (2007) paras 334-337. 
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 Goy (2012) ICL Rev 8-9. 
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 Damgaard Individual Criminal Responsibility for Core International Crimes 176. According to Damgaard, Sliedregt 
and Ambos share the same view. See also K Ambos “Remarks on the General Part of International Criminal Law” 
(2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 660 672-673.  
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Prosecutor v Simić (“Simić Appeal”) found that aiding and abetting warrants a lower sentence than 
responsibility for co-perpetration and participating in a JCE.
961
 For example, in the Krstić Appeal 
the sentence was decreased from 46 to 35 years imprisonment when the conviction was changed on 
appeal from participating in a JCE to aiding and abetting.
962
 The decrease in sentencing was based 
on the decrease in seriousness of the crime. Furthermore, article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute refers 
to “contribut[ions] to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of 
persons acting with a common purpose,” in “any other way,” after listing committing, inducing and 
assisting or aiding and abetting.
963
 Arguably, by using the phase “[i]n any other way contributes” 
the Rome Statue acknowledges that committing, inducing and assisting are all forms of 
contributions, in varying degrees. Moreover that a contribution to the commission of a crime by a 
group can amount to a commission, an inducement or assistance in certain circumstances yet failing 
those requirements, a contribution in any other way will be covered under sub-article 25(3)(d) of the 
Rome Statute. Damgaard argues that it could be argued that JCE category three is encompassed by 
article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, which sets out criminal responsibility for commission.
964
   
Arguably, JCE liability, as understood by the ad hoc tribunals, is comparable in severity and in 
the characterisation of its elements to commission as provided for in article 25(3)(a) of the Rome 
Statute. As discussed in chapter two, the ICTY in the Furundžija Appeal stated that two types of 
criminal participation exist in international law; co-perpetrators who participate in a JCE and aiders 
and abettors.
965
 Furthermore, the ICTY Appeal Chamber found that article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute 
includes acting in concert as a form of commission.
966
 Arguably, the Furundžija Appeal provides 
support for the inclusion of JCE liability under article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, which lists joint 
commission or acting in concert “with another” as a form of commission.967 However, the ICC is 
not bound to accept the ICTY‟s jurisprudence when interpreting article 25, nonetheless; the ICC 
might elect to consider the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals if their interpretation of 
commission and principal liability is consistent with article 25 of the Rome Statute. In order to 
establish whether a contribution to a JCE can be included in article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, 
the subjective and objective elements of each must be compared. 
 
5 6 3 1 Mens rea 
 
Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute requires that “every co-perpetrator has to act with the requisite 
mental element himself”.968  The ICTY in the Tadić Appeal stated that a participant in a JCE can 
incur criminal responsibility for crimes that fall beyond the scope of the common plan where they 
                                                          
961
 Werle & Burghardt “Establishing Degrees of Responsibility” in Pluralism in International Criminal law 15 cf  
Prosecutor v Krstić IT-98-33-A (2004) para 268; Prosecutor v Simić IT-95-9-A (2006) para 265.  
962
 Werle & Burghardt “Establishing Degrees of Responsibility” in Pluralism in International Criminal law 15-16 cf 
Prosecutor v Krstić IT-98-33-A (2004) para 275. 
963
 Art 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90. 
964
 Damgaard Individual Criminal Responsibility for Core International Crimes 176. 
965
 Prosecutor v Furundžija IT-95-17/1-A (2000) para 118.  
966
 Para 116.  
967
 Art 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90: “In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be 
criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person: (a) 
Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another person, regardless of whether 
that other person is criminally responsible.” 
968
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 959 and 961 (My own emphasis added). 
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are a “natural and foreseeable consequence” of executing the common plan.969  Werle argues that, 
when using JCE category three, the accused does not need to “fulfil the mens rea of the crime on his 
[or her] own”.970 However, the ICTY in the Brđanin Appeal stated that: “[t]he accused must possess 
the requisite intent”.971 Therefore the prosecution must prove that the un-concerted crime was 
objectively foreseeable and subjectively foreseen by the accused.
972
 Furthermore, the ICTR in 
Karemera stated that principal liability only ensues after the prosecution has proved that the 
accused shared the intent to further to the common purpose of the JCE.
973
 Moreover, the requisite 
intent of the accused can only be established beyond a reasonable doubt if it is the only reasonable 
inference on the evidence.
974
 Therefore JCE category three requires that the accused possesses a 
form of intent (mens rea) known as dolus eventualis. Where the accused subjectively foresees the 
possibility that an undesired crime might occur, in substantially the same manner as it does occur, 
during or as a result of the execution of the concerted crime yet the accused reconciles him or 
herself with that risk and proceeds nonetheless; he or she possesses dolus eventualis.
975
 For 
example, the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Prosecutor v Brđanin (“Brđanin”) stated, with respect to 
the third category of JCE, that “[a]n accused convicted of a crime under the third category of joint 
criminal enterprise need not be shown to have intended to commit the crime or even to have known 
with certainty that the crime was to be committed.”976 The ICTY elaborates further:  
 
“[i]t is sufficient that the accused entered into a joint criminal enterprise to commit a 
different crime with the awareness that the commission of that agreed upon crime made it 
                                                          
969
 Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A (1999) para 228; Prosecutor v Vasiljević IT-98-32-A (2004) para 101; Prosecutor v 
KvoČka et al IT-98-30/1-A (2005) para 83; Prosecutor v Ntakirutimana & Ntakirutimana ICTR-96-10-A/ICTR-96-17-
A (2004) para 46Z. See also Prosecutor v Krstić IT-98-33-T (2001) paras 615-618. Krstić was member of the JCE, 
aimed at forcibly transferring the Bosnian Muslim civilians despite knowing that the crimes were related to a 
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population he participated in the common purpose, which indicated 
that the specific intent required for a liability for a crime against humanity was satisfied. Krstić therefore incurred 
liability for the deviatory or incidental murders, rapes, beatings and abuses committed in the execution of the JCE at 
Potoĉari. 
970
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 959 (My own emphasis added). 
971
 Prosecutor v Brđanin IT-99-36-A (2007) paras 365, 411 and 429. 
972
 Prosecutor v Ojdanić et al IT-99-37-AR72 Separate Opinion of Judge David Hunt on Challenge by Ojdanić IT-99-
37-AR72 (2003) para 11. See also Prosecutor v Tadić ICTY IT-94-1-A (1999) para 204; Prosecutor v Karemera & 
Ngirumpatse ICTR-98-44-A para 627 cf Prosecutor v KvoČka et al IT-98-30/1-A (2005) para 86.  
973
 Prosecutor v Karemera & Ngirumpatse ICTR-98-44-T (2012) para 155; Prosecutor v Karemera & Ngirumpatse 
ICTR-98-44-A (2014) para 608: The Appeal Chamber upheld that the Trial Chamber had “adequately explained and 
reasonably concluded” that the perpetrators of rape and sexual assault possessed genocidal intent. 
974
 Prosecutor v Brđanin IT-99-36-A (2007) para 429. 
975
 J Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 3 ed (2005) 152. 
976
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 959 cf Prosecutor v Brđanin (Trial Chamber) IT-99-36-T (1 September 2004) para 
709 cf Prosecutor v Brđanin (Trial Chamber) IT-99-36-R77 Decision on Motion for Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98bis 
(19 March 2004) para 57: dolus specialis could not be reconciled with the mens rea required for a conviction pursuant 
to the third category of joint criminal enterprise because the latter only requires awareness of the risk that genocide 
would be committed by other members of the group. Therefore this mens rea and falls short of the threshold needed to 
satisfy the specific intent required for a conviction for genocide.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
100 
 
reasonably foreseeable to him that the crime charged would be committed by other 
members of the joint criminal enterprise, and it was committed.”977   
 
Furthermore, where the crime charged requires genocidal intent “the Prosecution will be required to 
establish that it was reasonably foreseeable to the accused that an act specified in [a]rticle 4(2) 
would be committed and that it would be committed with genocidal intent”.978 In summation, the ad 
hoc tribunals require that the accused must possess the direct intent (dolus directus) to contribute to 
the group and further the commission of the international crime that falls within the common 
purpose.
979
 Also, the accused does not need to possess direct intent with regards to the deviatory 
crime but must possess dolus eventualis before criminal responsibility for the commission of the 
deviatory crime can ensue.  
According to Werle‟s understanding of Lubanga: “[f]oreseeing and reconciling yourself with the 
risk is enough for JCE liability under ICTY but this is not sufficient for ICC, the accused must act 
with the specific requisite intent.”980 Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute and the Elements of 
Crimes, require that the accused act with the requisite mens rea for the crime especially where the 
crime falls within the common purpose.
981
 Where the crime falls outside the common purpose of the 
group, the accused must satisfy the specific mens rea (for example, the intent to destroy for 
genocide) for the crime.
982   
If the crime does not involve specific intent (dolus specialis), the 
prosecution must prove that the accused satisfies the general mens rea, pursuant to article 30 of 
Rome Statute.
983
 The ICC in Lubanga interpreted article 30 of the Rome Statute as including dolus 
eventualis.
984
 According to Goy, the ICC PTC has provided different interpretations for article 30 of 
the Rome Statute and the jurisprudence the tribunals can therefore be helpful in reconciling these 
differences.
985
  
In conclusion, JCE category three arguably fits within the plain reading of joint commission and 
satisfies its subjective element because article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute provides for crimes that 
fall outside of the common purpose yet which are a natural foreseeable consequence of executing 
the common purpose. Where the crime does not require specific intent, Werle explains that the 
subjective element for a commission is satisfied where “the co-perpetrator is aware of the risk that 
the crime might be committed in the execution of the common plan, and that he accepted that risk” 
(ie dolus eventualis).
986
   Werle posits that “this standard seems to be consonant with the threshold 
established by the ICTY for the third category of the joint criminal enterprise doctrine”.987  
                                                          
977
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 959 cf Prosecutor v Brđanin IT-99-36-T (2004) para 709 cf Prosecutor v Brđanin 
IT-99-36-R77 Decision on Motion for Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98bis (2004) para 57.  
978
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 959 cf Prosecutor v Brđanin IT-99-36-T (2004) para 709 cf Prosecutor v Brđanin 
IT-99-36-R77 Decision on Motion for Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98bis (2004) para 57. 
979
 Prosecutor v Haradinaj ICTY IT-04-84-T (2008) 135-139; Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A (1999) para 196; 
Prosecutor v Karemera & Ngirumpatse ICTR-98-44-A (2014) para 634. 
980
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 963 cf Prosecutor v Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06 (2007) para 349. 
981
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 962 cf art 25 of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90. See the ICC, “Elements of 
Crimes” (2002) pursuant to article 9(1) of the Rome Statute ICC Doc ICC-ASP/1/3 at 108, UN Doc 
PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000). 
982
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 962.  
983
 962 cf art 25 of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90. See the ICC, “Elements of Crimes” (2002) pursuant to 
article 9(1) of the Rome Statute ICC Doc ICC-ASP/1/3 at 108, UN Doc PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000).  
984
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 962 cf Prosecutor v Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06 (2007) para 323. 
985
 Goy (2012) ICL Rev 7. 
986
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 963.  
987
 963.  
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However, where the crime falls outside of the common purpose, as rape usually does, the accused 
must also satisfy the specific intent if the crime is a specific intent crime.  The attachment of 
specific intent where it does not exist, violates the principle of personal culpability.
988
 After the 
accused has made a substantial contribution, co-perpetration and the JCE doctrine attributes the 
contribution of others to the accused, not their mens rea.
989
  It appears that the subjective 
requirements of JCE category one are compatible with the subjective requirements for a 
commission, pursuant to articles 25(3)(a) and 30 of the Rome Statute. Furthermore, the subjective 
requirements of JCE category three are also compatible if the crime does not require specific intent.  
 
5 6 3 2  Actus reus 
 
The ICTY Appeal Chamber in the Tadić Appeal clearly sets out the three objective elements that 
need to be satisfied before JCE liability can ensue, including; a group of persons, the emergence of 
a common plan and the contribution of the accused to a crime within the common plan.
990
 The ICC 
in the Lubanga Confirmation Decision set out three similar elements; the existence of an agreement 
or common plan between two or more persons that includes the commission of a crime or an 
element of criminality and the co-perpetrators‟ awareness that implementing the common plan will 
result in the commission of a crime and reconcile themselves with that outcome.
991
 Commission, 
pursuant to article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, includes; the physical perpetration the crime, joint 
commission and indirect commission.
992
  Physical perpetration is where the accused carried out the 
actus reus of the crime himself.
993
 Indirect perpetratorship is where the accused uses another as an 
instrument.
994
 Indirect perpetration acknowledges the norm “tater hinter dem tater” that attributes 
criminal responsibility for the perpetrator-behind-the-perpetrator.
995
 The indirect perpetrator is 
criminally responsible because he or she holds a superior position and exercises tight control over 
the physical perpetrator‟s will and actions; usually through an organised criminal hierarchy.996 Joint 
commission, otherwise known as co-perpetration, is where two or more perpetrator possess joint 
control over criminal conduct through the essential nature of their separate contributions together 
with an awareness of their ability to frustrate the commission.
997
 Therefore in order to bear the same 
responsibility as the physical perpetrator of the crime who carries out the actus reus, the 
contribution must be of similar weight.
998
  
Like the objective elements of JCE liability, joint commission requires an agreement between 
co-perpetrators ie the existence of a common plan.
999
 Joint commission (co-perpetration) attributes 
criminal responsibility to “criminal co-operation within the framework of a common plan or 
                                                          
988
 963 cf Prosecutor v Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06 (2007) para 349. 
989
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 963 cf K Ambos Internationales Strafrecht (2006) 134. 
990
 Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A (1999) para 227.  
991
 Goy (2012) ICL Rev 41 cf Lubanga Confirmation Decision ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN (2007) paras 343-344.  
992
 Art 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90. 
993
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 963. 
994
 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 364. 
995
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 964 cf A Eser “Individual Criminal Responsibility” in A Cassese, P Gaeta and JR 
WD Jones (eds) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary Vol 1 (2002) 767 794.  
996
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 963-964 cf Eser “Individual Criminal Responsibility” in The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court 793. See also Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 364. 
997
 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 362.  
998
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 962.  
999
 958.  
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design”.1000 Due to the “work sharing cooperation each is liable for the actions of others” ie “every 
co-perpetrator is responsible for the whole crime committed within the framework of the common 
purpose”.1001 Furthermore, like joint commission, JCE category three also attributes liability for 
crimes that are foreseeable yet fall outside of the common purpose. It appears that article 25(3)(a) of 
the Rome Statute might not be able to support liability pursuant to JCE category three due to 
requisite degree of the contribution unless one can prove that the contribution to the JCE was a 
contribution to the crime at the preparatory stage. Nonetheless article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute 
may support contributions in terms of JCE categories one and two.
1002
 Moreover, the ICC in the 
Lubanga Confirmation Decision expressly rejected the argument that joint commission includes 
JCE liability.
1003
 However, according to Cassese, committing jointly also covers certain 
contributions to a JCE.
1004
 This uncertainty calls for a more detailed discussion of the tests that 
distinguish a commission from other forms of contributions and thereby principle liability from 
derivative forms of liability.  
 
5 6 4 Comparing the ad hoc tribunals‟ and the ICC‟s tests for principal liability  
 
In Katanga, Chui, the Bemba Gombo Confirmation Decision and Lubanga the ICC adopted a 
control-of-the-crime-approach to distinguish commission that amounts to principal liability from 
other forms of participation in article 25(3)(b) to (d) that amount to accessorial liability.
1005
 
According to the ICC in the Lubanga Confirmation Decision, co-perpetrators jointly control the 
crime through the essential nature of their contributions or tasks.
1006
 An essential contribution can 
occur during planning, physical perpetration or organising.
1007
 The control-criterion is consistent 
with the German criminal law understanding of co-perpetration ie Mittäterscaft based on the 
functional control over the crime.
1008
 However it is broader than Roxin‟s theory of co-perpetration 
because the essential contribution can be made at any stage before or during the execution ie during 
the planning or execution phase.
1009
 In the Lubanga Confirmation Decision the ICC added that an 
accused possesses the necessary control when he or she can decide whether and how the offence 
                                                          
1000
 958.  
1001
 958.  
1002
 957 and 961.  
1003
 Goy (2012) ICL Rev 40 cf Lubanga Confirmation Decision ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN (2007) para 325.  
1004
 Cassese International Criminal Law 212. 
1005
 Werle & Burghardt “Establishing Degrees of Responsibility” in Pluralism in International Criminal Law 25 cf 
Prosecutor v Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06 (2007) para 338. Katanga Confirmation Decision ICC-01/04-01/07-717 (2008) 
para 480; Prosecutor v Al Bashir ICC02/05-01/09-3 Decision on the Prosecution‟s Application for a Warrant of Arrest 
against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (2009) para 210; Prosecutor v Bemba Gombo ICC-01/05-01/08-424 (2009) para 
348; Prosecutor v Banda and Jerbo (Pre-Trial Chamber I) ICC-02/05-03/09-121-Corr-Red Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges‟ (7 March 2011) para 126; Prosecutor v Ruto, Kosgey and Sang (Pre-Trial Chamber II) ICC-
01/09-01/11-373 Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Art 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute (23 
January 2012) paras 291-292; Prosecutor v Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali (Pre-Trial Chamber II) ICC-01/09-02/11-382 
Decision on the confirmation of charges (23 January 2012) para 296; Prosecutor v Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-2842 
(2012) para 994: with regards to joint commission. 
1006
 Goy (2012) ICL Rev 41 cf Lubanga Confirmation Decision ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN (2007) para 341.  
1007
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 962.  
1008
 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 407. 
1009
 407 cf C Roxin Täterschaft und Tatherrschaft (2000) 294 299.  
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will be committed.
1010
 According to Werle, a “contribution is „essential‟ if the common purpose 
cannot be achieved without it”.1011 Therefore each co-perpetrator possesses effective control when 
they are equally able to frustrate the commission.
1012
 Their contributions are therefore equally 
interdependent and temporarily irreplaceable. However, each co-perpetrator “need not possess 
overall control over the offence, because they all depend on one another for its commission”.1013 In 
addition, the principal perpetrator(s) must be aware that he, she or they control the outcome.
1014
 
Therefore the control-criterion is an objective-subjective test, which determines whether the 
accused made an essential contribution.
1015
 The control-criterion is superior to an approach that 
focuses predominantly on subjective criteria.
1016
 The “[s]ubjective criteria should not be the sole or 
predominant indicator” of the level of individual criminal responsibility.1017 If the test focuses 
solely on the subjective element, the fact that the accused‟s actions determine the degree of guilt not 
purely his or her state of mind could be lost.
1018
  
According to the ad hoc tribunals, the JCE doctrine can be used to establish principal 
liability.
1019
  
The ICTY Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v Vasiljević (“Vasiljević”), referring to JCE liability, stated 
that “all participants to the common purpose, are equally responsible for the crime committed, 
„regardless of the part played by each in its commission‟”.1020 The ICTY in the Vasiljević Appeal 
explained that JCE liability would occur when the subjective element has been satisfied, 
irrespective of the degree of participation.
1021
  Furthermore, the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the 
KvoĈka Appeal stated that “in general, there is no specific legal requirement that the accused make 
a substantial contribution to the joint criminal enterprise”.1022  It also added that it is “not necessary 
that the accused takes part directly in committing the crime under international law, or that the 
contribution is indispensable for the realization of the common plan”.1023 It appears from these 
excerpts that when the accused shares in the intention to further the underlying common purpose 
individual criminal responsibility arises.
1024
 The ICC in the Lubanga Confirmation Decision found 
that a purely subjective test that attributes liability as a principal where the accused‟s contribution to 
the JCE was made with the requisite state of mind (intent) was used by the ad hoc tribunals.
1025
 Goy 
posits that unlike JCE liability, the role and degree of each perpetrator‟s contribution is 
exceptionally relevant under principal liability as conceived by the ICC.
1026
 It appears that principal 
                                                          
1010
 Lubanga Confirmation Decision ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN (2007) para 330. 
1011
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 962.  
1012
 Lubanga Confirmation Decision ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN (2007) paras 338-339 and 347.  
1013
 Goy (2012) ICL Rev 41 cf Lubanga Confirmation Decision ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN (2007) para 342. 
1014
 Lubanga Confirmation Decision ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN (2007) paras 338-339. 
1015
 Goy (2012) ICL Rev 6 and 9. 
1016
 Werle & Burghardt “Establishing Degrees of Responsibility” in Pluralism in International Criminal Law 26.  
1017
 26.  
1018
 26. 
1019
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 955 cf Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A (1999) para 185.  
1020
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 959 cf Prosecutor v Vasiljević (Trial Chamber) IT-98-32-T (29 November 2002) 
para 67.  
1021
 Goy (2012) ICL Rev 27-28 cf Prosecutor v Vasiljević IT-98-32-A (2004) para 111. 
1022
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 959 cf Prosecutor v KvoČka et al IT-98-30/1-A (2005) paras 87, 104 and 187.  
1023
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 959 cf Prosecutor v KvoČka et al IT-98-30/1-A (2005) paras 87, 104 and 187.  
1024
 Goy (2012) ICL Rev 27-28 cf Prosecutor v Vasiljević IT-98-32-A (2004) para 111. 
1025
 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 406 cf Lubanga Confirmation Decision ICC-01/04-
01/06-803-tEN (2007) para 329. 
1026
 Goy (2012) ICL Rev 28. 
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liability arises in more limited circumstances before the ICC compared to the ad hoc tribunal‟s 
interpretation.
1027
 Therefore due to the difference between the tests that determine commission, Goy 
argues that the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals will not be of use when interpreting the 
objective elements of article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute ie the degree of the contribution 
required.
1028
  
However, the ICTY in the Brđanin Appeal (a more recent case) stated that principal liability only 
ensues where the accused possessed the requisite intent and made a significant contribution to 
furthering the JCE.
1029
 Also, the ICTR in Gacumbitsi v The Prosecutor (“Gacumbitsi Appeal”) and 
the Furundžija Appeal clarifies that “committing” includes physical perpetration or playing an 
integral part in the commission of a crime with others.
1030  
Therefore principal liability, established 
by using JCE doctrine, does not ensue as a result of the accused‟s control over the physical 
perpetrator, it does however ensue based on the accused‟s contribution to the common purpose of 
the JCE and his or her shared intent with members.
1031
 Arguably, principal liability as understood 
by the ad hoc tribunals, like the ICC, is determined by an objective-subjective test. The accused 
must at least foresee and accept that the crime he or she is being charged with might occur, share 
the direct intent to execute the crime within the common plan (subjective elements) as well as make 
a significant contribution to furthering the common purpose of the JCE (objective element) in order 
to establish liability as a principal. While the subjective element may determine whether the 
accused incurs JCE liability, as stated in the Vasiljević Appeal and confirmed by Goy above, I am of 
the opinion that it is not sufficient to incur principal liability for crimes committed by other 
members. Therefore while JCE liability may occur as soon as the subjective element is met, liability 
as a principal only ensues after the objective-subjective test is discharged. Furthermore, the only 
way to reconcile the seemingly contradictory statements, from the Brđanin Appeal, Vasiljević 
Appeal and KvoĈka Appeal discussed above, is by clarifying that the JCE doctrine does not always 
result in liability as a principal. JCE liability attributes equal responsibility to all members of the 
group; however the degree of liability attributed can be accessorial or principal in nature depending 
on the degree of participation.  
According to the ICC in the Lubanga Confirmation Decision, an accused can incur principal 
liability as a co-perpetrator, pursuant to article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, for making an 
contribution at the preparatory or execution stage provided that following five elements are met.
1032
 
Firstly, an agreement or common plan exists between two or more persons.
1033
 This objective 
element is consistent with JCE category one and three. Secondly, “a co-ordinated and essential 
contribution” must be made by each co-perpetrator “resulting in the realisation of the objective 
                                                          
1027
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 963.  
1028
 Goy (2012) ICL Rev 7. 
1029
 Prosecutor v Brđanin IT-99-36-A (2007) para 430.  
1030
 Goy (2012) ICL Rev 35 cf Gacumbitsi v The Prosecutor (Appeal Judgement) ICTR-2001-64-A Separate Opinion of 
Judge Schomburg on the Criminal Responsibility of the Appellant for Committing Genocide (7 July 2006) paras 60-61. 
See also Prosecutor v Furundžija IT-95-17/1-T (1998) para 252: To be convicted as a co-perpetrator, the accused “must 
participate in an integral part” of the crime. This was reiterated in Prosecutor v Furundžija IT-95-17/1-A (2000) para 
118. See also the Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A (1999) para 188.  The ICTY in the Tadić Appeal states that it is 
possible that the physical perpetration of the crime and the “vital” contribution by another group member may result in 
the same degree of liability. 
1031
 Prosecutor v Karemera & Ngirumpatse ICTR-98-44-A (2014) para 155.  
1032
 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 407 cf Lubanga Confirmation Decision ICC-01/04-
01/06-803-tEN (2007) paras 343-367. 
1033
 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 407 cf Lubanga Confirmation Decision ICC-01/04-
01/06-803-tEN (2007) paras 343-345. 
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elements of the crime”.1034  Arguably, a contribution to a JCE, through which the commission of 
un-concerted crimes is enabled, is a contribution at the preparatory phase. Therefore in certain 
circumstances, where the contribution to the JCE is essential in nature therefore resulting in the 
realisation of the objective elements of the un-concerted crime, principal liability can arguably 
ensue before the ICC. For instance in Lubanga, the accused incurred principal liability as a co-
perpetrator for his involvement in the common purpose.
1035
 The ICC in Lubanga found that the first 
two objective elements must be assessed on all the relevant evidence before the court.
1036
 Thirdly, 
the co-perpetrators must fulfil “the subjective elements of the crime in question” including specific 
intent, if required.
1037
 Fourthly, the all the co-perpetrators must “be mutually aware and mutually 
accept” that executing the common plan may result in the realisation of the objective elements of 
the crime.
1038
 The fourth element is characterised by a cognitive element; ie awareness, and a 
volitional element; ie acceptance.
1039
 Arguably, the third and fourth elements of the crime are 
fulfilled by the accused‟s intent in the form of dolus eventualis ie his or her awareness and 
acceptance of the commission of the crime as a likely result of his or her contribution to the JCE. 
However, Badar argues that the third element can only be satisfied by dolus directus of the first 
degree and dolus directus of the second degree (dolus indirectus) whereas dolus eventualis is 
insufficient.
1040
 Furthermore, it appears that the accused‟s intent in the form of dolus eventualis is 
insufficient to discharge the requisite special intent, from Werle and Badar‟s understanding of 
Lubanga.
1041
 However, Badar adds that the accused can alternatively satisfy the requisite intent by 
being aware of the factual circumstances that classify a specific crime as a crime against 
humanity.
1042
 Arguably, this statement supports the possibility that dolus eventualis is sufficient. 
The relationship between JCE category three, special intent crimes and principal liability will be 
discussed in greater detail in the following chapter six. Fifthly, the co-perpetrator “must be aware of 
the factual circumstances enabling him to jointly control the crime” ie he is aware of his ability to 
frustrate the commission of the crime.
1043
  This subjective element of the control-criterion, is not 
satisfied by any of the requirements for JCE liability therefore the prosecution would have to prove 
this additional requirement in the ICC. In conclusion, a contribution to a JCE with the requisite 
intent can arguably amount to a commission, pursuant to article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, in 
very particular circumstances. Therefore where the accused‟s degree of contribution to a JCE and 
his or her mental state satisfies the control-over-crime criterion then the ICC could attribute 
principal liability to him or her, in theory, where the crime does not require specific intent. For 
instance, where the accused‟s involvement in the common purpose warrants the attribution of 
principal liability as it did in Lubanga. 
 
                                                          
1034
 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 407 cf Lubanga Confirmation Decision ICC-01/04-
01/06-803-tEN (2007) paras 346-348.  
1035
 Prosecutor v Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-1049 (2007). 
1036
 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 407 cf Prosecutor v Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-
2842 (2012) para 1006.  
1037
 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 407 cf Lubanga Confirmation Decision ICC-01/04-
01/06-803-tEN (2007) paras 349-360.  
1038
 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 407. 
1039
 408. 
1040
 407. 
1041
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int'l Crim Just 963 cf Prosecutor v Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06 (2007) para 349. Refer back to 5 6 
3 1 Mens rea above. See also Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 408 cf Prosecutor v 
Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-2842 (2012) para 349. 
1042
 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 422.  
1043
 407 cf Lubanga Confirmation Decision ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN (2007) paras 366-367.  
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5 7 Conclusion 
 
The ad hoc tribunals have accepted that a contribution to a JCE, with the requisite intent, may 
amount to liability as a principal perpetrator by using JCE category three. The ICC has not used the 
JCE doctrine. The ICC has, however; attributed accessorial liability, pursuant to article 25(3)(d) of 
the Rome Statute, for contributing to a group that committed a crime. Furthermore, the ICC has 
attributed principal liability, pursuant to article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, for the co-
perpetrator‟s involvement in a common purpose. Considering the intimate nature of sexual violence, 
the hierarchy within which combatants operate and the varying manners in which they can 
contribute to the commission of crimes; it arguably would be insensitive to the nature and context of 
the crime to limit principal liability to the physical perpetrators of the crime. It would therefore be 
beneficial for the ICC to take note of developments such as the JCE doctrine when interpreting 
commission and principal liability, as entrenched in article 25(3) of the Rome Statute.  The apparent 
benefit is however insufficient in obligating or encouraging the ICC to consider the jurisprudence of 
the ad hoc tribunals. I have therefore offered, authority for this proposition by analysing the 
theoretical foundation and emergence of precedent in international law, customary international 
law, the primary instrument of the ICC ie the Rome Statute, the VCLT and the human rights 
standard.  
As a point of departure I concluded that the stare decisis principle does not generally apply in 
international law. However, it is apparent from extensive case law that the judiciary and legal 
practitioners still make use of case law in providing reasons for their findings and in support of their 
interpretation, respectively. It therefore appears that the use of precedent has emerged as a state 
practice. From a doctrinal point of view it is clear that judicial decisions are not law and the 
findings of any judicial institution do not bind any parties other than the parties to the specific case. 
However an investigation into the emergence of the use of precedent has revealed that; applicable 
sources for interpretation such as rules and practices of international law might be reflected within 
the jurisprudence of other judicial institutions. In addition, states prefer predictability and 
consistency over starting each case a new. Even though they are not bound by the principle of stare 
decisis, they have elected to follow the decisions. By acting, states display their understanding of 
the rules and practices of international law and over time, with conviction, these practices become 
part of customary international law. Moreover, certain state parties have expressly elected to 
authorise the precedence of prior decisions, through the constitutive instruments, to the PCIJ and 
ICC, over their own subsequent decisions.   
After establishing that the use of case law is a generally accepted practice, while not binding in 
nature, the focus shifted to the Rome Statute. As the primary and constitutive treaty of the ICC; the 
Rome Statute sets out the power, competencies and limitations of the ICC. Article 21 of the Rome 
Statute, expressly lists the applicable sources that should be used when interpreting the Rome 
Statute and the order in which they should be applied. The Rome Statute is the primary source. In 
addition, principles and rules of international law and general principles of law are listed as 
applicable sources. Principles and rules of international law include; customary international law 
and international criminal law. It is evident that the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals is neither 
expressly listed as a source for interpreting the Rome Statute nor deemed to be international law 
itself. However the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals does display principles and rules of 
international law and general principles of law. Therefore the ICC could look to the jurisprudence 
of the tribunals when interpreting article 25 of the Rome Statute.  
Furthermore, while the plain reading of the VCLT does not expressly include the jurisprudence 
of the ad hoc tribunals as a source of interpretation, a purposive interpretation does. The purpose of 
the VCLT, pursuant to article 31(3)(c), is to foster coherency between sources of law such as these 
three constitutive treaties. A broad and systematic view of the “context” of the Rome Statute, 
beyond the text itself, includes the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals. Firstly, the ICC and the ad 
hoc tribunals both adjudicate on matters of international criminal law. Therefore even though the 
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forums differ they both operate within the context of international criminal law. Secondly, while 
drafting the Rome Statute the drafters drew from the ICTY and ICTR Statutes and their 
jurisprudence as the immediate predecessors of the ICC.  
According to the human rights system of super legality, pursuant to article 21(3) of the Rome 
Statute, an interpretation that is consistent with human rights trumps the plain reading of the 
provision. Any interpretation of the provisions within the Rome Statute and the RPE, must be 
checked against internationally recognized human rights norms and the principle of non-
discrimination. Therefore according to the principles of legality and the principles of non-
discrimination; the elements of a crime must be construed strictly and where possible, the law 
should be applied consistently in order to foster predictability and fairness. The different 
interpretations offered by the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC, regarding the elements and degree of 
liability for the same crime, are problematic. The different interpretations breed inequality for the 
accused and the victim, where the same conduct, amounts to accessorial liability in the ICC and 
principal liability in the ad hoc tribunals. Arguably, the interpretation of individual criminal 
responsibility, commission and principal liability in the ICC should be consistent with the 
interpretations of the ad hoc tribunals. Consistency and predictability are essential to the accused‟s 
ability to regulate his or her behaviour in order to avoid prosecution, prepare his or her case and 
experience a fair trial. The balance between the use of the JCE doctrine and the principles of 
culpability, the principles of legality and the rights of the accused will be discussed further in 
chapter six. As a point of departure, like cases should be treated alike and any distinction should not 
be without due cause. Therefore in order for a judge to justify his or her departure from an existing 
interpretation, the judge would first need to acknowledge the current construction of the JCE 
doctrine. 
In addition, the JCE doctrine has been used by the ad hoc tribunals to resolve the difficulties 
with establishing criminal responsibility. It has therefore minimised the number of acquittals for 
acts of sexual violence. Arguably, the inclusion of participation in a JCE, as a form of commission 
that results in principal liability has diminished gender discrimination and improved access to 
justice by recognising the specific nature of sexual violence and developing an effective remedy. If 
looking to the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals will assist the ICC in developing an 
understanding of participation in a group as a form of commission, while respecting the text of the 
Rome Statute, in order to provide an effective remedy for the prevalence of sexual violence, then 
arguably it should. It is therefore clear that the ICC is not bound, but may look to the jurisprudence 
of the ad hoc tribunals based on state practice or because the jurisprudence might display applicable 
sources of law. This construction is supported by the purpose of the VCLT, a systematic 
interpretation of the context of the Rome Statute and the human rights standard.  
The ICC is most likely to use the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals to interpret the Rome 
Statute, where the provisions are identical or similar. In comparing article 25 of the Rome Statute to 
article 6 of the ICTR Statute and article 7 of the ICTY Statute I found both attribute principal 
liability to forms of participation that amount to their understanding of a commission. However, the 
ICC attributes principal liability to commission and accessorial liability for any other contribution 
to the commission of a crime by a group, while the ad hoc tribunals includes a contribution to the 
common criminal purpose of a group that results in the commission of an international crime (ie 
JCE liability) as a commission. It is clear that the ad hoc tribunals‟ understanding of JCE liability as 
a form of principal liability is not reconcilable with article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute that 
construes a contribution to a group as a subsidiary form of criminal responsibility that gives rise to 
the weakest form of liability. According to its characteristics, as described by both judicial forums; 
JCE liability for contributing to the common criminal purpose as construed by the ad hoc tribunal is 
arguably consistent with the ICC‟s conceptualization of commission, pursuant to article 25(3)(a) of 
the Rome Statute.  
The distinction between the ICC and the ad hoc tribunal‟s interpretation of principal liability is 
the test used by each to distinguish a commission from any other form of participation. The Rome 
Statute does not set out the test, however the test has clearly been set out in case law. The ICC uses 
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the control-criterion, while the ad hoc tribunals looks at the intention of the accused when making a 
substantial contribution.  Due to the difference in the tests, Goy argues that JCE liability cannot fit 
into article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute that regulates principal liability for joint commission. His 
argument is based on the interpretation that the ICC uses an objective-subjective test, while the ad 
hoc tribunals use a purely subjective test to distinguish a commission from lesser forms of 
participation and thereby; principal liability from accessorial liability.  
While I accept that the control-criterion is an objective-subjective test and that the basic test for 
JCE liability is a subjective test, I argue, contrary to Goy, that the ad hoc tribunals have also used an 
objective-subjective test to attribute principal liability. JCE liability is not synonymous with 
principal liability. Depending on the degree of the contribution, the intent of the accused and the 
type of crime, JCE liability can be used as a mechanism to attribute principal liability or derivative 
forms of liability. If correct, article 25 of the Rome Statute and article 6 of the ICTR Statute and 
article 7 of the ICTY Statute are comparable. Arguably, the ICC should therefore, despite not being 
bound, consider the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals when interpreting commission as a form 
of principal liability. Thereby the ICC should arguably, endeavour to include JCE liability in 
articles 25(3)(a) through (d) of the Rome Statute in order to provide for different degrees of liability 
relative the specific accused‟s degree of participation and level of intent on the facts of each 
particular case. Consequently, the JCE doctrine could be accepted and implemented by the ICC to 
establish the principal liability of high-ranked officials, in accordance with my seventh research 
question.   
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CHAPTER 6: THE LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY OF THE USE OF THE JCE 
DOCTRINE  
 
6 1 Introduction  
 
As discussed in chapter five, the JCE doctrine, particularly category three, has successfully been 
used by the ICTY and ICTR ad hoc tribunals to hold high-ranked officials criminally responsible 
for acts of sexual violence despite the fact that the actus reus was carried out by another. 
Notwithstanding its usefulness in the prosecution of crimes involving sexual violence the JCE 
doctrine must be able to stand the test of criticism. In this final substantive chapter, I test the legality 
and legitimacy of the JCE doctrine in pursuance of my eighth research question. Firstly, the rights 
of an accused to fair trial, the principle of legality and the principle of culpability are defined. The 
right to fair trial protects the accused from unfair practices, including placing the onus on the 
prosecution to establish all the elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt. 
Moreover, the principles of legality and culpability ensure the legitimacy of any criminal law 
system. While the international community has a duty to prosecute acts of sexual violence and to 
hold all those responsible accountable, as discussed in chapters two and three, the desire to secure 
convictions and appease societies‟ understanding of justice should not overshadow the fundamental 
principles of criminal law. Solutions or doctrines, which do not preserve these principles, will 
eventually fade away because they are not be useful if they lack legal certainty. The legitimacy of 
the international criminal system as “a fair, impartial and effective system” of justice is being 
determined by every decision the judiciary makes.
1044
 Therefore the use of solutions, which do not 
preserve the principles of legality and culpability could potentially threaten international criminal 
law.  
To be able to conclude on whether the JCE doctrine should have a place within modern 
international criminal law seven criticisms of the JCE doctrine and counter-arguments that I have 
come across in case law and academic articles throughout my research will be discussed and 
analysed in this chapter. Thereby, I aim to determine the best way to balance the beneficial use of 
the JCE doctrine against the concerns that it may threaten the rights of the accused and fundamental 
principles of criminal law. In conclusion, various solutions in response to the criticisms, including 
the possible reform of the JCE doctrine, are discussed.  
 
6 2  The general principles of criminal law 
 
International criminal law is relatively new and constantly developing. Therefore the accused is 
usually not aware of all the procedures and only a limited number of cases from the ICC are 
available when preparing his or her defence.
1045
  Furthermore, substantial parts of international law 
are neither codified because they have developed through customary international law nor are they 
derived from a central legislative organ.
1046
 Despite the infancy of international criminal law and 
the restricted availability of information for the accused, the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC have the 
                                                          
1044
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cal L Rev 143. 
1045
 98.  
1046
 98. According to Danner and Martinez, the fact that there is no centralised legislative body means that it is unlikely 
that the interpretation of the judges with regards to the definitions of the crime and forms of liability will be challenged 
even when an oversight body exits. For example, during the first 10 years of the ad hoc tribunals‟ operation UNSC has 
not “amended any of the definitions of the substantive crimes or liability theories in the Statutes of the ICTY or ICTR”. 
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power to lawfully deprive the accused of their right to freedom once convicted.
1047
 Danner and 
Martinez argue that international criminal law “inherently lacks the security provided by a clearly-
articulated and time-tested criminal code, familiar and longstanding criminal procedures, and the 
certainty that most serious crimes will be punished”.1048 Therefore Danner and Martinez suggest 
that in order to ensure the legitimacy of international criminal law “the judges should hew closely to 
the restraining influences of the culpability model when deciding how to construe substantive and 
procedural rules”.1049 By preserving the culpability principle, as “the cornerstone of the criminal 
law paradigm,” the legitimacy in international criminal law is established and preserved.1050 Danner 
and Martinez add that the “[l]imitations derived from criminal principles preserve not only the 
rights of the defendants, but also the legitimacy of the proceedings in a way that is critical to 
serving their transitional justice and human rights goals”.1051  
 
6 2 1 The principles of legality 
 
The Rome Statute does not expressly refer to the principles of legality, however it lists two of its 
“expressions” in articles 22 and 23, which sets out the general principles of criminal law.1052 The 
principles of legality and basic notions of criminal law include; nullum crimen sine lege (no crime 
without law), nulla poena sine lege (no punishment without law) and non-retroactivity ratione 
personae.
1053
 These principles require that the conduct, at the time it was committed, had to 
constitute a crime otherwise liability cannot ensue.
1054
 Therefore the attribution of liability for 
conduct committed before the Statute entered into force is prohibited.
1055
 It also specifies that a 
definition of a crime must be interpreted narrowly.
1056
 Moreover, if the law changes, prior to a final 
judgement, the law that favours the accused will apply.
1057
 In addition, an accused convicted by the 
                                                          
1047
 98. 
1048
 98.  
1049
 96.  
1050
 97.  
1051
 97.  
1052
 BS Brown Research Handbook on International Criminal Law (2001) 6 cf arts 22 and 23 of the Rome Statute 
(2003) 2187 UNTS 90. 
1053
 Arts 22-24 of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90. 
1054
 Art 15 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into for 23 
March 1976) 999 UNTS 171: “1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission 
which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor 
shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was 
committed. If, subsequent to the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of the lighter 
penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby. 2. Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any 
person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal”; art 11 of the UDHR (1948) 
UNGA Res 217 A(III): “2. No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which 
did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a 
heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed”; art 22(1) of 
the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90. 
1055
 Art 24(1) of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90. 
1056
 Art 22(2) of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90. 
1057
 Art 24(2) of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90. 
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ICC can only be punished in accordance with the options provided by the Rome Statute.
1058
  
Therefore in order not to violate the principles of legality, the crimes for which the accused is being 
tried, “must be criminal under customary or treaty law and entail individual criminal responsibility” 
at the time the crime was committed.
1059
  
According to the ECCC in Prosecutor v Kaing Guek Eav (“Kaing Guek Eav”), the principles of 
legality include the accused‟s right to know the theories of liability that will be used against him or 
her.
1060
 The Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR were drafted after the genocides in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, respectively. In order to prevent the retrospective application of 
substantive international criminal law, “the ICTY and the ICTR generally test whether their Statutes 
reflect customary law”.1061 The judges of the ad hoc tribunals can only apply the provision if it 
correctly reflects customary international law.
1062
 If it does not, the judges must determine and 
apply custom instead of the statute.
1063
 The ICTY and ICTR have generally relied on customary 
international law instead of treaty law.
1064
 By ensuring that the provisions of the statute are 
consistent with pre-existing crimes in customary international law, the ad hoc tribunals avoided 
violating the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, despite the fact that the statutes were enacted 
after the crimes were committed.
1065
 In the same way, theories of liability; including the JCE 
doctrine, should be tested against treaty and customary law, as I have done in chapter four, to 
determine whether it was previously recognised by international customary law and therefore not 
being applied retrospectively.
1066 
Furthermore, article 22(2) of the Rome Statute requires a strict interpretation of the definitions of 
the crimes.
1067
 Werle and Burghardt argue that article 22(2) of the Rome Statute is of “paramount 
                                                          
1058
 Art 23 of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90. 
1059
 International Criminal Law Services “Module 3: General Principles of International Criminal Law” (no date) United 
Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (13 June 2015) 4 
<http://wcjp.unicri.it/deliverables/training_icl.php.Module_3_General_principles_of_international_criminal_law.pdf> 
(accessed 13-06-2015).  
1060
 van Schaack (2009) 7 Nw J of Int‟l Hum Rts 223 cf Prosecutor v Kaing Guek Eav 002/14-08-2006/ECCC/OCP 
Public Information by the Co-Prosecutors Pursuant to Rule 54 Concerning Their Rule 66 Final Submission Regarding 
Kaing Guek Eav alias “Duch” (18 July 2008) paras 24-28. 
1061
 International Criminal Law Services “Module 3: General Principles of International Criminal Law” United Nations 
Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute 4.   
1062
 International Criminal Law Services “Module 3: General Principles of International Criminal Law” United Nations 
Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute 4. 
1063
 International Criminal Law Services “Module 3: General Principles of International Criminal Law” United Nations 
Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute 4. 
1064
 International Criminal Law Services “Module 3: General Principles of International Criminal Law” United Nations 
Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute 4. 
1065
 International Criminal Law Services “Module 3: General Principles of International Criminal Law” United Nations 
Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute 4 cf Prosecutor v Kordić & Čerkez (Appeal Chamber) IT-95-14/2-A 
(17 December 2004) para 46: “The original reason for this approach is to avoid violating the principle of nullum crimen 
sine lege in the event that a party to the conflict did not adhere to a specific treaty”. 
1066
 van Schaack (2009) Nw J Int‟l Hum Rts 223 cf Prosecutor v Kaing Guek Eav 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (2008) 
paras 24-28. 
1067
 Art 22 of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90: “Nullum crimen sine lege 1. A person shall not be criminally 
responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court. 2. The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In 
case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted. 
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importance for interpretation” of the Rome Statute, however; it does not require that the ICC must 
always adopt the most restrictive interpretation because that would cause unjustifiable results.
1068
 
Moreover, Van den Wyngaert J, in her Concurring Opinion delivered by the ICC Trial Chamber, in 
Chui argues that the “greatest importance” should be attached to article 22(2) of the Rome Statute 
when interpreting the Rome Statute.
1069
 However, Werle and Burghardt argue that the principle of 
strict construction only arises where an interpretation in accordance with article 31(1) of the VCLT 
gives rise to two equally plausible constructions.
1070
  
 
6 2 2 The principle of individual culpability 
 
The principle of culpability “expresses a moral theory of responsibility and punishment”.1071 Parry 
explains that establishing the accused‟s criminal responsibility on their moral blameworthiness “is 
the primary justification for imposing criminal sanctions”.1072 The principle of culpability is broadly 
accepted as the basis of criminal law.
1073
 Pomorski states that European democracies regard the 
principle of culpability to be “a fundamental precept of criminal law, requiring that the moral 
culpability be the basis for the imposition of individual criminal responsibility” and the severity of 
the sentence of imposed.
1074
 The principle of individual culpability prevents “harsh outcomes that 
are incompatible with human dignity, such as imposing criminal liability when no behaviour at all 
can be attributed to the accused or when his conduct was not voluntary”.1075 In addition, the 
principle of culpability limits “the punishment for an offense to what is deserved according to the 
offender‟s culpability”.1076 As discussed in chapter five, despite the collective nature of many 
international crimes, criminal responsibility still needs to be established individually, in order to 
comply with the principle of individual culpability.
1077
 
The Rome Statute does not expressly refer to the principle of culpability under the general 
principles of criminal law, however Brown argues that this principle is reflected in article 30 of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
3. This article shall not affect the characterization of any conduct as criminal under international law independently of 
this Statute.” 
1068
 Werle & Burghardt “Establishing Degrees of Responsibility” in Pluralism in International Criminal law 22 cf G 
Werle & B Burghardt “Do Crimes Against Humanity Require the Participation of a State or a „State- Like‟ 
Organization?” (2012) 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1151 1158-1159. 
1069
 Werle & Burghardt “Establishing Degrees of Responsibility” in Pluralism in International Criminal law 21-22 cf 
Prosecutor v Chui ICC-01/04-02/12-4 Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert (2012) 18-19; 
Prosecutor v Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-2842 Separate Opinion of Judge Adrian Fulford (2012) 10. 
1070
 Werle & Burghardt “Establishing Degrees of Responsibility” in Pluralism in International Criminal law 22 cf art 
31 of the VCLT (1980) 1115 UNTS 331: “1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” 
1071
 Brown Research Handbook on International Criminal Law 6. 
1072
 6 cf JT Parry “Culpability, Mistake, and Official Interpretations of Law” (1997) 25 American Journal of Criminal 
Law 1 21.  
1073
 Brown Research Handbook on International Criminal Law (2001) 6 cf JL Diamond “The Myth of Morality and 
Fault in Criminal Law Doctrine” (1996) 34 American Criminal Law Review 111: Diamond argues that it is not 
universally regarded as the basis of criminal law.   
1074
 Brown Research Handbook on International Criminal Law (2001) 6 cf S Pomorski “Review Essay; Reflections on 
the First Criminal Code of Post-Communist Russia” 46 American Journal of Comparative Law 385. 
1075
 M Kremnitzer & T Hörnle “Human Dignity and the Principle of Culpability” (2011) 44 Israel Law Review 115 115. 
1076
 115. 
1077
 Werle (2007) J Int‟l Crim J 953. 
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Rome Statute.
1078
 Article 30 of the Rome Statute states that criminal responsibility can only ensue 
where the material elements of the crime are committed with intent and knowledge.
1079
    
 
6 3 Criticisms of the JCE doctrine  
 
6 3 1 Argument one: The JCE doctrine has no foundation in customary international law 
 
Werle argues that the JCE doctrine violates the principles of legality because it has no foundation in 
customary international law.
1080
 Furthermore, Ohlin argues that the cases, referred to by the ICTY 
in the Tadić Appeal during the investigation into the origin of common purpose liability, were 
disreputable sources.
1081
  For instance, Ohlin opposes the repute of the Trial of Erich Heyer and six 
others (“Essen Lynching”), delivered by the British Military Court, because some of the war crimes 
tribunals exercised their “jurisdiction without a written penal statute” whereas the ICTY draws its 
competence, powers and mandate from the ICTY Statute.
1082
 Arguably, this argument has no merit 
because the rules and practices of customary international law do not stem from a written penal 
code, either. Ohlin concedes that the ICTY recognised the jurisprudence of the British Military 
Court as evincing the existence of customary international law.
1083
 In addition, Werle argues that 
the ICTY in the Tadić Appeal found that participation in a JCE is a form of commission, originated 
in post-WWII jurisprudence, which forms part of customary international law.
1084
 Furthermore, 
Scharf concludes that it was the “paradigm-shifting nature” of the IMT precedent, and the “unified 
                                                          
1078
 Brown Research Handbook on International Criminal Law 7.  
1079
 7 cf art 30 of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90: “1. Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally 
responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are 
committed with intent and knowledge.  2. For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where: (a) In relation to 
conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct; (b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that 
consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events. 3. For the purposes of this article, 
„knowledge‟ means awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events. 
„Know‟ and „knowingly‟ shall be construed accordingly.” 
1080
 Werle (2007) J Int‟l C J 960-961. See Ambos Internationales Strafrecht 36; A Bogdan “Individual Criminal 
Responsibility in the Execution of a „Joint Criminal Enterprise‟ in the Jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc International 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia” (2006) 6 International Criminal Law Review 63 109; Powles (2004) J Int‟l Crim J 
615. 
1081
 Ohlin (2007) J Int‟l Crim J 76.  
1082
 76: “The cases heard by the IMT were governed by the Nuremberg Charter, which included only a minimalist 
definition of substantive offences. Subsequent prosecutions were also held under the auspices of Control Council Law 
No. 10, which governed the administration of Germany after the war before the return of sovereignty. However, these 
prosecutions rarely involved the interpretation of a sophisticated penal statute that defined war crimes or conspiracy in 
an explicit fashion.” See also 71: Ohlin argues that these three categories are extracted from international cases, some of 
which he believes are unconvincing sources of precedent. See also 77: Ohlin argues that the criticisms of the Tadić 
Appeal are still relevant because they highlight the “unique circumstances” of the case such as the limited language of 
art 7 of the ICTY Statute and its purposive expansion yet he finds that the Tadić Appeal is not a meaningful precedent 
for the interpretation of art 25 of the Rome Statute because its “provisions were born from an entirely different process 
and its provisions must be interpreted within that context”. 
1083
 76. 
1084
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int‟l C J 959 cf Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A (1999) para 188.  
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and unqualified endorsement of the Nuremberg principles by the nations of the world in 1946, 
rather than the number of cases applying JCE liability at the time, that crystalized this doctrine into 
mode of individual criminal liability under customary international law.”1085 Therefore the JCE 
doctrine is rooted in customary international law, as discussed in chapter four. Arguably, because 
the participation in a JCE and JCE liability originates in customary international law its use is not 
retrospective and does not violate the principles of legality.  
 
6 3 2 Argument two: JCE category three cannot be applied to crimes that require specific intent  
 
Cassese posits that the main difficulty experienced with JCE category three is not an evidentiary 
problem; instead it arises from the risk that it poses to the fundamental notions of criminal law; 
culpability and causation.
1086
 Cassese argues that the expansive interpretation of article 25(d) of the 
Rome Statute to include JCE category three is justified by punishing criminal conduct that would 
otherwise not lead to culpability, however, the form of intent required by JCE category three is 
insufficient when the un-concerted crime requires specific intent (dolus specialis).
1087
  As of late, 
the ICTY Appeal Chamber in the Brđanin Appeal has expanded the application of the JCE category 
three by attributing criminal responsibility to the “primary offender” for reasonably foreseeable 
crimes that require specific intent; ie genocide.
1088
 Additionally, the ICTY in Prosecutor v 
Milošević (“Milošević”) used the extended form, JCE category three, for specific intent crimes such 
as genocide and crimes against humanity.
1089
  According to Cassese, JCE category three does not 
require that the accused possess the specific intent (dolus specialis) for the un-concerted crime.
1090
  
The use of JCE category three may therefore disregard the prerequisite that a person may only be 
held guilty if his culpability has been proven by establishing that the accused‟s conduct and mens 
rea caused the subsequent crime.
1091
 In addition, Badar argues that special intent crimes require 
proof of the accused‟s dolus directus of the first degree.1092 As discussed in chapter five, Werle also 
argues that JCE category three violates the principle of personal culpability because the accused 
does not need to possess the requisite intent.
1093
 The lesser from of mens rea, required by JCE 
category three, arguably results in causal link being defective.  
                                                          
1085
 MP Scharf “Joint Criminal Enterprise, the Nuremberg Precedent, and Concept of „Grotian Moment‟” in T Isaacs & 
R Vernon (ed) Accountability for Collective Wrongdoing (2011) 119 138.  
1086
 Cassese (2007) J Int‟l C J 117. 
1087
 132-133.  
1088
 133 cf Prosecutor v Brđanin IT-99-36-A (2007). See also Cassese (2007) J Int‟l C J 113: Cassese refers to physical 
perpetrator of the un-concerted crime as the “primary offender” and the accused as the “secondary offender”. 
1089
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cal L Rev 143 cf Prosecutor v Milošević (Trial Chamber) IT-02-54-T Decision on 
Motion for Judgement of Acquittal (16 June 2004) para 291; Prosecutor v Brđanin (Appeal Judgement) IT-99-36-A 
Decision on Interlocutory Appeal (19 March 2004) para 9: stating “provided that the standard applicable to that head of 
liability, i.e. 'reasonably foreseeable and natural consequences' is established, criminal liability can attach to an accused 
for any crime that falls outside of an agreed upon joint criminal enterprise”. 
1090
 Cassese (2007) J Int‟l C J 117. 
1091
 117. 
1092
 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 426. 
1093
 Werle (2007) 5 J Int‟l C J 961 cf ME Badar “Just Convict Everyone! Joint Preparation: from Tadić to Stakić and 
Back Again” (2006) 6 International Criminal Law Review 293 301; V Haan “The Development of the Concept of Joint 
Criminal Enterprise at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia!” (2005) 5 International Criminal 
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6 3 3  Argument three: The JCE doctrine violates the human rights of the accused and the 
principles of legality 
 
The accused‟s human right to a fair trial, including the presumption of innocence and non-
compellability, is guaranteed by the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”) and the UDHR.1094 The JCE doctrine does not compel the accused to incriminate him or 
herself. Furthermore, the JCE doctrine neither negates the prosecution‟s duty to prove all the 
objective and subjective elements of the crime before liability can ensue nor place a reverse onus on 
the accused to disprove any elements. According to Shahabuddeen J‟s, dissenting opinion in the 
Prosecutor v Brđanin (“Brđanin Decision on Interlocutory Appeal”), the JCE category three does 
not remove the prosecution‟s duty to prove intent.1095 Instead it “provides a mode of proving intent 
in particular circumstances” by proving the accused‟s foresight and acceptance of the risk.1096 
Shahabuddeen J adds that specific intent is an untouchable element of genocide.
1097
 Therefore, I 
argue that the application of the JCE doctrine does not violate the right of the accused to a fair trial. 
Therefore a limitations enquiry which is used to determine whether one human right justifiably and 
reasonably limits another human right, is not necessary.
1098
 
Furthermore, the accused has the right be aware of the charges against him or her so that he or 
she can prepare his or her defence. Cassese argues that the application of the JCE doctrine is not 
contrary to the principles of legality; nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena, sine lege, because 
the accused has or should have sufficient knowledge of the JCE doctrine‟s applicability in 
customary international law.
1099
 The JCE doctrine is a complex legal doctrine that, as has been 
discussed in great detail in this thesis, is not codified. It would be an exceptionally high burden on 
the prosecution to prove that the accused had actual knowledge of the JCE doctrine itself. Arguably, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Law Review (2005) 195 and 197; G Mettraux International Crimes and the ad hoc Tribunals (2005) 292; Powles (2004) 
J Int‟l C J 611. 
1094
 Art 14 of the ICCPR (1976) 999 UNTS 171: involves the right to fair trial including the presumption of innocence, 
non-compellability and minimum guarantees; art 10 of the UDHR (1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III): “Everyone is entitled 
in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights 
and obligations and of any criminal charge against him;” art 11 of the UDHR (1948) UNGA Res 217 A (III): “1. 
Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a 
public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defense.” 
1095
 E van Sliedregt “Joint Criminal Enterprise as a Pathway to Convicting Individuals of Genocide” (2007) 5 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 184 204 cf Prosecutor v Brđanin IT-99-36-A Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen (2004) paras 2 and 4-5. 
1096
 van Sliedregt (2007) JICL 204 cf Prosecutor v Brđanin IT-99-36-A Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen (2004) paras 2 and 4-5. 
1097
 van Sliedregt (2007) JICL 204 cf Prosecutor v Brđanin IT-99-36-A Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen (2004) paras 2 and 4-5. 
1098
 Human Rights and Constitutional Rights “Limitations on Rights” (26 March 2008) Human Rights and 
Constitutional Rights <www.hrcr.org/chart/limitations+duties_general.html> (accessed 13-07-2015): art 29(2) of the 
UDHR (1948) UNGA Res 217 A (III): “In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to 
such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights 
and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of  morality, public order, and the general welfare in a 
democratic society. (3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles 
of the United Nations.” The ICCPR (1976) 999 UNTS 171, does not contain a general limitation clause, however 
certain provisions provide limitations clauses pertaining to that specific right.  
1099
 Haffajee (2006) Harv J L & Gender 223 cf Prosecutor v Kaing Guek Eav 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (2008) 4. 
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the principles of legality are preserved, where the accused knew that his or her contribution to a 
criminal enterprise was wrongful and that it could lead to liability under international criminal law 
instead of arguing that the accused had sufficient knowledge of the applicability of the JCE 
doctrine.  
In addition, the accused can only be charged with crimes that were already criminalised at the 
time of the alleged commission. Where the mode of participation and form of liability are expressly 
listed in the Statute, before the crime was committed, then there is no threat of uncertainty or a 
retrospective application. Ohlin therefore supports the plain reading of article 7 of the ICTY Statute 
and criticises the purposive expansion in the Tadić Appeal to include the JCE doctrine.1100 
According to Ohlin, one cannot retrospectively expand the forms of participation in article 7 of the 
ICTY Statute purely because the object and purpose of the ICTY Statute calls for the prosecution of 
all those who are responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law.
1101
 Ohlin 
finds that the ICTY Statute should only be construed by its terms, which limits the criminal liability 
of conspirators to aiding and abetting.
1102
 According to Ohlin, conspiracy sufficiently acknowledges 
the collective nature of the crime yet remains “faithful to the basic foundation of criminal law and 
its commitment to holding individuals responsible”.1103 Cassese acknowledges that some scholars 
agree that the judges of the ICTY have engaged in unwarranted judicial creativity by including the 
participation in a common purpose ie JCE liability in article 7 of the ICTY Statue.
1104
 This 
argument ties in with the unwarranted and unbalanced influence that human rights law has had on 
international criminal law, as further discussed below.   
It is true that article 7 does not expressly refer to JCE liability, however Cassese dismantles this 
criticism by affirming that the ICTY was created with the purpose of prosecuting all those 
responsible for serious crimes that fall within its jurisdiction.
1105
 In order to fulfil its purpose the 
ICTY must look to customary international law to fill gaps or provide greater detail to the ICTY 
Statute because, while the ICTY Statute does list the international crimes within its jurisdiction it 
does not provide the elements of the crime.
1106
 Ohlin acknowledges that the ICTY Statute is a 
limited document that “purposely” leaves room for the Judges to provide greater detail.1107  
Furthermore, customary international law, in accordance with comparative law, calls for the 
tribunals to look to “general concepts of criminal law” for its persuasive value whenever the statute 
is silent on matters such as “modes of responsibility”.1108 According to Cassese the Appeals 
Chamber of the ICTY has correctly stated that “commit” has a broad ambit, it is therefore within the 
ICTY‟s mandate to flesh out the JCE doctrine in execution of their proper duties which is to find 
and interpret the law which enables them to apply it to the issue at hand.
1109
 Therefore, I argue that 
the application of the JCE doctrine does not violate the principles of legality.  
                                                          
1100
 Ohlin (2007) J Int‟l C J 72. 
1101
 72. 
1102
 74. 
1103
 74. 
1104
 Cassese (2007) J Int‟l C J 113. 
1105
 114. 
1106
 114 cf See Report of the UN Secretary-General (3 May 1993) S/25704 34: “In the view of the Secretary-General, 
the application of the principle nullum crimen sine lege requires that the International Tribunal should apply rules of 
international humanitarian law that are beyond any doubt part of customary law so that the problem of adherence of 
some but not all States to specific conventions does not arise. This would appear to be particularly important in the 
context of an international tribunal prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian 
law.” 
1107
 Ohlin (2007) J Int‟l C J 74. 
1108
 Cassese (2007) J Int‟l C J 114. 
1109
 114. 
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6 3 4 Argument four: An unfettered prosecutorial discretion has over-expanded the JCE doctrine 
 
Danner and Martinez argue that there is limited jurisprudence pertaining to the link between an 
individual‟s potential criminal liability and the scope of the relevant enterprise.1110 The individual‟s 
liability therefore depends on “how broadly the prosecutors describe the criminal goal” of the JCE 
and “how loosely the judges construe foreseeability”.1111 According to Danner and Martinez, the 
JCE doctrine provides international prosecutors with a broad discretion to determine the scope of 
wrongdoing.
1112
 They therefore argue that, “prosecutorial discretion appears to be the only 
meaningful limit on the extent of wrongdoing attributable to an individual defendant in JCE”.1113 
This is concerning because the prosecution presumably tries to “maximize its chances of 
conviction” by promoting the broadest construction of the JCE.1114 They notice, that when 
international judges of the ad hoc tribunals have attempted to limit the scope of JCE they 
consistently use JCE category three without defining the limits of the enterprise.
1115
 For instance, 
the ICTY in Milošević used JCE category three for specific intent crimes such as genocide and 
crimes against humanity.
1116
 In addition, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has also expanded the 
application of JCE category three to “„vast criminal enterprises‟ where the fellow participants may 
be „structurally or geographically remote from the accused‟”.1117 These cases display the 
willingness of the judges to place the discretion onto the prosecutors.
1118
   
While prosecutorial discretion is a feature of many domestic criminal law systems, the 
concentration of power within the international criminal sphere should arguably be diluted due to 
the type of the crimes that the accused may be convicted of and their “evolving definitions”.1119 In 
addition, the Rome Statute is “more complex” than the ICTY Statute and the ICTR Statute.1120 
Danner and Martinez argue that the complexity of the Rome Statute and its differences, compared 
to the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, will birth new uncertainties.
1121
 They add that even the 
definitions of the crimes call for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
1122
 Therefore the relatively 
new international criminal system cannot operate as freely, with regards to doctrine and procedure, 
                                                          
1110
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cal L Rev 134-135.  
1111
 135. 
1112
 98. 
1113
 135. 
1114
 136.  
1115
 142. 
1116
 143 cf Prosecutor v Milošević IT-02-54-T (2004) para 291; Prosecutor v Brđanin IT-99-36-A Decision on 
Interlocutory Appeal (2004) para 9: stating “provided that the standard applicable to that head of liability, i.e. 
'reasonably foreseeable and natural consequences' is established, criminal liability can attach to an accused for any 
crime that falls outside of an agreed upon joint criminal enterprise”. 
1117
 Cassese (2007) J Int‟l C J 133. 
1118
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cal L Rev 143.  
1119
 98-99. 
1120
 99. See also Ohlin (2007) J Int‟l C J 77: art 25 of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90 includes “a more detailed 
provision on joint criminal enterprise”. 
1121
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cal L Rev 99. See also Ohlin (2007) J Int‟l C J 77 for an alternative view: Ohlin argues 
that the additional judicial doctrine in the Rome Statute, provides less opportunity for judicial creativity and provides 
greater certainty for state parties pertaining to the court‟s function and the possible modes of liability. Ohlin praises the 
Rome Statute for these developments as it “is consistent with the principle of nullum crimen sine lege”.  
1122
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cal L Rev 99. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
119 
 
as well-established domestic forums.
1123
 Hunt J‟s Dissenting Opinion in Prosecutor v Miloŝević 
stated that the fairness of the trials, not the number of convictions, will determine the legitimacy of 
the ICTY.
1124
 The unfettered discretion of prosecutors, broadly interpreted doctrines and 
unpersuasive judicial decision-making may therefore threaten the legitimacy of the international 
criminal system.
1125
 Hunt J warned that decisions giving little or no attention to the rights of the 
accused “will leave a spreading stain on this Tribunal's reputation”.1126 
 
6 3 5 Argument five: The JCE doctrine violates three concepts of criminal law and in turn the 
principle of culpability 
 
Ohlin avers that the construction of the JCE doctrine, developed by the ICTY in the Tadić Appeal, 
threatens three key concepts of criminal law, namely; the principle of culpability, intentionality and 
foreseeability.
1127
 I discuss these three concepts separately below. 
 
6 3 5 1 Equal culpability 
 
Ohlin states that an accused must only face criminal liability if he or she “participated in a 
meaningful way”.1128 The level of culpability must reflect the degree of participation and therefore 
the imposition of equal culpability for all members of a joint enterprise is philosophically 
incorrect.
1129
  Ohlin adds that “guilt and innocence must be determined relative to the elements of 
each offence”.1130 However, it is apparent from the numerous domestic and international tribunals 
referred to in the Tadić Appeal that an expansive notion of conspiracy, in the convictions of war 
criminals, was a prevalent practice.
1131
 For instance, the British Military Court in Essen Lynching 
established that “all members of the mob were guilty of the murder irrespective of their degree of 
participation, because they were „concerned in the killing””.1132 Additionally, the ICTY in the Tadić 
Appeal confirmed that:  
 
                                                          
1123
 143. 
1124
 143 cf Prosecutor v Miloŝević (Appeals Chamber) IT-02-54-AR73.4 Dissenting Opinion of Judge David Hunt on 
Admissibility of Evidence in Chief in the Form of Written Statements (21 October 2003) para 22: Hunt J, in dissent 
from a procedural ruling on the admissibility of written witness statements, stated that “[t]his Tribunal will not be 
judged by the number of convictions which it enters... but by the fairness of its trials”. 
1125
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cal L Rev 143. 
1126
 143 cf Prosecutor v Miloŝević IT-02-54-AR73.4 Dissenting Opinion of Judge David (2003) para 22.  
1127
 Ohlin (2007) J Int‟l C J 74 and 81-85.  
1128
 74. 
1129
 85. 
1130
 87.  
1131
 75-76 cf Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A (1999) para 199: “[f]or example, in the Ponzano case, which involved the 
killing of British prisoners of war, the judge noted that liability attaches in situations where the accused is 'the cog in the 
wheel of events leading up to the result and that the participation need not be so extensive that the crime would not have 
happened without his participation.” The judge concluded that “liability for a common criminal plan required 
knowledge of the group's plan”. Implicitly this suggests that the intention to further the common criminal plan is not 
required for liability.   
1132
 Ohlin (2007) J Int‟l C J 76 cf Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A (1999) para 207 cf Trial of Erich Heyer and six others 
British Military Court for the Trial of War Criminals Essen UNWCC vol 1 (18-22 December 1945) para 91. 
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“[a]lthough only some members of the group may physically perpetrate the criminal act 
(murder, extermination, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, etc.), the 
participation and contribution of the other members of the group is often vital in facilitating 
the commission of the offence in question. It follows that the moral gravity of such 
participation is often no less - or indeed no different - from that of those actually carrying 
out the acts in question”.1133 
 
The ICTY in the Tadić Appeal found that the degree of liability attributed to participants and the 
physical perpetrators is “often” equal, however this statement is qualified. The degree of liability 
depends on whether the contribution was vital to the commission of the crime ie whether the moral 
gravity can be equated to the physical perpetration.  
According to Ohlin, the Tadić-construction of the JCE doctrine violates the principles of 
criminal law, namely the principle of culpability by attributing liability to all of members equally 
irrespective of their degree of participation.
1134
 Ohlin adds that treating all members of a conspiracy 
as equally culpable “ignores the internal structure of the conspiracy and treats it as if it were some 
kind of group person whose internal structure was morally irrelevant”.1135 However, the internal 
structure is anything but irrelevant.
1136
 According to Ohlin, the “architect, the executioner, and the 
background supplier all perform distinct functions within the conspiracy and they should be held 
responsible relative to the importance of their personal conduct”.1137 It may be difficult but Ohlin 
argues that it “is possible to prove who joined the group first, who directed and planned its activities 
and who carried out its orders”. 1138  Furthermore, any legal doctrine that treats them equally, “does 
a disservice to the project of codifying difficult moral distinctions into a legal system”.1139  
In addition, Ohlin argues that the attribution of liability, for an un-concerted crime, to an accused 
other than the physical perpetrator, is “a strong and unwarranted conclusion” and an unnecessarily 
expansion of article 7 of the ICTY Statute, which restricts liability to planning, instigating, and 
aiding and abetting.
1140
 Ohlin suggests that conspiracy, unlike JCE category three, is the mode of 
participation that acknowledges the collective nature of the crime yet “still remain[s] faithful to the 
basic foundation of criminal law and its commitment to holding individuals responsible”.1141 
Furthermore, Ohlin argues that the “collective moral guilt suggested by these crimes cannot be used 
as a justification to blindly impose criminal liability to all members of a conspiracy, regardless of 
their level of participation”.1142 However, the ICTY in the Brđanin Appeal found that the JCE 
doctrine provides sufficient safeguards against overreaching or lapsing into guilt by association.
1143
 
Arguably, the JCE doctrine does not blindly impose liability, irrespective of the accused‟s actions 
and state of mind. Furthermore, the application of JCE category three does not ignore the moral and 
legal significance of the internal structure of the criminal enterprise by equally imposing liability on 
each member irrespective of his or her participation. On the contrary, there is great scope for 
differentiation; each individual, within the group, may foresee the occurrence of different un-
                                                          
1133
 Ohlin (2007) J Int‟l C J 76-77 cf Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A (1999) para 191. 
1134
 Ohlin (2007) J Int‟l C J 76. 
1135
 77. 
1136
 88. 
1137
 88. 
1138
 88. 
1139
 88. 
1140
 76. 
1141
 74. 
1142
 74. 
1143
 Prosecutor v Brđanin IT-99-36-A (2007) para 426.  
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concerted crimes and criminal responsible may only accrue for the crimes that he or she foresaw.
1144
 
For instance, the ICTY in the KvoĈka Appeal found that what is natural and foreseeable to the one 
might not be natural and foreseeable to the other, based on the information to which he or she is 
privy.
1145
 In addition, an accused can contribute in many different ways, yet liability only ensues if 
the contribution is substantial, according to the ICTY in the Brđanin Appeal.1146 Furthermore, 
Cassese argues that JCE category three does not infringe the principle of culpability because the 
prosecution still has to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intentionally 
contributed to the criminal enterprise while possessing the requisite “mens rea concerning the 
additional” yet un-concerted crime, in the form of foresight.1147 Therefore, only once the 
prosecution has proven all the subjective and objective elements with regards to the specific 
accused, can the JCE doctrine be used to attribute liability beyond the scope of the accused‟s own 
actions. That is the only benefit that the JCE doctrine permits. As previously discussed in chapter 
five, while the degree of liability is equally attributed to all members, not all members will satisfy 
the requisite subjective and objective elements for their liability to ensue; especially not principal 
liability. 
Alternatively, Cassese offers three arguments in defence of the attribution of equal liability.
1148
 
Firstly, he argues that the JCE doctrine was born because of the prevalence and actual commission 
of crimes by groups with a shared intent.
1149
 The foundation of the JCE doctrine is firstly, “found in 
considerations of public policy, that is the need to protect society against persons who” form groups 
with the shared intention to commit a crime.
1150
 Secondly, Cassese provides a purely legal 
argument.
1151
 Cassese avers that liability arising from JCE category three “is consequential on (and 
incidental to) a common criminal plan, that is, an agreement or plan by a multitude of persons to 
engage in illegal conduct”.1152 Cassese explains that the un-concerted crime “is the outgrowth of 
previously agreed or planned criminal conduct for which each participant in the common plan is 
already responsible”.1153 The prior joint planning to commit a crime has enabled the commission of 
un-concerted crimes.
1154
 In other words, “the additional crime is premised on the existence of a 
concerted criminal purpose”.1155 Therefore a causal link between the concerted crime and the un-
concerted crime exits.
 1156
 However only the accused “that evinced knowledge and risk” shares the 
liability with the physical perpetrators of the un-concerted crime.
1157
 The Italian Court of Cassation 
                                                          
1144
 Prosecutor v Karemera & Ngirumpatse ICTR-98-44-A (2014) para 627 cf Prosecutor v KvoČka et al IT-98-30/1-A 
(2005) para 86.  
1145
 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 422-423 cf Prosecutor v KvoČka et al IT-98-30/1-A 
(2005) para 86.  
1146
 Prosecutor v Brđanin IT-99-36-A (2007) paras 427 and 430 cf Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A (1999) para 192. 
1147
 Cassese (2007) J Int‟l C J 132. 
1148
 117-118. 
1149
 117. 
1150
 117-118: “These policy considerations were aptly spelled out by the House of Lords in 1997, in Regina v Powell 
and another and Regina v English, albeit with regard to crimes committed at the domestic level.” 
1151
 118. 
1152
 118. 
1153
 119. 
1154
 119. Cassese qualifies his statement by adding that the attribution of criminal responsibility differs where the group 
has planned to commit a lawful act and during the execution of such plan, one commits a crime. In these circumstances 
the physical perpetrator is solely responsibility for his or her criminal acts.  
1155
 119. 
1156
 119. Cassese adds that the former constitutes the preliminary sine qua non condition and the basis of the latter.  
1157
 119. 
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in D‟Ottavio and others (“D‟Ottavio”) emphasised that “the incidental crime may be based on a 
nexus with the concerted crime”.1158 By joining and participating in the criminal enterprise the 
accused placed him or herself in a position to foresee the possible commission of un-concerted 
crimes.
1159
 Furthermore, despite the risk the accused willingly contributed to the group where he or 
she could have elected to disassociate or try to prevent the commission of the un-concerted 
crime.
1160
 These aspects culminate in the accused‟s culpability.1161  
Arguably, the proof that the accused satisfied the subjective and objective elements together with 
the premeditative nature of joining a criminal enterprise and the impact and prevalence of criminal 
enterprises justifies the attribution of equal culpability for an un-concerted crime, committed by 
another. However, is still unclear whether it is just to attribute principal liability to the physical 
perpetrator (“primary offender”) and the accused (“secondary offender”), equally.1162 Cassese 
admits that in a “mature legal system it should be possible to take account of the lesser degree of 
culpability of the participant at issue by qualifying his culpability through a charge lesser”.1163 
Cassese argues that the secondary offender is less culpable for the un-concerted crime, which 
should be taken into account at the sentencing stage.
1164
 However, international criminal law “is 
rudimentary body of law” and, as of yet, does not provide for this distinction.1165 In addition, due to 
its infancy and continuous development, Danner and Martinez argue that international criminal law, 
unlike its domestic counterparts, cannot significantly relax the requirements that stem from the 
principles of culpability, just yet.
1166
 Ohlin, along the same lines, therefore argues for the reform of 
article 25 of the Rome Statute in order to expressly provide for this distinction.
1167
 This proposal is 
addressed in greater detail, below.  
Thirdly, Cassese proposes the qualification of the application of JCE category three in order to 
defend and limit of the equal attribution of liability.
1168
 Cassese argues that where the crime requires 
a specific intent (“dolus specialis”), JCE category three is not applicable.1169 For instance, JCE 
                                                          
1158
 119-120 cf D‟Ottavio and others Italian Court of Cassation (12 March 1947). The Teramo Court of Assize held that 
“[w]here the crime committed is different from that willed by one of the participants, also that participant answers for 
the crime, if the fact is a consequence of his action or omission. If the crime committed is more serious than that willed, 
the penalty is decreased for the participant who willed the less serious offence.” On appeal, the Court of Cassation held 
that: “[i]n order for a criminal event to be held to constitute the consequence of the participant‟s action, it is necessary 
that there be a causation nexus which is not only objective but also psychological between the fact committed and 
willed by all the participants and the different fact committed by one of the participants.” “This is so because the 
participant‟s responsibility envisaged in [a]rt 116 is grounded not in the notion of collective responsibility ... but in the  
fundamental principle of concurrence of interdependent causes, upheld and specified in [a]rts 40 and 41 of the Criminal 
Code.” In “accordance with the canon causa causae est causa causati [the cause of a cause is also the cause of the thing 
caused; i.e. whoever voluntarily creates a situation bringing to, or resulting in, criminal conduct is accountable for that 
conduct whether or not he willed the crime]”.  
1159
 Cassese (2007) J Int‟l C J 120.  
1160
 120.  
1161
 120.  
1162
 120.  
1163
 120.  
1164
 132. 
1165
 120.  
1166
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cal L Rev 98.  
1167
 Ohlin (2007) J Int‟l C J 89. 
1168
 Cassese (2007) J Int‟l C J 121.  
1169
 121.  
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category three could not be used to establish liability for genocide, persecution and aggression 
because they all require specific intent before liability can ensue.
1170
 This argument is also 
discussed in greater detail, below.  
 
6 3 5 2 Intentionality 
 
According to Ohlin, a literal reading the term “intentional” in article 25 of the Rome Statute does 
not actually require that the contribution be made with the intent of furthering the common purpose 
of the criminal enterprise.
1171
 Ohlin argues that a literal reading of the term “intentional” in article 
25(d) of the Rome Statute only requires that the action or omission by the accused is intentional ie 
the “basic underlying action” cannot be negligent or accidental.1172 Therefore in order to fulfil this 
element, the prosecution only has to prove that the accused who contributed to the furtherance to 
the JCE intended the action or omission that amounted to a contribution.
1173
 However, sub-
articles 25(3)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Rome Statute require that the contribution be made with the aim 
of furthering the common purpose of the criminal enterprise or with knowledge of the group‟s 
criminal intent.
1174
 
While a contribution made with the “aim of furthering the criminal activity” satisfies the concept 
of intentionality, Ohlin argues that an intentional contribution “made in the knowledge of the 
intention,” does not.1175 Ohlin refers to the latter as imposing “severe criminal liability”.1176 For 
instance, any person who intentionally sells or gives commodities such as appliances or produce to 
a criminal enterprise, with the knowledge of their criminal intent, irrespective of his or her 
disapproval, is eligible for criminal responsibility and liability for the crimes of the conspiracy.
1177
 
Ohlin describes this application of the JCE doctrine as “a significant example of legislative over-
reaching”.1178 
Ohlin posits that the mistake stems from a lack of understanding the differences between intent 
and knowledge.
1179
 Knowledge alone is “rarely morally significant,” while the concept of 
intentionality is “acutely significant”.1180 Crimes committed with intent are the “more significant 
moral violation” and therefore more morally reprehensible than negligent acts or omissions because 
                                                          
1170
 121: According to Cassese, “it is common knowledge that for genocide the intent to destroy a „protected group‟ in 
whole or in part is required; persecution presupposes the intent to discriminate on one of the requisite grounds; 
aggression […] is grounded in the intent to appropriate a foreign territory or to obtain economic advantages, or to 
interfere with the internal affairs of the victim state”.  
1171
 Ohlin (2007) J Int‟l C J 78. 
1172
 78. 
1173
 78. 
1174
 Art 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90: The contribution to a criminal enterprise must be 
intentional and must either: “(i) [b]e made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the 
group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or (ii) 
[b]e made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime” before criminal responsibility and 
liability can ensue”. 
1175
 Ohlin (2007) J Int‟l C J 78. 
1176
 78. 
1177
 79. Ohlin explains that commodities are “readily available on the open market. (Of course, the sale of firearms or 
explosives is another story.) But if one merchant does not sell the gasoline, another merchant will.” 
1178
 79. 
1179
 79. 
1180
 79-80.  
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they indicate the existence of a “malignant heart” and the execution of calculated steps.1181 The 
distinction between these two concepts is destroyed by the disjunctive nature of article 25(3)(d) of 
the Rome Statute.
1182
 Despite the difference in moral reprehensibility, each form “yields the exact 
same criminal liability” for the acts of the entire conspiracy.1183 This is unjust because the degree of 
moral reprehensibility is not reflected in the degree of liability.
1184
 In order to resolve this anomaly, 
Ohlin suggest that article 25(3)(d)(i) and article 25(3)(d)(ii) should not be disjunctive.
1185
 The latter 
should receive the lightest form of liability, while the prior receives the highest; consequently, not 
attributing equal liability.
1186
   
 
6 3 5 3 Foreseeability 
 
Foreseeability is one of the elements of recklessness or negligence (culpa) as well as intent (dolus). 
Irrespective of desire, the accused possesses intent in the form of dolus eventualis where he or she 
subjectively believed that the commission of that crime was a natural and foreseeable consequence 
of executing the plan and the accused reconciled himself or herself with the risk and continued 
nonetheless.
1187
 Recklessness also requires foresight and a reckless contribution, however it does 
not requires the volitional element ie the accused is not required to have accepted or reconciled 
himself or herself with the risk.
1188
 An accused‟s state of mind cannot be established other than by 
his own admission therefore the court may infer his subjective foresight, and thereby his intent, 
from the evidence before the court.
1189
 Where it is the only rational inference on the facts.
1190
   
Ohlin argues that where the commission of an un-concerted crime was objectively foreseeable, 
all members of the JCE can be charged with the crime.
1191
 Therefore, Ohlin avers that the sole 
constraint for liability arising from the actions of others, under JCE category three, is 
foreseeability.
1192
 In addition, Ohlin opposes the foreseeability standard because conspiracies 
usually have very few foreseeable limits.
1193
 For instance, where the conspiracy involves the intent 
to commit acts of genocide, such as ethnic cleansing, the foreseeable consequences are 
extensive.
1194
 Otherwise, the common purpose is so broad that most of the attacks do form part of 
the common purpose, therefore nullifying the need to prove the foreseeability of un-concerted 
                                                          
1181
 80.  
1182
 80.  
1183
 80.  
1184
 80.  
1185
 81. 
1186
 81. 
1187
 Haffajee (2006) Harv J L & Gender 214 cf Prosecutor v Ojdanić et al IT-99-37-AR72 (2003) 11. 
1188
 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 431. 
1189
 Cassese (2007) J Int‟l C J 113. See also Prosecutor v Karemera & Ngirumpatse ICTR-98-44-A (2014) para 632 cf 
Prosecutor v Krajišnik IT-00-39-A (2009) para 692: The Appeals Chamber confirmed that a court can infer the physical 
perpetrator‟s intent from his or her knowledge of the deviatory crime, followed by his or her continued participation in 
the JCE.  
1190
 Prosecutor v Karemera & Ngirumpatse ICTR-98-44-A (2014) paras 629-630 cf Prosecutor v KvoČka et al IT-98-
30/1-A (2005) para 86. 
1191
 Ohlin (2007) J Int‟l C J 81 cf Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A (1999) para 204.  
1192
 Ohlin (2007) J Int‟l C J 81. 
1193
 81.  
1194
 81.  
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crimes.
1195
 Moreover, Ohlin finds the use of foreseeability by the prosecution more “troublesome” 
where a specific objective between the conspirators exists and thereafter some of the conspirators 
engage in criminal conduct that far exceeds the original plan.
1196
 In these situations, Ohlin argues 
that the prosecution may allege that the common objective of the criminal enterprise was the 
forcible and unlawful removal of civilians within a specific town yet the fact that some of the 
soldiers or militia opted to extend the scope of their targets or extend their tactics to include rape 
and torture, means that these crimes were foreseeable.
1197
 Ohlin is concerned that the prosecution 
will always be able to prove that all the members foresaw the possibility of rape occurring as a 
consequence of the forced removal.
1198
 Additionally, Cassese argues that the foreseeability standard 
is so unreliable that JCE category three amounts to strict liability.
1199
  
Arguably, as discussed in chapter two, the commission of acts of sexual violence rarely extends 
far from the original plan and therefore its commission is usually objectively foreseeable. However, 
the prosecution must prove the accused‟s subjective foreseeability, by establishing beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused‟s foresight is the only rational inference on the facts.1200 
Therefore liability for the un-concerted crime only ensues for the ones who subjectively foresaw the 
possibility of that crime being committed and despite the risk made a significant contribution with 
the intent of furthering the common criminal purpose.
1201
 Arguably, foresight is not the sole 
constraint for establishing liability pursuant to JCE category three. Nonetheless, objective 
foreseeability, alone, is undoubtedly insufficient.  
In addition, Badar argues that the reasonable foreseeability test for JCE category three is 
unjust.
1202
 According to Badar, the ICTY in the Brdanin Appeal dropped the volitional element, ie 
the requirement that the accused actually accepted or reconciled himself with the risk and adopted 
the “reasonably foreseeable” test to establish dolus eventualis instead. It consequently lowered the 
threshold of intent for JCE category three to culpa (negligence).
1203
 Badar argues that the volitional 
element should be an element of dolus eventualis ie the accused must accept that the objective 
elements of the crime might be realised during the implementation of the common plan.
1204
 
Furthermore, Badar argues that the accused must foresee the probability or high probability of the 
result occurring, not merely its possibility, before liability can ensue.
1205
 
Ohlin argues that participation in a criminal enterprise may give rise to a co-conspirator‟s 
responsibility to “anticipate the foreseeable actions of his co-conspirators”.1206 By engaging in a 
criminal enterprise, Ohlin argues that the co-perpetrator must assume the risk that other extreme 
acts beyond the common purpose, may arise.
1207
 According to the American law of torts, where the 
                                                          
1195
 82.  
1196
 82.  
1197
 82.  
1198
 82.  
1199
 Cassese (2007) J Int‟l C J 116 cf K Ambos “Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility” (2007) 5 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 159-183. 
1200
 Prosecutor v Karemera & Ngirumpatse ICTR-98-44-A (2014) paras 629-630 cf Prosecutor v KvoČka et al IT-98-
30/1-A (2005) para 86. 
1201
 Prosecutor v Karemera & Ngirumpatse ICTR-98-44-A (2014) para 627 cf Prosecutor v KvoČka et al IT-98-30/1-A 
(2005) para 86.  
1202
 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 431. 
1203
 431 cf Prosecutor v Brđanin IT-99-36-A (2007). 
1204
 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 431. 
1205
 431. 
1206
 Ohlin (2007) J Int‟l C J 82-83.  
1207
 83. See Cassese‟s justification for the attribution of equal liability above, 6 3 5 1. 
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criminal enterprise involves violent crime, it is appropriate to hold the co-conspirator vicariously 
liable for the foreseeable actions of other co-conspirators.
1208
 However, this source only carries 
persuasive value because domestic law does not bind international actors.
1209
 Ohlin acknowledges a 
co-conspirator‟s responsibility for the foreseeable yet un-concerted crimes committed by another 
yet argues that the level of responsibility must alleviated.
1210
 The co-conspirator neither “directly 
engaged in” nor intended the commission of the un-concerted crime.1211  He behaved negligently by 
contributing to the criminal enterprise, by neither preventing the commission of the un-concerted 
crime nor disassociating himself from the criminal enterprise.
1212
 Negligence is a lesser form of 
culpability, which always warrants a lesser form of liability than intentional acts.
1213
 In criminal 
law, this distinction, must be maintained because intent is “the result of the most extreme moral 
depravity”.1214 Ohlin adds that: “low-level participants in a massacre also deserve stiff sentences” 
that “may in a practical sense end up being similar to the punishment of the architects,” however 
“we ought to insist that our legal doctrine is sophisticated enough to distinguish between different 
levels of participation”.1215   
I agree that the distinction between negligent and intentional acts is essential as it preserves the 
principle of culpability, however as discussed above, JCE category three is arguably not 
synonymous with negligence. JCE category three does not attribute liability based on a negligent 
contribution arising from the accused‟s foresight, instead it attributes liability based on the 
accused‟s intentional contribution. Therefore the volitional element of dolus eventualis is the source 
of its characterisation as a form of intent rather than negligence.  Badar argues for dolus eventualis 
to be defined as “a foresight of the likelihood of the occurrence of the consequences and not mere 
indifference towards its occurrence”.1216 Arguably, the confusion arises from the difference between 
the wording of article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute and the ad hoc tribunals understanding of JCE 
category three. JCE category three requires that the accused subjectively foresee (dolus eventualis) 
the execution of the un-concerted crime yet despite the risk makes a significant contribution to the 
common criminal purpose with the intent of furthering the common criminal purpose (dolus 
directus). Alternatively, article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute attributes equal liability to an accused 
who made an intentional contribution to the crime in furtherance of the common criminal purpose 
(dolus directus) or who made an intentional contribution to the crime with knowledge of the 
                                                          
1208
 Ohlin (2007) J Int‟l C J 83. American tort law refers to this as “assumption of risk”.  
1209
 Wallace & Martin-Ortega International Law (2009) 8 cf art 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice (1946) 59 Stat 1055 1060 states that judicial decisions of a nation are a subsidiary means of determining rules of 
law, however; art 38(1)(d) is subject to art 59, which states that: “[t]he decision of the Court has no binding force except 
between the parties and in respect of that particular case;” Wallace & Martin-Ortega International Law 28: According 
to Wallace, the decision of a domestic court may be applied if relevant and its weight will depend on the standing of 
that court; 120: The diminished status of domestic laws in the international law arena stems from the principle of State 
sovereignty. Jurisdiction, as a characteristic of State sovereignty, is “the competence of a State to govern persons and 
property by its municipal law”. Therefore the domestic laws of one country do not apply to other countries unless that 
country willingly adopts those laws as its own, binds itself through a treaty or willingly becomes party to an 
international instrument. 
1210
 Ohlin (2007) J Int‟l C J 83.  
1211
 83.  
1212
 83.  
1213
 83. 
1214
 83. 
1215
 84. 
1216
 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 425.  
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group‟s criminal intent (culpa).1217 Liability pursuant to article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute is 
disjunctive and therefore attributes liability, pursuant to article 25(3)(d) irrespective of whether the 
accused was negligent or intentional. Therefore in support of the argument made in chapter five, 
liability under article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute is not reconcilable with JCE liability.
1218
 
 
6 3 6 Argument six: Transferring principles, models and norms from international human rights 
law to international criminal law has over-extended the JCE doctrine  
 
Within the sphere of human rights law, certain models, norms and principles are used to interpret 
human rights instruments. For instance, expansive, purposive and victim-oriented interpretations are 
features of human rights law. Danner and Martinez state that models within human rights law may 
“inform the goals of international criminal law” however, over-reliance on their interpretative 
techniques may threaten the legitimacy of international criminal law.
1219
 The threat to legitimacy of 
international criminal law stems from the distinct focus of each international legal sphere. While 
human rights law aims to hold states responsible, international criminal law focuses on the 
individual‟s criminal responsibility.1220 Furthermore, the human rights regime aims to protect 
against any violation of human life and well-being, while international criminal law aims to punish 
individuals for the commission of pre-existing crimes.
1221
 In addition, it may also threaten the rights 
of the accused, which are more attentively guarded in a human rights forum.
1222
 For instance, the 
accused is more likely to be used as a “scapegoat,” in order appease the society‟s desire to see 
justice done and thereby heal, in a criminal forum than in a human rights forum.
1223
 Danner and 
Martinez warned that the influence of certain aspects of human rights law in international criminal 
law might overpower the restraining force of the criminal law tradition.
1224
 For instance, they argue 
that principles of human rights law catalysed the development and growth of JCE liability to 
address large scale enterprises ie ethnic cleansing.
1225
 Thereby enhancing accountability yet 
threatening the culpability principle.
1226
 Therefore, according to Danner and Martinez, transferring 
models and norms that are features of international human rights law to international criminal law 
may threaten the integrity of the system.
1227
 
Danner and Martinez argue that the JCE doctrine has the potential to “stretch criminal liability to 
a point where the legitimacy of international criminal law will be threatened”.1228 The development 
of the JCE developed by favouring the rights of the victim and community, ie symbolic vindication, 
                                                          
1217
 Art 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90.  
1218
 Refer back to 6 6 4 “Comparing the distinction between principal liability and accessorial liability as understood by 
the ad hoc tribunals to the understanding of the ICC” in chapter six.  
1219
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cal L Rev 100.  
1220
 100: Danner and Martinez add that human rights law “can allow for the imposition of liability on a state in 
situations where imposition of criminal liability on an individual might violate the culpability principle” because it 
traditionally focuses on the responsibility of states. 
1221
 101.  
1222
 101.  
1223
 101.  
1224
 132.  
1225
 132.  
1226
 134.  
1227
 101.  
1228
 132.  
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over the rights of the accused.
1229
 The victim-oriented, civil law model of human rights, has 
therefore “diverted attention from the values vindicated by the criminal law-oriented culpability 
principle”.1230 This in turn may weaken the focus on an accused being held responsible in 
accordance with his or her actions or part, as protected by criminal law.
1231
  Therefore by expanding 
the scope of actions that result in liability the human rights of the accused and the general principles 
of criminal law may be threatened.
1232
 For example, the ICTY in the Tadić Appeal used a purposive 
interpretation, which relies on the object and the purpose of the instrument, to expand article 7 of 
the ICTY to include participation in a JCE.
1233
  The ICTY justified its inclusion by referring to the 
object and the purpose of the ICTY Statute ie the prosecution of all those who are “responsible for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law” under the tribunal‟s jurisdiction.1234 According 
to Danner and Martinez, using the object and purpose of an instrument to broaden the protection 
afforded by an instrument, is a feature of human right law.
1235
 For example, CEDAW and the 
VCLT both require that all reservations must be compatible with the object and purpose of the 
treaty.
1236
 In addition, the VCLT requires that all treaties be interpreted “in the light of its object and 
purpose”.1237   
A purposive interpretation is also consistent with the “principle of effectiveness,” which also 
stems from human rights law.
1238
 Human rights courts preserve the principle of effectiveness by 
interpreting human rights in a manner “that make those rights relevant to changing conditions or to 
ensure that they are practical and effective”.1239 For example, the ECtHR has read implicit rights 
into the ECHR in order to fulfil its object and purpose ie the protection of human rights.
1240
 The 
result of thereof, being the broader interpretation of the right.
1241
 According to Danner and 
Martinez, the principle of effectiveness and a victim-oriented perspective of human rights facilitated 
the adoption of JCE.
 1242
   
Along the same vein, the ICTY and ICTR have used the teleological purpose of “protecting 
human dignity,” which is another one of the interpretive methodologies of human rights 
                                                          
1229
 146. 
1230
 146. 
1231
 146. 
1232
 132. 
1233
 132 cf Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A (1999) paras 189-190 cf art 7(1) of the ICTY Statute (1993) 32 ILM 1159.  
1234
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cal L Rev 132 cf Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A (1999) paras 189-190 cf art 1 of the 
ICTY Statute (1993) 32 ILM 1159.  
1235
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cal L Rev 132. 
1236
 Art 28(2) of CEDAW (1981) 1249 UNTS 13; art 19(c) of the VCLT (1980) 1115 UNTS 33.  
1237
 Art 31(1) of the VCLT (1980) 1115 UNTS 331: “1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” 
1238
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cal L Rev 132. 
1239
 133 cf LR Heifer “Adjudicating Copyright Claims under the TRIPs Agreement: The Case for a European Human 
Rights Analogy” (1998) 39 Harvard International Law Journal 357 403. 
1240
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cal L Rev 133 cf JG Merrills The Development of International Law by the European 
Court Of Human Rights 2 ed (1993) 11: stating “what is in issue is the international responsibility of the State” 
(footnote omitted). 
1241
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cal L Rev 133 cf A Orakhelashvili “Restrictive Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties 
in the Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights” (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law 
529 534. 
1242
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cal L Rev 133.  
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proceedings, to broaden the definition of the crime of rape and torture.
1243
 For example, the ICTY in 
the Furundžija stated: 
 
“The Trial Chamber holds that the forced penetration of the mouth by the male sexual organ 
constitutes a most humiliating and degrading attack upon human dignity. The essence of the 
whole corpus of international humanitarian law as well as human rights law lies in the 
protection of the human dignity of every person, whatever his or her gender.  The general 
principle of respect for human dignity is the basic underpinning and indeed the very raison 
d‟ être of international humanitarian law and human rights law; indeed in modern times it 
has become of such paramount importance as to permeate the whole body of international 
law.  This principle is intended to shield human beings from outrages upon their personal 
dignity, whether such outrages are carried out by unlawfully attacking the body or by 
humiliating and debasing the honour, the self-respect or the mental well being of a person.  
It is consonant with this principle that such an extremely serious sexual outrage as forced 
oral penetration should be classified as rape.”1244 
 
The ICTY in Furundžija stated that the principle of respect for human dignity is not limited to the 
international human rights sphere. Conversely, it should apply to all spheres of international law, 
including international criminal law. Furthermore, the ICTR in Musema, acknowledged and 
accepted the ICTY‟s expansion of the term rape to include forced oral sex in Furundžija, because it 
is a “humiliating and degrading attack on human dignity”.1245 Moreover, the ICTR and ICTY 
Statutes do not include a definition of torture therefore the ICTY and ICTR adopted the definition 
from Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatments or 
Punishment (“CAT”), a Human Right‟s instrument, and even expanded CAT‟s definition of torture 
by including additional prohibited purposes.
1246
 Conversely, the ICTY Trial Chamber in Prosecutor 
v Kmojelac stated that:  
 
“There may be a tendency, particularly in the field of human rights, towards the enlargement 
of the list of prohibited purposes, but the Trial Chamber must apply customary international 
humanitarian law as it finds it to have been at the time when the crimes charged were 
alleged to have been committed. In light of the principle of legality, the proposition that „the 
primary purpose of [humanitarian law] is to safeguard human dignity‟ is not sufficient to 
permit the court to introduce, as part of the mens rea, a new and additional prohibited 
purpose, which would in effect enlarge the scope of the criminal prohibition against torture 
beyond what it was at the time relevant to the indictment under consideration.”1247 
 
The principle of efficacy keeps the human right‟s instrument abreast. However, the international 
courts and ad hoc tribunals must apply the law as they find it in customary international law in 
order to prevent retrospective application.  
Nonetheless, Danner and Martinez conclude that the correct definition of a doctrine, is not a 
choice between the broadening tendency of a human rights perspective and the narrowing potential 
                                                          
1243
 133-134 cf WA Schabas “Interpreting the Statutes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals” in LC Vohrah, F Pocar Y Featherstone, 
O Fourmy, C Graham, J Hocking  & N Robson eds Man's Inhumanity to Man: Essays on International Law in Honour 
of Antonio Cassese (2003) 846 865. 
1244
 Prosecutor v Furundžija IT-95-17/1 (1998) para 183.  
1245
 Prosecutor v Musema ICTR-96-13-A (2000) para 228. 
1246
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cal L Rev 133 cf Prosecutor v Furundžija IT-95-17/1 (1998) para 162. See also 
Prosecutor v Kunarac et al IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T (2001) paras 437-438 and 497, which lists the CAT (1987) 
1465 UNTS 85 as a source when formulating its definition of torture.  
1247
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cal L Rev 134 cf Prosecutor v Kmojelac (Judgement) IT-97-25-T (15 March 2002) para 
186.  
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of criminal law paradigms.
1248
 They found that the ICC should consider human rights law, however; 
the balance should tip “in favor of close adherence to the criminal culpability model in the context 
of construing liability doctrines”.1249 I agree with their conclusion. The importance of the principle 
of human dignity as displayed in Furundžija, together with the human rights interpretive standard 
pursuant to article 21(3) of the Rome Statute and a purposive interpretation pursuant to article 31 of 
the VCLT, does not limit these models of interpretation to the sphere of international human rights 
law. The application of these models extend to international criminal law as well so long as it does 
not infringe on the principles of legality and culpability. 
 
6 3 7 Argument seven: Participation in a JCE is not distinguishable from aiding and abetting.  
 
Ambos and Goy propose that the degree of criminal responsibility resulting from aiding and 
abetting is greater than that arising from participation in a common purpose; based on more 
stringent objective requirements for adding an abetting.
1250
 Cassese disagrees that the objective 
requirements are the distinctive factor because both forms of participation require a substantial 
contribution.
1251
 According to Cassese, the “major difference” rests with their respective mens 
rea.
1252
 On the one hand, an aider and abettor might be aware of the physical perpetrators intent yet 
he or she does not share in the mens rea.
1253
 He or she solely intends to assist the physical 
perpetrator in the commission of the crime.
 1254
 On the other hand, a participant in a common 
purpose shares in the common criminal plan and the common intent to perpetrate the crime or by 
willingly and knowingly participating he or she evidences that he or she shares in the common 
criminal intent.
1255
  A shared intent is therefore paramount. The criminal liability for participation in 
a criminal enterprise therefore arguably outweighs the liability for aiding and abetting.
 1256 
As 
evinced in Furundžija as discussed in sub-chapter 3 5 1, above.  
  
6 4 Suggested reform of the JCE doctrine 
 
6 4 1 The limitation of prosecutorial discretion 
 
Cassese argues that application the JCE doctrine has not caused as much abuse and confusion as 
expected because the ad hoc tribunals have interpreted JCE liability cautiously.
1257
 Over time the ad 
hoc tribunals have limited the scope of the Tadić-construction of JCE as well as the prosecution‟s 
discretion by adding additional requirements. Danner and Martinez argue that “strict adherence to 
the criminal law culpability principle” limits unfettered prosecutorial discretion of attributing 
                                                          
1248
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cal L Rev 144. 
1249
 101.  
1250
 115-116 cf Ambos (2007) J Int‟l C J 159-183 argues that: “the aider and abettor carries out substantial acts 
„specifically directed‟ to assist in the perpetration of the (main) crime, while the co-perpetrator must only perform acts 
(of any kind) that „in some way‟ are directed to the furthering of the common plan or purpose”. 
1251
 Cassese (2007) J Int‟l C J 116. 
1252
 116. 
1253
 116. 
1254
 116. 
1255
 116. 
1256
 116. 
1257
 133. 
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wrongdoing to an accused in JCE.
1258
 Strict adherence enhances the perceived legitimacy of 
international criminal trials and thereby its overall effectiveness in achieving human rights goals 
where.
1259
 For instance, the ICTY Chamber in the Brđanin Appeal stated that principal liability only 
ensues where the accused possesses the requisite intent and made a significant contribution to 
furthering the JCE.
1260
  In addition, the ICTY Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v KvoĈka (“KvoĈka”) 
set out the factors that should be considered by the prosecution and the judges when determining if 
the accused‟s contribution is significant: 
 
“The level of participation attributed to the accused and whether that participation is 
deemed significant will depend on a variety of factors, including the size of the criminal 
enterprise, the functions performed, the position of the accused... the seriousness and scope 
of the crimes committed and the efficiency, zealousness or gratuitous cruelty exhibited in 
performing the actor's function.... Perhaps the most important factor to examine is the role 
the accused played vis-d-vis the seriousness and scope of the crimes committed.”1261 
 
By adding these additional requirements, the ad hoc tribunals limited the prosecutor‟s discretion in 
attribution JCE liability, which is a solution suggested by Danner and Martinez.
1262
 This solution 
addresses Ohlin‟s concerns that JCE category three attributes liability equally, irrespective of the 
accused‟s degree of participation, based on post-WWII cases referred to in the Tadić Appeal.  
 
6 4 2 The differentiation between the degrees of participation at the sentencing phase protects the 
principle of culpability 
 
The ICTY in the Brđanin Appeal recognised that the JCE doctrine offers no formal distinction 
between members who make overwhelmingly large contributions and members whose contributions 
are significant yet not as great.
1263
 The application of the JCE doctrine may therefore lead to some 
disparities, however the Appeals Chamber recalls that any such disparity are adequately dealt with 
at the sentencing stage.
1264
 Danner and Martinez also argue that any threat posed by the JCE 
doctrine to the culpability principle can be resolved at the sentencing stage.
1265
 The sentencing can 
therefore reflect the accused‟s degree of participation. While the ICTY Appeal Chambers in 
Vasiljević found that aiding and abetting, as a form of responsibility, warrants a lower sentence than 
co-perpetration, the ICTY has never expressly stated that the sentencing should reflect the accused‟s 
actual degree of participation or contribution to the JCE.
1266
 Even though the distinction between 
participants in varying degrees can be achieved at the sentencing stage, it is essential to the 
maintenance of the “transitional justice goals of international criminal trials” that the accused‟s role 
be accurately reflected in the conviction.
1267
  
                                                          
1258
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cal L Rev 146. 
1259
 146. 
1260
 Prosecutor v Brđanin IT-99-36-A (2007) para 430.  
1261
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cal L Rev 150-151 cf Prosecutor v KvoČka et al IT-98-30/1-T (2001) para 311. 
1262
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cal L Rev 150. 
1263
 Prosecutor v Brđanin IT-99-36-A (2007) para 432.  
1264
 Para 432.  
1265
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cal L Rev 141. 
1266
 141 cf Prosecutor v Vasiljević IT-98-32-A (2004) para 182. 
1267
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cal L Rev 142: The judges of the ICTY “have rejected plea agreements negotiated 
between the Office of the Prosecutor and individual defendants because they believed the plea agreements did not 
capture accurately the defendant's role in crimes that occurred in the former Yugoslavia”. “Babić initially pleaded guilty 
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Ohlin argues; that “[t]he minor participant and the chief conspirator” possess different degrees of 
guilt “and it is this central truth that the current version of joint criminal enterprise obscures”.1268 
Therefore “[o]ne cannot solve the conceptual problem by giving the minor participant a reduction in 
prison time during the sentencing phase”.1269 Furthermore, Ohlin argues that: “[r]elative culpability 
is not simply a matter of serving the appropriate time in a penal facility. It goes deeper to the very 
heart of the criminal offence.”1270 In addition, the stigma of a criminal conviction is significant and 
therefore criminal law “requires that correct determinations of relative culpability be expressed at 
the level of offences”.1271  Moreover, the judges may exercise more discretion at the sentencing 
phase, which diminishes the number of sentencing appeals and makes the adjudication of 
sentencing appeals difficult.
1272
 During the trial, the “accused receives the appropriate procedural 
protections” of a sophisticated criminal law system, while sentencing allows for “gut-level 
decisions about the severity of each atrocity”.1273  Therefore the distinction between different levels 
of culpability must be made at the conviction or acquittal stage of the trial.
1274
 Arguably, the 
differentiation at the sentencing phase is an insufficient solution.  
 
6 4 3 Command or superior responsibility is a more suitable than the JCE liability 
 
Danner and Martinez argue that prosecutors should not favour JCE over command 
responsibility.
1275
 For instance, they propose that command responsibility instead of aiding and 
abetting would have “more accurately” captured the basis for Krstić‟s liability in Krstić.1276 
According to the Appeal Chamber, the Trial Chamber‟s conviction was based on Krstić‟s 
knowledge of Mladić's genocidal intent (ie the intention to execute the Bosnian Muslims of 
Srebrenica) and his knowledge that Drina personnel, over which he was the Commander, were used 
to carry out that intention.
1277
 Therefore, the Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber had 
erred in finding that Krstić possessed the intent to participate in a JCE to commit genocide.1278 The 
Appeal Chamber chose to not limit the scope of JCE but instead it overturned the conviction on 
factual grounds by changing Krstić‟s conviction from co-perpetration to aiding and abetting.1279 The 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
as an aider and abettor of a JCE. After the Trial Chamber „expressed doubts about the accuracy‟ of this level of 
responsibility, Babić pleaded guilty as a co-perpetrator of a JCE.” See Prosecutor v Babić (Sentencing Judgement) IT-
03-72-S (29 June 2004) paras 6-8. 
1268
 Ohlin (2007) J Int‟l C J 88. 
1269
 88. 
1270
 88. 
1271
 88. 
1272
 88. 
1273
 88. 
1274
 88. 
1275
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cal L Rev 150. 
1276
 153.  
1277
 152-153 cf Prosecutor v Krstić IT-98-33-A (2004) para 134. See also paras 2 and 47: Krstić was the commander of 
the “Drina Corps” of the Bosnian Serb army. “The Drina Corps was formally responsible for the area of Bosnia that 
included the town of Srebrenica during the massacre of approximately seven thousand Bosnian men and boys in July 
1995.” Krstić‟s role in the Srebrenica killings, however, was complicated by the fact that the killings appear to have 
been orchestrated by General Mladid, the Commander of the Bosnian Serb Army, and carried out largely by forces 
which Krstić did not command, including members of the military police. 
1278
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cal L Rev 152. 
1279
 153. 
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Appeal Chamber also decreased Krstić‟s sentencing from forty-five to thirty-five years of 
imprisonment.
1280
 Unlike the Trial Chamber, the Appeal Chamber based Krstić‟s liability on his 
failure to prevent his troops from participating in the genocide.
1281
 Therefore, Danner and Martinez 
argue that command responsibility instead of aiding and abetting would have provided a more 
suitable foundation for Krstić‟s liability.1282 In addition, they argue that a legal analysis of the 
relationship between JCE and command responsibility, instead of reversing the Trial Chamber's 
factual findings, “would have (…) provided an important signal for prosecutorial strategy in future 
cases”.1283 They conclude that the Krstić Appeal reflects “the ICTY Appeals Chamber's vindication 
of the culpability principle by calibrating a defendant's individual actions and intent with his 
liability”.1284 The Appeals Chamber's willingness to overturn the Trial Chamber findings “indicates 
the degree to which the ICTY itself views adherence to the culpability principle as essential to its 
legitimacy and the success of its overall mission”.1285 This argument ties in with Cassese‟s 
argument in favour of cautious judicial interpretation, as suggested in sub-chapter 6 4 1, above.
1286
 
While I agree that JCE should not replace command responsibility, I disagree with the suitability 
of command responsibility in this case. In order to succeed with superior liability, the prosecution 
must prove that the accused exercised effective control over the physical perpetrator through a 
superior-subordinate relationship and that the physical perpetrator had a reciprocal duty to obey the 
accused.
1287
 In Krstić, the crimes were “largely carried out by forces which Krstić did not 
command,” which would make it difficult to establish a superior-subordinate relationship.1288 Even 
where the crimes were committed by the Drina Corps, who were under Krstić‟s commanded, it 
would be difficult to prove which crimes were committed under Krstić and which were committed 
under Mladić. Alternatively, the JCE doctrine does not require the existence of a superior-
subordinate relationship to attribute liability. Furthermore, the analysis of Semanza and Musema in 
chapter three, displayed how difficult it to secure a conviction pursuant to superior liability as the 
prosecution in both cases failed to establish a superior-subordinate relationship. Therefore replacing 
the JCE doctrine with command responsibility is not the solution because they are not 
interchangeable forms of liability.  By removing the JCE doctrine as a form of liability the 
perceived threat to the culpability principle is avoided, however; years‟ worth of progress made by 
the ad hoc tribunals will be undermined. 
                                                          
1280
 152-153 cf Prosecutor v Krstić IT-98-33-A (2004) paras 137 and 268. 
1281
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cal L Rev 153. 
1282
 153. They add that: “we do not mean to endorse the Appeals Chamber's overturning of the Trial Chamber's factual 
findings regarding General Krstić‟s intent to aid the genocidal plan, nor to suggest that the Trial Chamber's conclusions 
of law, given its factual findings, were incorrect. Indeed, we view with some scepticism the Appeals Chamber's recent 
propensity to overturn the Trial Chamber's factual findings. Rather, we simply intend to comment on the appropriate 
legal categorization, based on the Appeals Chamber's factual findings.” 
1283
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cal L Rev 153. 
1284
 154.  
1285
 154.  
1286
 See 6 4 1, above.  
1287
 Prosecutor v Karemera & Ngirumpatse ICTR-98-44-A (2014) para 119: When relying on the theory of superior 
responsibility to hold an accused criminally responsible, the Prosecution must establish that “the accused is the superior 
of subordinates sufficiently identified, over whom he had effective control – in the sense of a material ability to prevent 
or punish criminal conduct – and for whose acts he is alleged to be responsible” as one of four elements. See also para 
155: Unlike superior-liability, JCE liability does not require control of the physical perpetrator in order to attribute 
liability, it does however attribute liability based on the accused‟s contribution to the common purpose of the JCE and 
his shared intent with other members. 
1288
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cal L Rev 152-153 cf Prosecutor v Krstić IT-98-33-A (2004) paras 2 and 47. 
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6 4 4 Co-perpetration and the common purpose doctrine should replace the JCE doctrine  
 
Cassese recognises the argument, by the ICTY Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v Stakić (“Stakić”), that 
the JCE doctrine should be replaced by co-perpetration.
1289
 Furthermore, Lindholm J in his Separate 
Opinion in Prosecutor v Simić (“Simić”) argued that the doctrine of JCE “does not (...) have any 
substance of its own”.1290 Lindholm J argues that the JCE doctrine is purely a new term for the pre-
existing form of co-perpetration.
1291
 As discussed in chapter four, the ICC has not used the JCE 
doctrine to address contributions to a criminal enterprise. Instead, the ICC has used accessorial 
liability for contributing to the commission of a crime by a group with a common purpose and 
principal liability as a co-perpetrator for the accused‟s involvement in a common purpose.1292 In 
addition, the prosecutor of the ICC made use of common purpose doctrine, not the JCE doctrine, by 
explicitly referencing to this doctrine in charges against Lubanga in the PTC.
1293
 Moreover, the 
prosecutor of the ICC in the Situation in Darfur, The Sudan, alleged that the accused, Haran and 
Kushauyb, committed crimes “as part of a group of persons acting in common purpose”.1294 
Furthermore, the ICTY in Stakić used “co-perpetratorship,” which is a mixture of co-perpetration 
and indirect perpetratorship otherwise known as “committing jointly with another”, instead of JCE 
as the mode of liability.
1295
 Perhaps it is important to reiterate that the Rome Statute expressly 
includes committing “jointly with another” as a form of commission in article 25(3)(a).1296 To 
succeed with establishing liability as a co-perpetrator the prosecution must firstly prove; an explicit 
agreement or silent consent between two or more persons, co-ordination or co-operation and joint 
                                                          
1289
 Cassese (2007) J Int‟l C J 114 cf Prosecutor v Stakić (Trial Chamber) IT-97-24-T (31 July 2003) paras 436-438. 
1290
 Cassese (2007) J Int‟l C J 115 cf Prosecutor v Simić & Others (Trial Chamber) IT-95-9-T Separate and Partly 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge PJ Lindholm (17 October 2003) para 2.  
1291
 Cassese (2007) J Int‟l C J 115 cf Prosecutor v Simić & Others IT-95-9-T Separate and Partly Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge PJ Lindholm (2003) para 2.  
1292
 See Prosecutor v Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-1049 Decision Regarding the Practices Used to Prepare and 
Familiarise Witnesses for Giving Testimony at Trial (2007). See also Prosecutor v Katanga & Chui ICC-01/04-01/07-
717 (2014). 
1293
 Damgaard Individual Criminal Responsibility for Core International 177 cf Situation in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Pre-Trial Chamber I) ICC-01/04-01/06 Submission 
of the Document Containing the Charges pursuant to Article 61(3)(a) and of the List of Evidence Pursuant to Rule 
121(3) (28 August 2006) <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/related%20cases/icc%20014%20
016/court%20records/chambers/pre%20trial%20chambers%20i/Pages/decision%20on%20the%20confirmation%200f2
0charges.aspx> (accessed 26-07-2007).  
1294
 Damgaard Individual Criminal Responsibility for Core International Crimes 177 cf Situation in Darfur, The Sudan, 
(Pre-Trial Chamber) ICC-02/05-01/07 Prosecutor‟s Application, under Article 58(7), for the issue of summons for 
Ahmad Muhammad Haran and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman Kushayb (27 February 2007) <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205/related%20cases/icc%200205%2
00107/court%20records/chambers/pre%20trial%20chambers%20i/pages/decision%20on%20the%20prosecution%20ap
plication%20under%20article%2058%207%20%20of%20the%20statute.aspx> (accessed 26-07-2007). 
1295
 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 362 cf Prosecutor v Stakić IT-97-24-T (2003) paras 
438-441.  
1296
 Art 25 of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90. 
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control over criminal conduct.
1297
 Secondly, each co-perpetrator must possess the mutual awareness 
of substantial likeliness that the crime will occur and the importance of his own role ie the 
awareness that he or she has ability to frustrate its commission.
1298
   
However the ICTY Appeal Chamber in Prosecutor v Stakić (“Stakić Appeal”) found that while 
co-perpetration is recognised by many domestic legal systems, customary international law does 
not.
1299
 Therefore the inclusion of co-perpetratorship within “committing” is retrospective. On the 
contrary, Schomburg J, dissenting in the Simić Appeal, argued that co-perpetratorship is firmly 
entrenched in customary international law due to its use in national legal systems, the ICTY has 
used co-perpetration, both ad hoc tribunals were vested with jurisdiction and committing “with 
another” is expressly referred to in the Rome Statute.1300  Schomburg J adds that co-perpetratorship 
suits international criminal law.
1301
  Conversely, in his Separate Opinion to the Gacumbitsi Appeal, 
Shahabhuddeen J found that co-perpetratorship has no foundation in customary international law 
because neither evidence of state practice nor evidence of opinio juris exists.
1302
 Furthermore the 
ICTY in the Simić Appeal added that JCE is “firmly established in customary international law”.1303 
The Appeal Chamber, according to Cassese, found that the JCE doctrine is better suited to 
international criminality.
1304
 
Alternatively, the prosecution can use indirect perpetratorship instead of the JCE doctrine.
1305
  
Indirect perpetratorship is where the accused uses another as an instrument.
1306
 Furthermore, the 
ICTY in Furundžija found that “he who acts through others is regarded and acting himself”.1307 It is 
perhaps important to reiterate that the Rome Statute expressly includes commits “through another 
person” as a form of commission in article 25(3)(a).1308 In order to establish liability for indirect 
participation the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused exercised 
control over physical perpetrator‟s will and actions.1309 This form of commission bridges any 
physical distance between the accused and the commission yet requires proof of the accused 
exercising sufficient control and his or her overall involvement.
1310
 Arguably, indirect perpetration 
preserves the principle of individual culpability, while recognising the nature of sexual violence. 
Schomburg J therefore argues that indirect perpetration is good for international criminal law and 
                                                          
1297
 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 362 cf Prosecutor v Stakić IT-97-24-T (2003) para 
440.  
1298
 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 363 cf Prosecutor v Stakić IT-97-24-T (2003) paras 
495-498. 
1299
 Cassese (2007) J Int‟l C J 115 cf Prosecutor v Stakić (Appeal Chamber) IT-97-24-A (32 March 2006) para 62. 
1300
 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 365 cf Prosecutor v Simić IT-95-9-A Judge 
Schomburg Dissenting Opinion (2006) para 16.  
1301
 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 365 cf Prosecutor v Simić IT-95-9-A Judge 
Schomburg Dissenting Opinion (2006) para 16.  
1302
 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 365 cf Gacumbitsi v The Prosecutor ICTR-2001-
64-A Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen (2006) para 51.  
1303
 Cassese (2007) J Int‟l C J 115 cf Prosecutor v Stakić IT-97-24-A (2006) para 62. 
1304
 Cassese (2007) J Int‟l C J 115. 
1305
 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 364. 
1306
 364. 
1307
 Prosecutor v Furundžija IT-95-17/1-T (1998) para 256. 
1308
 Art 25 of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90. 
1309
 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 364 cf Gacumbitsi v The Prosecutor ICTR-2001-
64-A Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg on the Criminal Responsibility of the Gacumbitsi for Committing 
Genocide (2006) para 18. 
1310
 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 364. 
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national law.
1311
 However, control as an element of indirect perpetrator and co-perpetratorship, will 
arguably exclude the successful prosecution of many cases that the JCE doctrine can address.
1312
 
The duty to prove that the accused exercised control over the physical perpetrator was also the 
reason why command responsibility cannot and should not replace JCE liability, as discussed 
above. 
Schomburg J, in the Gacumbitsi Appeal and the Simić Appeal, found that JCE and co-
perpetratorship “widely overlap and [should therefore] be harmonised in the jurisprudence of both 
ad hoc Tribunals”.1313 According to Schomburg J in the Simić Appeal, harmonisation could provide 
the three categories of JCE with “sharper contours by combining objective and subjective 
components in an adequate way”.1314 Additionally, harmonisation may lead to greater acceptance of 
ad hoc jurisprudence the ICC in future.
1315
 However, Shahabudeen J in the Gacumbitsi Appeal and 
Schomburg J in the Simić Appeal, argue that harmonisation is impractical because while these two 
modes of liability do overlap, at a point are incompatible.
1316
 Co-perpetratorship requires that the 
accused must be able to frustrate the commission thereby requiring that the accused‟s contribution 
is a sine qua non of the commission whereas the JCE doctrine does not require that it be a sine qua 
non.
1317
 
Otherwise, van Sliedregt argues that the JCE doctrine creates a “perpetrator status for those 
closely involved in the commission of an international crime”.1318 Because the defining 
characteristic of JCE liability is the existence of a common criminal plan or purpose, a higher 
degree of culpability than is attributed for aiding and abetting ensues, despite requiring a lesser form 
of participation, due to the accused‟s shared criminal intent.1319 Therefore the JCE doctrine provides 
for the attribution of a higher degree of culpability than aiding and abetting, which mirrors co-
perpetration, as a feature of civil law.
1320
 People can participate in the same group with varying 
                                                          
1311
 364 cf Gacumbitsi v The Prosecutor ICTR-2001-64-A Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg on the Criminal 
Responsibility of the Gacumbitsi for Committing Genocide (2006) para 21. 
1312
 Prosecutor v Karemera & Ngirumpatse ICTR-98-44-A (2014) para 115: Unlike superior-liability, JCE liability does 
not require control of the physical perpetrator in order to attribute liability, it does however attribute liability based on 
the accused‟s contribution to the common purpose of the JCE and his shared intent with other members. 
1313
 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 365 cf Gacumbitsi v The Prosecutor ICTR-2001-
64-A Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg on the Criminal Responsibility of the Gacumbitsi for Committing 
Genocide (2006) para 22; Prosecutor v Simić IT-95-9-A Judge Schomburg Dissenting Opinion (2006) para 17. 
1314
 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 365 cf Prosecutor v Simić IT-95-9-A Judge 
Schomburg Dissenting Opinion (2006) para 17. 
1315
 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 365 cf Prosecutor v Simić IT-95-9-A Judge 
Schomburg Dissenting Opinion (2006) para 17. 
1316
 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 366 cf Gacumbitsi v The Prosecutor ICTR-2001-
64-A Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen (2006) para 50; Prosecutor v Simić IT-95-9-A Judge Schomburg 
Dissenting Opinion (2006) para 32. 
1317
 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 366 cf Gacumbitsi v The Prosecutor ICTR-2001-
64-A Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen (2006) para 50; Gacumbitsi v The Prosecutor ICTR-2001-64-A 
Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg on the Criminal Responsibility of the Gacumbitsi for Committing Genocide 
(2006) para 32. 
1318
 van Sliedregt (2007) JICL 203. Note that “involvement” was also the term used by the ICC in Lubanga to describe 
the perpetrator‟s contribution the common purpose. 
1319
 203. 
1320
 203. 
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degrees of mens rea because each person‟s mental element is distinct.1321 According to van 
Sliedregt, JCE is both a form of accomplice liability, as discussed by Hunt J, and a form of co-
perpetration because it is a combination of civil and civil law.
1322
 It is therefore a sui generis 
concept.
1323
 The degree of culpability arguably depends on the accused‟s particular degree of 
participation and mens rea not which category of JCE was used to establish the existence of these 
elements. By using a construction of the JCE the doctrine that provides for differentiation, some 
contributors to the JCE may be participants that incur a derivative form of liability, while others 
may be perpetrators that incur principal liability.   
Arguably, the JCE doctrine does possess substance of its own. The JCE doctrine can attribute 
different degrees of liability to the members of the same criminal enterprise relative to each 
accused‟s contribution and mental state whereas co-perpetrators must incur equal liability due to 
their shared intent. Furthermore, the additional requirement for co-perpetration, ie the subjective 
and objective elements of joint control which in turn requires the contribution to the common 
purpose to be a sine qua non of the commission of the crime, limits the types of contributors that 
can incur criminal responsibility under this form of liability. Therefore co-perpetration could 
replace the JCE doctrine as the Rome Statute expressly provides for physical perpetrator, joint 
commission and commission through another. However, the replacement would allow impunity by 
ignoring the strides made by the ad hoc tribunals in establishing the criminal responsibility of those 
who are responsible yet did not physically perpetrate or control the commission of the crime. 
Nonetheless, it is apparent from the discussion above that the ICC cannot implement the Tadić-
construction of the JCE category three. I continue to evaluate other proposed solutions, below.  
 
6 4 5 JCE category three is not applicable to crimes that require specific intent  
 
The ICTR in Akayesu described special intent crimes as: 
 
“[A] crime [where] the specific intention, required as a constitutive element of the crime, 
which demands that the perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act charged. Thus, the 
special intent in the crime of genocide lies in „the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.‟”1324  
 
Danner and Martinez add that specific intent (dolus specialis) is a characteristic of these crimes and 
the source of the stigma that attaches to the perpetrators of these crimes.
1325
 The ICTY in Stakić 
referred to dolus specialis as “surplus of intent”.1326  Surplus intent is intent ie genocidal intent, 
beyond the actus reus of the crime, ie rape or murder.
1327
 For instance, genocide consists of one or 
several of the listed actus reus in sub-articles 4(2)(a) to (e) of the ICTY Statute carried out with the 
mens rea required for the commission of that crime and with the underlying and specific intent “to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such”.1328 For example, 
both rape and murder have their own subjective and objective elements which when satisfied, 
                                                          
1321
 203. 
1322
 199. 
1323
 199. 
1324
 191 cf Prosecutor v Akayesu ICTR-96-4-T (1998) para 498.  
1325
 Danner & Martinez (2005) Cal L Rev 151 cf Prosecutor v Krstić IT-98-33-A (2004) para 134: “Genocide is one of 
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1326
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1327
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amount to a crime. This is what Badar refers to as the “offensive package”.1329  Therefore failing to 
establish dolus specialis means that the enumerated acts, which are “offensive packages” in 
themselves, still maintain its criminal characteristic; however, it either amounts to a lesser offence 
under ICTY Statute or an ordinary crime under national jurisdiction.
1330
  As discussed in chapter 
three, rape is not a crime within the international criminal sphere unless it falls within one of the 
listed international crimes ie war crime, crimes against humanity or genocide. However when the 
accused possessed genocidal intent in addition to satisfying the “offensive package” the crime is 
elevated to a specific crime. Dolus specialis “aggravates the offensive package to fall into the realm 
of the crime of crimes”.1331 The ad hoc tribunals have “unanimously adhered to the fact that 
genocide is characterised by a dolus specialis”.1332  
According to Badar, the ICTY‟s interpretation of article 4(2) of ICTY Statute, in Stakić and 
Brdanin, elevated genocide as it requited that the prosecution prove that the accused both wanted to 
commit the criminal act and intended to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group as two separate and distinct entities.
1333
 Therefore, Badar argues that when the 
commission concerns a specific intent crime, the accused must also have specifically intended that 
outcome in addition to foreseeing and accepting the likelihood of its commission before liability as 
a principal can ensue.
1334
  
Danner and Martinez argue that JCE category three should not be applicable to crimes that 
require specific intent; such as genocide and persecution because JCE category three requires 
negligence (culpa) or recklessness in order to satisfy the requisite mens rea, which in turn 
undermines this distinctive characteristic.
1335
 I disagree, arguably JCE category three requires more 
than negligence, requires intent (mens rea) in the form of dolus eventualis. Badar argues that the 
ICTY Trial Chamber found that dolus eventualis is not the same as recklessness (culpa) because it 
requires a “cognitive element of awareness and a volitional element of acceptance of risk” whereas 
recklessness only requires the former.
1336
 Therefore to establish that the accused possessed dolus 
eventualis the prosecution must prove that he or she foresaw and accepted that risk by reconciling 
him or herself with the foreseen outcome.
1337
 Badar argues that the element of acceptance brings 
dolus eventualis within the ambit of intent and rules out recklessness.
1338
  
Nonetheless, dolus eventualis falls short of dolus specialis. van Sliedregt argues that genocide 
requires evidence of dolus specialis, while liability under JCE category three requires dolus 
eventualis.
1339
 The type of mens rea is the hurdle when determining whether JCE category three 
may be used to establish liability for genocidal crimes that have been committed as a natural and 
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 300. 
1330
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1333
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Law 301 cf Prosecutor v Brđanin IT-99-36-T (2004) para 695. 
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 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 346 cf Prosecutor v Galić (Trial Chamber) IT-98-29 
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foreseeable consequence of implementing a common criminal plan.
1340
 According to van Sliedregt, 
genocidal intent comprises of two mental elements; the purpose-element ie the intent to destroy 
whole or part of a group and the general mens rea, which is part of the actus reus ie the intent to kill 
or rape.
1341
 According to the ICTY in Statić and Brđanin, the accused must possess the intent to 
destroy in order to discharge the purpose-element.
1342
 The ICTY in Brdanin found that specific 
intent and the mens rea standard of JCE category three is irreconcilable.
1343
 In summation, the 
general mens rea can be satisfied by dolus eventualis, while the purposive element requires dolus 
specialis. Moreover, according to the ICTY in Statić and Brđanin, the accused‟s knowledge of the 
physical perpetrator‟s intent to destroy is not sufficient.1344 The ICTY in Krstić used JCE category 
three to establish liability for genocide, yet the conviction was altered, on appeal, to aiding and 
abetting genocide.
1345
 Furthermore, the ICTY in Statić found that: 
 
“[T]he application of a mode of liability cannot replace a core element of a crime. The 
Prosecution confuses modes of liability and the crimes themselves. Conflating the third 
variant of joint criminal enterprise and the crime of genocide would result in the dolus 
specialis being so watered down that it is extinguished. Thus, the Trial Chamber finds that in 
order to „commit‟ genocide, the elements of that crime, including the dolus specialis must be 
met. The notions of „escalation‟ to genocide, or genocide as a „natural and foreseeable 
consequence‟ of an enterprise not aimed specifically at genocide are not compatible with the 
definition of genocide under Article 4(3)(a) [of the ICTY Statute].”1346 
 
Badar argues that specific intent can only be satisfied by the accused‟s direct intent ie dolus directus 
of the first degree.
1347
 Furthermore, the ICC stated in the Katanga Confirmation Decision that 
general evidence on the prevalence sexual offences in the area provided an insufficient base to infer 
the accused‟s knowledge or intent.1348 Therefore the prosecution cannot make use of JCE category 
three when prosecuting rape or sexual violence for “causing serious bodily or mental harm” as an 
act of genocide.
1349
 Arguably, this will have devastating effects on the prosecution of sexual 
violence as an international crime because only physical perpetrators can be charges with 
committing acts of genocide.  
Conversely, Sliedregt argues that the ICTY in the Brdanin Appeal, without precedential support, 
and the Prosecutor v Miloević (“Miloević Appeal”) found that an accused can be held responsible 
for committing genocide where genocide is a natural and foreseeable consequence of his acts.
1350
 
The ICTY‟s finding in Brdanin that specific intent and the mens rea standard of JCE category three 
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 Prosecutor v Stakić IT-97-24-T (2003) para 530; Prosecutor v Brđanin IT-99-36-T (2004) para 29. 
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Decision on Motion for Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98bis (2004) para 57.  
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 van Sliedregt (2007) J Int‟l C J 190-191 cf Prosecutor v Krstić IT-98-33-A (2004) para 143.  
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 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 301-302.  
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 Art 6(b) of the Rome Statute (2003) 2187 UNTS 90. 
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are irreconcilable, was versed on appeal.
1351
 The ICTY in the Brdanin Appeal found that “[t]he 
Trial Chamber erred by conflating the mens rea requirement of the crime of genocide with the 
mental requirement of the mode of liability by which criminal responsibility is alleged to attach to 
the accused”.1352  Thereafter the Brdanin Appeal clarified that JCE category three is not an element 
of the particular crime.
1353
 It is a mode of liability “through which an accused may be individually 
criminally responsible despite not being the direct perpetrator of the offence”.1354  
Furthermore, the ICTY in Krstić also found that “some legal commentators further contend that 
genocide embraces those acts whose foreseeable or probably consequences is the total or partial 
destruction of the groups without any necessity of showing that destruction was the goal of the 
act.”1355 Yet the ICTY is uncertain whether the latter reflects the status of customary international 
law.
1356
  The Appeal Chamber explained that the shared intention (mens rea) and purpose was 
established by looking at the scale of the attacks, the systematic nature and public targeting, of the 
Tutsi population, as discussed in chapter three.
1357
  The Appeal Chamber therefore concluded that 
the Trial Chamber had “adequately explained and reasonably concluded” that the perpetrators of 
rape and sexual assault possessed genocidal intent.
1358
 The perpetrators‟ intent was inferred from; 
the knowledge of deviatory crime occurring as a result of implementation and the perpetrator‟s 
continued participation.
1359
 Furthermore, in Akayesu, The ICTR inferred the physical perpetrators‟ 
specific intent:  
 
“Owing to the very high number of atrocities committed against the Tutsi, their widespread 
nature not only in the commune of Taba, but also throughout Rwanda, and to the fact that the 
victims were systematically and deliberately selected because they belonged to the Tutsi 
group, with persons belonging to other groups being excluded, the Chamber is also able to 
infer, beyond reasonable doubt, the genocidal intent of the accused in the commission of the 
above-mentioned crimes.”1360 
 
 According to Cassese, the ICC requiring specific intent for crimes that fall outside of the common 
purpose appears to annihilate the chances of the JCE category three being applied in the ICC.
1361
 
However, Cassese argues that JCE category three may be applicable if a “broad interpretation of the 
expression „intentional participation‟” is accepted.1362 Article 25 of the Rome Statute, requires that 
the contribution to the crimes of a group be intentional and made “in the knowledge of the intention 
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 Badar The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law 361. 
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of the group to commit the crime”.1363 According to Cassese “[t]he notion of „knowledge‟ could 
well cover that of „foresight‟ and „voluntary taking of the risk‟ of a criminal action by one or several 
members of the group”.1364  In other words the requisite intent is satisfied by the accused awareness 
and acceptance of the likelihood that the un-concerted crimes might be committed and that the 
physical perpetrators might possess specific intent. Cassese adds that article 25 of the Rome Statute 
includes JCE category three, so long as the accused was aware and foresaw the commission of the 
un-concerted crime.
1365
  The onus rests with the prosecution to prove that the crime was objectively 
foreseeable and subjectively foreseen by the accused. The expansive interpretation of 
article 25(3)(d)(i) as proposed by Cassese therefore includes JCE category three whereby intent is 
satisfied by the intent to contribute to the common purpose.
1366
 van Sliedregt argues that the 
prosecution need not prove that the accused possessed genocidal intent himself.
1367
 The ICTY in the 
Brđanin Decision on Interlocutory Appeal also found that the prosecution need not prove that the 
accused intended the commission or even knew for definite that it would be committed.
1368
 On the 
contrary, the accused need only be aware that the implementation of the concerted crime might 
result in the commission of the eventual yet un-concerted crime by others and thereby it was 
reasonably foreseeable in his own mind.
1369
 The accused‟s criminal responsibility arises from the 
fact that he intentionally and willingly entered a JCE to commit another crime together with his or 
her subjective foresight and acceptance of the risk that un-concerted crimes might occur.
1370
 Badar 
argues that fault is a distinctive feature of principal liability arising from participation in a JCE.
1371
 
Fault is established where the accused foresaw or knew that the un-concerted crime, that 
materialised, might be committed and willingly took that risk by intentionally contributing to 
common criminal purpose or criminal enterprise.
1372
 Therefore the accused‟s fault permits the 
attribution of liability beyond the crimes agreed upon. 
 Furthermore, van Sliedregt argues that proof of the accused‟s intentional yet reckless 
contribution to a criminal enterprise together with his or her foresight with regards to the 
commission of the un-concerted crime and the physical perpetrator‟s genocidal intent is sufficient 
for deviatory forms of liability to ensue from genocidal acts.
1373
 According to her, the “purpose 
element could thus be satisfied by „knowledge of intent.‟”1374 She furthermore states that Brdanin 
and Milosević offer support for this approach.1375 According to the Brdanin Interlocutory Appeal 
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Decision, where the crime requires specific intent as an element, the accused must have reasonably 
foreseen that the un-concerted crime might be committed with specific intent ie genocidal intent.
1376
  
Badar argues that the ICTY in the Brdanin Appeal “lowered the threshold of mens rea requisite 
category of JCE to reach one of negligence” by adopting a “reasonably foreseeable and natural 
consequences” test.1377 Furthermore, Badar argues that the accused‟s liability for a crime that he 
neither intended nor participated in, is unjust.
1378
 However, van Sliedregt explains that 
“[p]articipatory liability has its own mental element through which the mental element of 
underlying crime (genocide) is established”.1379 Therefore the JCE doctrine does not water down the 
requisite mens rea for genocidal acts from dolus specialis to dolus eventualis because they are two 
distinct elements.
1380
 The prior pertains to the physical perpetrators specific intent regarding the 
commission of the un-concerted crime (mental element for the underlying crime) and the latter 
pertains to the accused‟s intent with regards to participating in a criminal enterprise (mental element 
to participate).
1381
 The JCE doctrine merely provides a mode of showing whether the perpetrator or 
the accused possessed specific intent or not.
1382
 The genocidal intent does therefore exist; the 
physical perpetrator possessed dolus directus with regards to his or her genocidal intent and the 
accused foresaw and reconciled himself with the risk (dolus eventualis) that the physical perpetrator 
may commit a crime with genocidal intent and decided to contribute nonetheless. van Sliedregt 
concludes that JCE category three can be used to establish liability for un-concerted genocidal acts 
only where JCE is understood to be a form of participation not perpetration.
1383
  
The distinction between perpetrators and participants is therefore important because the prior 
needs to possess genocidal intent themselves in order to incur liability for genocidal acts while, the 
latter do not need to possess genocidal intent themselves.
1384
 However it is important to note that 
with a lower threshold comes a lower form of culpability.
1385
 van Sliedregt argues that the 
attribution of a lower form of liability for participants is consistent with post-WWII concepts of 
“being concerned in” or “participating in a common design,” on which JCE liability is based.1386 
The JCE doctrine is therefore based on Anglo-American doctrine of common purpose.
1387
 
Additionally, the JCE doctrine creates a “perpetrator status for those closely involved in the 
commission of an international crime”.1388 
In summation, JCE category three is a mechanism used to determine whether the accused 
foresaw and accepted (dolus eventualis) that an un-concerted crime might be committed by another 
and that he or she might possess specific intent (dolus specialis). Consequently, they both incur 
liability for genocide yet the participant incurs a deviatory form of culpability; relative to the 
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difference in their degree of mens rea. The JCE doctrine is arguably a mechanism used to establish 
the elements of the crime, it is not an element in itself and neither does it exempt the fulfilment of 
any of the elements. Special intent will always be an element of genocide, however under JCE 
category three only the physical perpetrator, not the participatory accused, needs to possess the 
genocidal intent and its existence can be proved by using JCE category three.
1389
 The liability of the 
accused, for genocidal acts committed by another, is established by his or her criminal participation 
together with foreseeing and accepting the commission of that specific un-concerted crime with 
specific intent as a result of implementing the JCE. According to van Sliedregt, using JCE category 
three to establish liability for act of genocide is justifiable.
1390
 
 
6 4 6 The enactment of amendments to article 25 of the Rome Statute 
 
As discussed above, Ohlin argues that the three conceptual problems with the JCE doctrine; ie 
foreseeability, intentionality and equal culpability, “do not implicate the essential core of the 
doctrine”.1391 Ohlin therefore suggests four immediate amendments to article 25 of the Rome 
Statute as the solution.
1392
 International judges have a tendency to look to the jurisprudence of the 
tribunals in coming to a finding.
1393
 Therefore the previous application of the JCE doctrine needs to 
be expressly overwritten before the ICC, as the future of international criminal justice, replicates it 
along with its conceptual problems.
1394
   
Firstly, article 25(3)(d) must expressly require “substantial and indispensable contribution,” as 
required by the ICTY in KvoĈka, before criminal liability is invoked.1395 Secondly, Ohlin suggests 
that article 25(3)(d)(i) and article 25(3)(d)(ii) should not be disjunctive.
1396
 Article 25(3)(d)(i)-(ii) 
should be separated into two distinct categories.
1397
 The first of which; provides for individuals who 
are “considered to be members of the conspiracy and should receive the harshest sentences in 
accordance with their individual culpability”.1398 The second of which; should be rewritten in a 
separate category which provides for those, who did not intent to further the criminal goals yet were 
aware of the group‟s criminal intent, to be liable for a lower criminal provision.1399 Ohlin proposes 
that article 25(3)(d)(ii) could be rewritten in a new provision that creates “an affirmative duty to 
make reasonable efforts to stop a criminal plan in progress”.1400 In addition, Danner and Martinez, 
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suggest that limiting responsibility under category three to military and political leaders could 
resolve the discomfort surrounding its application.
1401
 These new provisions should for example 
protect merchants who solely provide background services to a criminal enterprise from being 
charged with the crimes of their customers.
 1402
 
Thirdly, article 25 of the Rome Statute, which is silent on foreseeability, should expressly 
display “the principle that the foreseeable crimes of one's co-conspirators will carry a lower 
criminal penalty than crimes that were explicitly or implicitly part of the criminal plan”.1403 Ohlin 
therefore suggests the addition of a new provision that explicitly codifies “this interpretation of the 
concept of foreseeability and its appropriate level of culpability” and thereby entrenches the moral 
hierarchy of intentional acts over unintended yet foreseen acts (negligence).
1404
 
The fourth amendment to article 25 expressly address the attribution of equal liability.
1405
 The 
amended provision should expressly state that: “all members of a conspiracy will be judged 
according to their individual participation and importance in the overall criminal scheme”.1406 In 
addition, this amendments should include a clause that states that “prosecutions under Article 25 
must be relative to an individual‟s role in the overall criminal organization and that minor players 
are less culpable than masterminds”.1407 After the judges have engaged in fact finding to determine 
the hierarchy of positions within the circumstances, they can assign guilt relative to the role that the 
specific accused played. In addition, Cassese suggests how to qualify and straighten out the 
application of JCE category three.
1408
 For instance, when using JCE category three to establish 
individual criminal responsibility the “secondary offender” should be charged with a lesser crime 
than the “primary offender” when it is applicable.1409   
Ohlin concedes that enacting amendments to the Rome Statute is difficult, however that cannot 
stand in the way of legitimising the JCE doctrine by formulating revisions within the context of the 
Rome Statute‟s article 25 that are consistent with criminal law paradigms, namely; foreseeability, 
intentionality and culpability.
1410
 
 
6 5 Conclusion 
 
Arguably, the discussions in this chapter have revealed that the JCE doctrine does not violate the 
principles of legality. JCE liability and a contribution to a JCE, as a form of commission, are 
recognised by customary international. Therefore a conviction and punishment can arise out of the 
use of this theory of liability because it exists in law. In addition, the JCE doctrine is evinced to 
exist in customary law and has been applied  in post-WWII criminal tribunals long before the 
enactment of the ICTY Statute, ICTR Statute an the Rome Statute. The use of the JCE doctrine is 
not applied retrospectively and the accused is therefore sufficiently aware that a contribution to a 
criminal enterprise may lead to his or her criminal liability.  
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Furthermore the expansion of article 7 of the ICTY Statute and article 6 of the ICTR Statute to 
include JCE liability is acceptable because it extended the scope of criminal responsibility to those 
who would not otherwise be culpable. The expansion was therefore supported by the object and 
purpose of the ICTY Statute to prosecute all those who are responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law. It has become apparent that the judges of the ICC and ad hoc 
tribunals must be cautious when adopting human rights law into a criminal law system. Purposive 
expansions of a right or obligation, interpretations that protect human dignity and victim-oriented 
constructions have a tendency to threaten the restraining characteristics of criminal law such as the 
principle of culpability and relative culpability. However the judges of ad hoc tribunals have 
cautiously used human rights law to improve accountability, without limiting the fundamental 
principles of criminal law. The ad hoc tribunals only attribute liability when it is clear that the 
prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that all the requisite subjective and objective 
elements have been met for that specific crime, and thereafter relatively allocating a degree of 
liability and sentencing that reflects the accused‟s culpability ie his or her degree of participation 
and his or her state of mind. Consequently, the application of the JCE doctrine does not remove the 
prosecution‟s duty to prove all the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt before liability 
can ensue. Thus the application of the JCE doctrine does not violate the accused‟s presumption of 
innocence. These principles and the onus on the prosecution protect and ensure the accused‟s right 
to a fair trial.  
It is uncertain whether the Rome Statute will adopt a similar expansive interpretation of 
commission as the ad hoc tribunals, in the future. Article 22 of the Rome Statute requires a strict 
interpretation of its provisions, including the forms of participation and modes of liability. 
However, it is clear that article 22 of the Rome Statute does not necessitate the strictest 
interpretation possible. Moreover, a strict interpretation is usually only necessary when two possible 
constructions arise from the ordinary meaning of the terms in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose, in accordance with article 31 of the VCLT. In addition, it is clear from the 
investigation above that it is within the ICC‟s or ad hoc tribunals‟ mandate to look to customary 
international law to fill the gaps within its constitutive instrument. Commission is a very broad term 
and therefore the tribunal was fully within its mandate to explore the JCE doctrine as a possible 
sub-category.  
Additionally, numerous legal authors and criminal adjudicators have accepted the JCE doctrine 
as a justified theory of liability that should be maintained in international law. However, the Tadić-
construction of the JCE doctrine threatens the principle of culpability.  The Tadić-construction of 
the JCE doctrine attributes an equal degree of liability to all its members for crimes committed by 
members, irrespective of their degree of participation or role in the criminal enterprise. This is 
clearly against the principle of individual culpability, including relative culpability. However, the 
ICTY in the Brđanin Appeal has limited the prosecution‟s discretion to attribute wrongdoing 
equally by requiring that the contribution be vital, substantial or significant before criminal 
responsibility can ensue. Moreover, it is clear that the ad hoc tribunals require that the accused must 
have made an intentional contribution to a criminal enterprise in furtherance of its criminal purpose 
and have subjectively foreseen the possibility of the specific un-concerted crime occurring, albeit 
inferred foresight, before criminal responsibility for the un-concerted crime can occur. While these 
interpretive developments have limited the scope of JCE liability and the discretion of the 
prosecution, more recent interpretations have arguably expanded the scope of JCE category three 
too far. The ICTY in Milošević and the Brđanin Appeal have extended the application of JCE 
category three to crimes that requires specific intent. Ohlin, van Sliedregt and Cassese propose that 
an accused can justifiable incur a derivative form of liability, pursuant to JCE category three, for 
specific intent crimes commit by another, despite not possessing dolus specialis himself or herself. 
However, this extension, while providing differentiation through the attribution of a derivative form 
of liability, may still violate the principle of culpability because JCE category three does not 
discharge the requisite intent and therefore undermines the character of, and stigma attached to, 
specific crimes. JCE category three requires dolus eventualis, an intentional state of mind greater 
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than negligence or recklessness (culpa) yet it falls short of dolus specialis. Therefore, JCE category 
three cannot apply to specific crimes, such as genocide and persecution. The conviction as an 
accessory to genocide does not rightly reflect an accused‟s contribution to a common criminal 
purpose in furtherance of a criminal purpose other than genocide and who furthermore did not 
possess the intent to destroy a group. Even though the accused intentionally and significantly 
contributed to a JCE despite foreseeing and accepting that an act of genocide might be committed 
by another with genocidal intent in the execution of the JCE. According to my findings the 
application of JCE category three does not limit the accused‟s right to fair trial or the principles of 
legality as set out to be determined in my eighth research question. However a broad application of 
JCE category three can threaten the principle of individual culpability.  These conceptual mistakes 
in the construction of the existing JCE doctrine threaten the principle of culpability and may 
influence the ICC‟s interpretation of article 25 of the Rome Statute. Ohlin expressly encourages the 
ICC to investigate and develop its own version of the JCE doctrine.  
Therefore the reform of article 25 of the Rome Statute is an immediate necessity before the ICC 
adopts the “Tadić-version” with all its conceptual uncertainties or worse, dismisses it as a legitimate 
form of commission and theory of liability entirely. The latter might have occurred already because 
the ICC, as of yet, has not used the JCE doctrine and has rather opted to rely on co-perpetration or 
aiding and abetting to attribute liability for the contribution to a common criminal enterprise, 
depending on the participant‟s degree of participation and state of mind. The reform of article 25 of 
the Rome Statute should expressly include the developments made by the ad hoc tribunals by 
firstly, expressly requiring that the contribution to the JCE be “significant or substantial” before 
liability can ensue. Secondly, article 25(3)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Rome Statute should not be 
disjunctive but should rather be two separate provisions. The new provisions will provide that 
intentional and significant contributions to the criminal enterprise, with the intention of furthering 
the common criminal purpose, will acquire the highest form of liability, while intentional and 
significant contributions to the criminal enterprise made with knowledge of the common criminal 
purpose can acquire a lower form of liability akin to negligence. It is important to maintain the 
distinction between intentional and negligent contributions, as the prior is more morally 
reprehensible than the latter. The distinction also maintains the principle of culpability. 
Furthermore, article 25(3)(d)(ii) of the Rome Statute could be rewritten to create an affirmative duty 
to make reasonable efforts to stop a criminal plan in progress. Thirdly, a member of the JCE should 
only incur liability, once all the objective and subjective elements have been met, for the concerted 
crimes perpetrated by other members, ie the crimes that fall within the common purpose, because 
they were the intended outcomes. Consequently, all the members that subjectively foresaw that the 
un-concerted crime may occur (in addition to satisfying the other elements for liability) may incur 
liability for the un-concerted crime yet it must be a lesser degree of liability than ascribed to the 
concerted crime. This reiterates the principle that liability for intentional crimes must be greater 
than the liability for negligent crimes. Fourthly, article 25 of the Rome Statute should expressly 
state that all members of a conspiracy will be judged according to their individual participation and 
importance in the overall criminal scheme. It is not necessary to list the varying roles and positions 
in a hierarchy and their respective degree of liability within this new provision, however the ICC 
should be able to ascertain the accused‟s role within the hierarchy after engaging in a fact finding 
investigation and thereafter attach a degree of liability relative to his or her degree of participation. 
Finally, the differentiation model in article 25 of the Rome Statute that attributes principle 
liability to the forms of commission listed in article 25(3)(a) and lesser forms of liability to the 
forms of participation listed in article 25(3)(b) through (3)(d) protects the principle of culpability by 
determining the degree of liability based on the accused‟s degree of participation. The 
differentiation model should therefore be maintained because it enhances transparency, improves 
foreseeability and thus overall fairness. Therefore I concede that the Tadić-construction of JCE 
category three as it is currently construed, may only amount to a lesser forms of liability under 
article 25(3)(c) to (d) of the Rome Statute not joint commission as a co-perpetrator under article 
25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute. However, with a reformation of article 25(3) of the Rome Statute as 
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suggested by Ohlin, the ICC can make distinctions between which contributions to a criminal 
enterprise result in liability as a principle and which result in lesser forms of liability. This, I argue, 
would be the ideal outcome of the separation of article 25(3)(d)(i) and 25(3)(d)(ii) of the Rome 
Statute.  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Despite the prohibition and criminalisation of rape and other acts of sexual violence in international 
criminal law, Haffajee, Van Schaack, Gardam and Jarvis all found that very few acts of sexual 
violence are successfully prosecuted and upheld on appeal by international courts and tribunals. For 
example, the ICC in Katanga Confirmation Decision acquitted the accused of all sex-related 
charges. The ICC found that the evidence was not strong enough to establish substantial grounds to 
confirm that the accused was criminally responsible for crimes of rape and sexual violence. It 
furthermore concluded that the knowledge or intent of the accused could not be sufficiently inferred 
from general evidence on the prevalence of acts of sexual violence in the area. Moreover, the ICC 
in the Prosecutor‟s Darfur Submission attempted to infer the accused‟s genocidal intent from the 
evidence of the scale of the violence and witnesses attesting to staggering proof of sexual violence, 
however; the issuance of an arrest warrant was denied due to the prosecutor‟s inability to 
reasonably establish that the accused actually committed the crime. Additionally, the Lubanga 
indictment did not mention gender violence crimes.  
Against this backdrop, the aim of my thesis was to analyse whether the JCE doctrine could 
facilitate the conviction of high-ranked officials under international criminal law for acts of sexual 
violence. One of the objectives was therefore to determine whether the JCE doctrine is a legitimate 
doctrine that can establish a link between an accused who did not carry out the actus reus and the 
act of sexual violence. Consequently, my sixth research question was to determine whether JCE 
category three could be used to establish the individual criminal responsibility of an accused who 
did not physically carry out the acts of sexual violence. I hypothesised that JCE category three 
would be the most suitable construction for prosecuting acts of sexual violence based on the 
propositions of Haffajee who inspired this thesis. However, before evaluating JCE as a solution, the 
source of problem had to be unearthed.  
Discovering the nature of rape and sexual violence became the research endeavour of chapter 
two in consonance with my first research question. Based on the readings during my pre-study, I 
hypothesised that acts of sexual violence are used during armed conflict to terrorise civilians and 
emasculate the opposition. By looking to various feminist, legal, socio-political and socio-economic 
theories, in chapter two, for a deeper understanding of the nature of sexual violence in general as 
well as the reasons for its commission, it became clear that the very nature of the crime and the 
context within which it is committed, labours the likelihood of a successful prosecution.  
A theoretical evaluation revealed that the commission of acts of sexual violence during armed 
conflict are purposely and intentionally used as tools or weapons of war; whether it be to terrorise 
or aid war strategies. Furthermore, acts of sexual violence are used during armed conflict or 
apparent times of peace to aggravate ethnic cleansing or the genocide of a specific group.  
Additionally, acts of sexual violence have been used as a weapon by one group against another in 
order to systematically assist or amplify the execution of their criminal enterprise or plan. Therefore 
the instrumental, strategic and intentional use of acts of sexual violence as part of a bigger plan by 
one group against another indicates that sexual violence is often perpetrated as a product of a 
criminal enterprise. Furthermore, it indicates the objective foreseeability of these practices, 
particularly during armed conflict.  In addition, the prevalence and widespread occurrence of acts of 
sexual violence together with its instrumental and purposive use by one group against another form 
a factual and circumstantial foundation from which the court may infer the accused‟s subjective 
foreseeability and intention. However, as established in chapters three and four, the existence of the 
accused‟s intent and foresight may only be established where the accused‟s intent is the only 
reasonable inference on the facts.  
Furthermore, I found that rape is rarely expressed as an intended objective of a criminal 
enterprise or expressly ordered. However, it is very often an implicit part or foreseeable 
consequence of implementing a criminal plan or a war strategy, which is supported, planned and 
coordinated by individuals in a position of power. It is noteworthy to mention that international 
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criminal law is concerned with holding high-ranked officials and masterminds responsible for 
international crimes, albeit that the crimes were committed by another. This is compelled by the 
reality that high-ranked officials use others to implement their war, or criminal, strategies and the 
use of a chain of command which facilitates its operation and implementation. Therefore the 
difficulty experienced in linking the high-ranked official to the crime arises from the distance 
relating to the absence of a direct order to commit rape, the absence of the accused at the scene of 
the crime, sexual violence being omitted from the common criminal plan and the use of a chain of 
command. Consequently, the nature of sexual violence together with the characteristics and 
operation of armed conflict or criminal enterprises, make it difficult to link high-ranked officials, 
who did not physically carry out the actus reus of the crime, to the crime.   
In addition to the theoretical analysis of the nature of acts of sexual violence, I investigated 
sexual violence as a violation of human rights and international humanitarian law in chapter two. 
According to the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols, rape, enforced prostitution and 
indecent assault are prohibited practices during armed conflict.  Furthermore, case law from the 
ECtHR, IACtHR and IACHR and communications from the HRC acknowledge that the 
commission of sexual violence, irrespective whether committed during armed conflict or apparent 
times of peace, violates numerous human rights including human dignity, the protection against 
torture and privacy. The commission of sexual violence is therefore a serious violation of 
international human rights and international humanitarian law. According to the UDHR, the ACHR, 
the ECHR, the Women‟s Protocol and CERD, among other regional and international human rights 
treaties, these violations give rise to obligations on the part of state parties and the international 
community to ensure access to justice and the provision of effective remedies including effective 
prosecution for those who have had their rights violated. It is necessary to reiterate that in order for 
prosecution to be effective there must be a reasonable prospect of securing a conviction.  
Furthermore, the General Recommendation 19 of the CEDAW Committee established that 
sexual violence is a form of gender discrimination, which is a ius cogen. This non-derogable norm 
requires that all states, even those who are not party to the relevant human rights treaties, are 
obliged to prevent and punish acts of sexual violence pursuant to erga omnes obligations. Chapters 
two and three, answered my first research question by revealing the nature of acts of sexual 
violence committed during armed conflict as war crimes and grave violations of international 
human rights and international humanitarian law. In addition, acts of sexual violence committed 
without a connection to armed conflict can also amount to grave violations of international human 
rights and either qualify as crimes against humanity or acts of genocide. My findings confirmed my 
assumption that acts of sexual violence are systematically and intentionally used to generate terror 
and facilitate underlying criminal strategies. In addition, the theoretical discussion alluded to the 
fact that establishing the individual criminal responsibility of the accused is the source of the 
difficulty experienced in successfully prosecuting sexual violence under international criminal law. 
Thus answering my fourth research question, ie the source of the difficulties experienced in 
prosecuting acts of sexual violence, as alluded to in chapter two.  
The aim of chapter three was to determine the source of the difficulty experienced in securing a 
conviction for acts of sexual violence. In order to do so, I had to firstly, determine the obligation 
under international criminal law to prosecute acts of sexual violence and to ensure the reasonable 
prospect of a conviction, in accordance with my second research question. Secondly, I had to 
investigate under which international crimes acts of sexual violence can be prosecuted, pursuant to 
my third research question. Thirdly, I had to source the difficulties experienced in prosecuting acts 
of sexual violence under international criminal law as covered by my fourth research question. 
Based on the Haffajee‟s averments, I hypothesised that the inability to establish the high-ranked 
official‟s individual criminal responsibility was impeding the ability of the prosecution to secure a 
conviction for acts of sexual violence. An investigation of the ICTY Statute, the ICTR Statute and 
the Rome Statute revealed that the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC were created with the specific 
purpose of prosecuting serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights. In 
addition, articles 1, 25, 86 and 93 of the Rome Statute legally obligates the international community 
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to hold all those who are responsible for grave crimes that concern the international community 
even if they did not physically commit the offence themselves. However acts of sexual violence are 
not prosecuted as sexual offences, instead they are indicted as war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
acts of genocide and violations of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Consequently, in 
addition to satisfying all the elements of the acts of sexual violence, the prosecution must also 
establish all the objective and subjective elements of one of these international crimes before 
liability can ensue under international criminal law. For instance, the ICTR in Semanza found that 
rape was committed as part of a widespread attack against the Tutsi people. Therefore in addition to 
proving the elements of rape, the prosecution had to prove that rape was committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack against a particular civilian group and that the accused was aware 
of those circumstances. Alternatively, for rape to amount to an act of genocide; the accused must 
have caused serious bodily or mental harm to persons belonging to a particular national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group with the specific intent of destroying that group as a whole or in part. For 
example, the ICTR in Musema found that rape and sexual violence was an integral part of the plan 
to destroy the Tutsi ethnic group. Consequently, without the accused‟s knowledge of the 
circumstances within which crimes against humanity are committed or the accused‟s possession of 
specific intent, an international crime has not been committed. Thus, the accused can only be 
convicted of a lesser crime or under national jurisdiction. These factors also contribute to the 
difficulty in securing a conviction for acts of sexual violence under international criminal law. It is 
important to reiterate that, unlike war crimes, the international crime of genocide and crimes against 
humanity do not require that the act of sexual violence be committed within the context of armed 
conflict, which means that these international crimes can be committed during everyday life. 
Furthermore, in support of the theoretical evaluation in chapter two, cases from the ICTY and 
ICTR, which involved charges concerning rape and other acts of sexual violence, were discussed 
and evaluated in chapter three. This analysis was carried out in order to confirm or oppose the 
hypothesis that the difficulty experienced in successfully prosecuting these crimes is being caused 
by the inability to link the high-ranked official to the crime that is committed by another; as alluded 
to in chapter two. A deeper analysis of the case law revealed that Furundžija incurred a derivative 
form of liability as an aider and abettor for outrages upon personal dignity; including the rape of 
Witness A. Furundžija‟s individual criminal responsibility ensued from his substantial contribution 
to the physical perpetrator‟s acts of raping, sexually assaulting and torturing Witness A by means of 
encouraging the physical perpetrator with his presence and continuing to interrogate Witness A 
during her assault. Nonetheless, Furundžija only incurred a derivative from of liability, not liability 
as a principal, because he did not physically penetrate Witness A or co-perpetrate her rape. 
However, on the same evidence, despite not laying a hand on Witness A, Furundžija incurred 
principal liability as a co-perpetrator for torture as a violation of the laws and customs of war. 
Furundžija incurred principal liability as a co-perpetrator of the torture of Witness A because he and 
the physical perpetrator (Accused B) both partook and shared in the purpose behind the torture and 
made their contributions simultaneously with knowledge of each other‟s actions.   
Furthermore, the ICTR in Semanza found that the accused incurred a derivative form of liability. 
Semanza was found guilty of instigating rape as crimes against humanity and guilty of instigating 
torture as a crimes against humanity for the rape committed by another. Semanza was sufficiently 
linked to the crime because the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the physical 
perpetrator heard Semanza‟s inciteful speech, admitted that he understood Semanza‟s speech to be 
permissive and subsequently proceeded to commit an act of sexual violence due to the accused‟s 
encouragement. Nonetheless, Semanza displays how difficult it is to hold an accused responsible as 
a principal perpetrator for crimes committed by another even where a clear and an extraordinary 
causal link can be established. Analogous to Furundžija, the basis for linking Semanza‟s 
contribution in the form of a speech to the physical perpetrator‟s commission of rape was their 
shared underlying purpose to destroy the Tutsi population. Despite satisfying the requirements for 
principal liability, Semanza was not convicted as a principal for committing rape because the 
accused did not receive sufficient notice of this particular charge.  
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In this regard, it is moreover important to note that the ICTY, usually attributes principal liability 
as a co-perpetrator instead of accessorial liability for complicity in cases involving torture, because 
despite playing different roles both the physical perpetrator and the substantial contributor partook 
and shared in the purpose behind the torture. It is clear from these two cases that the prosecution of 
sexual crimes differs from the prosecution of non-sexual crimes. Despite not laying a hand on the 
victim Furundžija incurred principal liability for torture yet derivative liability for rape as a 
violation of the laws and customs of war. Arguably, where the prosecution can prove that the 
accused and the physical perpetrator of rape shared an underlying criminal purpose, akin to cases 
involving torture, then the prosecution should be able to attribute principal liability to the accused 
despite the accused not physically carrying out the actus reus of the crime. Whether the underlying 
criminal purpose is the genocidal desire to destroy an ethnic group or attacks against a civilian 
population in a widespread or systematic manner, principal liability should arguably ensue from the 
intentional and significant contribution to further the common criminal purpose. However this is 
clearly not the case. 
The ICTR in Musema also illustrated that establishing individual criminal responsibility is the 
biggest hurdle in attributing guilt to an accused for acts of sexual violence. Where the prosecution 
can prove that the accused physically carried out the actus reus, he or she usually incurs liability as 
a principal perpetrator. However, where the actus reus of rape was physically carried out by others, 
it is difficult for the prosecution to link the accused to the crime. For example, Musema incurred 
liability as a principal for personally raping Nyiramusugi in concert with others and for aiding and 
abetting others in raping Nyiramusugi through his presence as a high-ranked official, his comments 
and the example he portrayed through his actions. However, the prosecution failed to link Musema 
to the rape of Nyiramusugi and Annunciata that were committed by others. Despite a witness‟s 
testimony that the Musema ordered the rape of Annunciata, Musema evaded liability because of the 
prosecution‟s inability to prove that the physical perpetrator had heard Musema‟s call to rape 
Annunciata and acted in response to it. Unlike the evidence in Semanza, the prosecution in Musema 
did not have the benefit of the physical perpetrator‟s admission that he understood the accused‟s 
speech to be permissive and therefore acted as a result thereof. That admission was essential yet a 
rare piece of evidence that the prosecution used to link the accused to the crime.  
The ICTR in Kajelijeli in the same vein demonstrated that it is only possible to secure a 
conviction where the prosecution establishes a clear link between the accused and the act of sexual 
violence. The ICTR listed physical perpetration, a direct order given by the accused to rape a 
specific individual and an eye-witness who can attest to the high ranked official‟s presence and 
view of the incident as indicators of a clear link. Nonetheless the ICTR clarified that international 
criminal law also provides for the attribution of individual criminal responsibility to those who 
make a substantial contribution to the crime despite not carry out the actus reus themselves. While 
the ICTR found that the rape of Witness ACM, the rape and sexual mutilation of Witness GDT, the 
rape of Witness GDF, the mutilation of Nyiramburanga, the inhumane acts against Joyce and the 
rape of Witness GDO‟s daughter did in fact occur, the prosecution failed to prove that Kajelijeli‟s 
previous speeches and actions had caused the rape and sexual assault of those women because they 
could not prove that the physical perpetrators had heard him and thereafter acted accordingly. 
Furthermore, the prosecution was neither able to prove Kajelijeli‟s presence at the scene of the 
crime nor that he specifically ordered the sexual assault of those specific victims on that day despite 
overwhelming evidence of Kajelijeli‟s encouragement, contributions and involvement in the attacks 
on the Tutsi people throughout April 1994. These contribution included speeches and conversations 
where he directly yet broadly instructed and encouraged sexual violence. Conversely, the 
prosecution successfully established Kajelijeli‟s individual criminal responsibility for non-sexual 
crimes committed by others. Yet again, like in Furundžija, there is a clear distinction between 
linking an accused to crimes of a non-sexual nature and crimes of a sexual nature. Arguably if the 
prosecution viewed Kajelijeli‟s contributions to the underlying criminal purpose of genocide and 
extermination as a crime against humanity as facilitating the foreseeable commission of sexual 
violence then he could incur liability for the commission of acts of sexual violence committed by 
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others. These facts are exacerbated by the fact that Kajelijeli found to have expressly encouraged 
sexual violence.    
The evaluation of Furundžija, Musema, Semanza, Kajelijeli and the Katanga Confirmation 
Decision answered my fourth research question by revealing that the difficulty experienced in 
securing convictions for acts of sexual violence is the inability of international criminal law to offer 
a successful way of establishing a legal nexus between a crime, committed by another, and a high-
ranked official. Establishing principal liability, for a crime committed by another, is particularly 
burdensome. Therefore establishing individual criminal responsibility and the requisite knowledge 
and intent are the two biggest hurdles in obtaining a successful conviction. An in-depth evaluation 
of cases from the ICTY and ICTR in chapter three confirmed my assumption that establishing 
individual criminal responsibility of the high-ranked official was and continues to impede 
convictions. However it unexpectedly revealed that establishing the accused‟s intent is also a 
hurdle.  
After establishing the nature of sexual violence in chapter two and determining the duty to 
effectively prosecute acts of sexual violence in chapters two and three. Then pin-pointing the ability 
to prove the accused‟s individual criminal responsibility as the problem with securing a conviction 
for acts of sexual violence and recognising that linking an accused to crimes of a sexual nature is 
more difficult than linking an accused to non-sexual crimes that are expressly included in the 
common criminal purpose in chapter three. I consequently, proceeded to use this information to 
evaluate the JCE doctrine as an effective remedy, in chapter four. The aim within chapter four was 
to firstly, set out the general theory and application of the JCE doctrine, pursuant to my fifth 
research question. In doing so, I also analysed the three different categories of the doctrine and the 
circumstances in which each are applicable. I hypothesised that JCE category three would be the 
most suitable construction for the prosecution of acts of sexual violence because liability extends to 
crimes that fall outside of the common purpose yet which are a foreseeable consequence of 
implementing the common purpose. Building on that hypothesis, I secondly set out to determine 
whether JCE category three could be used to establish the individual criminal responsibility of an 
accused who did not physically carry out the acts of sexual violence, in accordance with my sixth 
research question.  
My research revealed that the JCE doctrine is only applicable to crimes with multiple 
perpetrators who share the same intent. As established in chapter two, the commission of rape is 
usually used by members of one group to terrorise and harm members of another group; in 
pursuance of a broader common criminal purpose such as torture, ethnic cleansing, genocide, forced 
transfer or persecution. Therefore as I departed from the notion that the JCE doctrine caters to the 
collective, instrumental and purposive nature of this crime it could prove to be instrumental to 
convicting high-ranked officials for acts of sexual violence committed by others. Haffajee argues 
that the JCE doctrine removes the prosecutor‟s responsibility to prove a direct link between the 
accused and the un-concerted yet reasonably foreseeable crime committed by another. I however 
found that the JCE doctrine does not remove the prosecution‟s duty to establish all the elements of 
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It does, however assist in establishing a link where the 
accused intentionally contributed to the common criminal plan of a JCE that involves genocidal 
intent or attacks against a civilian population in a widespread or systematic manner. The JCE 
doctrine is therefore a form of common purpose or common plan liability. Therefore, I argue that 
the JCE doctrine provides a solution by establishing a link between the accused and the crime 
through the accused‟s intentional involvement in a criminal enterprise together with his or her 
foresight and acceptance that acts of sexual violence might be committed in execution thereof. The 
ICTY in the Vasiljević Appeal found that this doctrine considers each member of the common plan 
responsible for the crimes committed by other members.  
In each case that I evaluated, I applied five requirements of JCE category three to the facts of the 
case. Firstly, the prosecution has to establish the existence of a common criminal purpose that 
concerns the commission of an international crime. The common plan need not be express and can 
arise, or expand, extemporaneously. In Karemera the ICTR found that rape and other sexual acts 
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became part of the common purpose to destroy the Tutsi people after the 18
th
 of April 1994. It 
found that a common purpose to destroy the Tutsi population, ie genocide, materialised on the 11
th
 
of April 1994 when weapons were distributed to the Interahamwe in Kigali. Furthermore, the ICTY 
in Krstić found that the common criminal purpose was the forcible transfer of the Bosnian Muslims. 
Furthermore, both cases established that the existence of the common plan could be inferred from 
the surrounding circumstances. 
Secondly, the prosecution has to establish that the accused made a significant contribution to the 
common criminal plan. In Krstić the ICTY confirmed that the accused was a key participant in the 
common purpose because he organised and supervised the forcible transportation of civilians. 
Moreover, the ICTR in Karemera found that Karemera and Ngirumpatse significantly contributed 
to the common purpose by distributing weapons to the Interahamwe, intimidating those who 
opposed the attack of the Tutsis and by holding governmental positions. Furthermore, the MICT 
confirmed that Ngirabatware made a significant contribution by distributing weapons and 
addressing the Interahamwe at roadblocks. The Appeal Chamber in Karemera clarified that the 
accused‟s criminal responsibility, pursuant to JCE liability, arises from his or her intentional 
contribution to the common criminal purpose. 
Thirdly, the prosecution has to establish that the contribution must have been made with the 
direct intent of furthering the criminal purpose. In Krstić the ICTY inferred that the accused was 
aware of the humanitarian crisis based on his presence at the scene of the crime after the forcible 
transfer and his presence in meetings leading up to the forcible transfer. His intent was therefore 
evidenced by his extensive participation. The ICTR in Karemera also inferred the accused‟s 
awareness from his position, comments and actions. As a political leader within the Interim 
Government, Karemera was privy to information regarding national security and he also visited the 
Kibuye Commune where he must have seen the devastation for himself. 
Fourthly, the prosecution has to establish that the accused either possessed specific intent where 
the crime is categorised as an act of genocide or persecution or had been aware that the crime was 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population if the crime is 
categorised as a crime against humanity. In Karemera the ICTR found that sexual violence 
qualified as widespread based on the sheer number of incidences. Moreover, the Appeal Chamber 
confirmed that the Trial Chamber in Karemera had correctly inferred that the physical perpetrators 
of rape and sexual assault possessed genocidal intent. The physical perpetrators‟ genocidal intent 
was inferred from the fact that sexual violence was purposely used to intensify the Tutsi‟s level of 
suffering and sexual violence was committed in the context of a campaign to destroy the Tutsi 
population by the same perpetrators that were committing concerted crimes of a non-sexual nature.  
Fifthly, the prosecution has to establish that the accused subjectively foresaw that sexual 
violence was a natural and foreseeable consequence of implementing the common purpose and that 
the accused accepted the risk and chose to contribute nonetheless. For example, Karemera admitted 
during his testimony that it would be ridiculous to think that soldiers do not rape during war, 
therefore his admission proved that he subjectively foresaw and reconciled himself with the risk. 
However, admissions are very rare therefore the ICTR in the Karemera Appeal, the MICT in 
Ngirabatware and the ICTY in the Krstić Appeal found that the accused‟s subjective foresight or 
awareness can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances, as long as it is the only reasonably 
inference. The ICTR in Karemera found that surrounding circumstances include the accused‟s 
position, his or her access to information, presence and the notoriety of the events. In summation, 
by making a significant contribution to the common criminal plan with the direct intent of 
furthering the criminal purpose together, the accused opened himself up to criminal responsibility 
for crimes that were natural foreseeable consequence of implementing the common purpose, albeit 
that they were committed by another.  
My findings revealed that JCE category three has arguably been successfully used by the ad hoc 
tribunals in the Karemera Appeal, Ngirabatware and the Krstić Appeal to establish the criminal 
responsibility of high-ranked officials and masterminds as contributory members of a JCE, for acts 
of sexual violence physically perpetrated by others. Whereas category one was only used in the 
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Karemera Appeal to establish liability for the commission of rape and other acts of sexual violence 
after the common criminal purpose extemporaneous expanded on the 18
th
 of April to include these 
sexual practices. Furthermore the MICT in Ngirabatware, the ICTR in Karemera relating to crimes 
committed before the 18
th
 of April 1994 and the ICTY in the Krstić Appeal found that acts of sexual 
violence were not included in the common criminal purpose. For example, the ICTY in Krstić 
found that rape was not included in the objective of the JCE, however; it was undoubtedly a natural 
foreseeable consequence of implementing the common purpose, ie ethnic cleansing through forcible 
transfer. The ICTY in Krstić went as far as categorising the commission of rape as “inevitable” due 
to the dire circumstances of armed conflict. Thereby confirming my assumption that JCE category 
three is most suitable construction for prosecuting acts of sexual violence. Moreover, by using the 
JCE category three, Krstić incurred principal liability for persecution, including the un-concerted 
commission of rape as a crime against humanity. However on Appeal the conviction was replaced 
with aiding and abetting extermination as a crime against humanity. Additionally, Karemera and 
Ngirumpatse incurred principal liability for genocide, including rape and rape as a crime against 
humanity, pursuant to JCE category three. Furthermore, Ngirabatware incurred principal liability 
for rape as a crime against humanity, pursuant to JCE category three, for his participation in a joint 
criminal enterprise intended to exterminate the Tutsi population. However his conviction was 
overturned on appeal because the relevant paragraphs in the indictment, concerning his charge for 
rape as a crime against humanity, did not contain sufficient evidence to establish Ngirabatware‟s 
contribution the common criminal purpose. Despite Ngirabatware acquittal, Ngirabatware and 
Krstić illustrate the ad hoc tribunals‟ recognition that participation in a JCE can amount to a 
commission and thereby principal liability, in particular circumstances. The ad hoc tribunals have 
therefore clearly used JCE category three to attribute principal liability and derivative forms of 
liability to high-ranked officials for un-concerted yet foreseeable crimes of a sexual nature, 
committed by one other than the accused. My findings therefore exceeded my expectations and met 
my ultimate goal of arguably using JCE category three to establish principal liability.  
The ICC has not used JCE category three to attribute liability for contributions to criminal 
enterprise, instead it has opted to utilise co-perpetration and aiding and abetting to attribute liability.  
Consequently, my research departed from the primary assumption that the ICC may rely on the 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals when interpreting article 25 of the Rome Statute in order to 
sustain the continued use of the JCE doctrine within international criminal law. Article 25 of the 
Rome Statute, article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute and article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute lists the forms of 
perpetration and participation that result in individual criminal responsibility. Moreover, my 
ultimate goal was to determine whether the ICC, like the ad hoc tribunals, could also use JCE 
category three to attribute principal liability for participation in a common criminal enterprise as 
illustrated by my seventh research question.  
Consequently, I had to establish whether the ICC was either obliged or at least permitted to rely 
on the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals as a source for interpreting the Rome Statute, in chapter 
five. In order to do so, I firstly examined article 21 of the Rome Statute to determine whether the 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals is a source of “applicable law” in the interpretation of the 
Rome Statute. Secondly, I evaluated the provisions within article 31 of the VCLT that sets out the 
general rules for interpreting treaties in order to ascertain whether the jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
tribunals should be used in interpreting the Rome Statute. Thirdly, I referred to the human rights 
standard pursuant to article 21(3) of the Rome Statute and case law, to establish whether they 
support the inclusion of jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals as an applicable source. If the 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals is found to constitute an applicable source for interpreting the 
Rome Statute, the ICC will only consider jurisprudence that is based on provisions that are similar 
to the provisions found in the Rome Statute. Hence, I would thereafter have to determine whether 
the provisions concerning individual criminal responsibility in the ICTY and ICTR Statutes are 
comparable to the respective provision in the Rome Statute. Moreover whether their respective tests 
that distinguish principal from accessorial liability are theoretically reconcilable. Based on Goy‟s 
interpretation of article 25 of the Rome Statute, I presumed that the ad hoc tribunals‟ 
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conceptualisation of a contribution to a JCE as a form of commission that ensues in principal 
liability could not be supported by the ICC.  
An in-depth investigation revealed that the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals is neither 
expressly listed as an applicable source for interpreting the Rome Statute, pursuant to article 21 of 
the Rome Statute, nor does it amount to binding precedent. Judicial decisions are not a distinct 
source of law in international criminal adjudication. They are not binding on anyone else except the 
parties to the particular case; they are furthermore not binding on future cases, or on future parties, 
unless the constitutive instrument of that judicial body states otherwise. Nevertheless, the ICC may, 
I argue, have to consider the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals when interpreting the Rome 
Statute because the jurisprudence often reflects applicable sources for interpretation, pursuant to 
article 21 of the Rome Statute, ie principles and rules of international law as well as general 
principles of law. Furthermore, I submit that the fact that international judicial bodies and parties 
continue to cite case law in support of their findings and perspectives, despite not being bound to do 
so, indicates the emergence of the use of precedent in international law as a custom. A rule of 
customary international law is binding and arises where a state practice developed over a relative 
period time in conjunction with the conviction that the states are required to do so. Arguably, the 
prevalent and intentional use of case law within various international institutions based on 
relevance, usefulness, legal certainty and uniformity displays the existence of rule of customary 
international law. While the actions of one state do not bind others, repetitive behaviour do create 
behavioural and legal expectations that form customs.  
Additionally, article 21(3) of the Rome Statute requires that every interpretation must be 
consistent with international recognised human rights. Moreover, Pellet argues that an interpretation 
that is consistent with human rights trumps the plain reading of the Rome Statute. Therefore I 
conclude that when interpreting and applying the Rome Statute including the definition of the 
crime, the elements of the crime, types of criminal responsibility, the forms of liability and 
remedies; the ICC must ensure that the interpretation preserves equal access to justice, sexual 
autonomy and non-discrimination. The JCE doctrine offers a solution to the impunity of high-
ranked officials for rape and other acts of sexual violence that predominantly impact women. 
Consequently, by reading participation in a JCE into article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute and article 7(1) 
of the ICTY Statute, the ad hoc tribunals improved the prosecution of crimes that would otherwise 
maintain gender discrimination thereby improving women‟s access to justice and providing an 
effective remedy. Therefore I submit that the ICC should be encouraged to do the same.  
In addition, a broad interpretation of “context” in article 31 of VCLT, which provides the rules 
for interpreting treaties, arguably includes the jurisprudence of the ad hoc in the context of the 
Rome Statute. The ICC, ICTY and ICTR are judicial bodies within the sphere of international 
criminal law. All three institutions were created with the specific function of prosecuting serious 
crimes and the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR as well as their subsidiary instruments were used 
when drafting the Rome Statute and the RPE. It is therefore plausible, I argue, that the statutes of 
the ad hoc tribunals fall within the context of the Rome Statute. After all, the purpose of the VCLT, 
pursuant to article 31(3)(c), is to ensure the coherency between various sources of international law. 
However the operations of the ICC are nonetheless primarily regulated by the Rome Statute, the 
Rules of Procedure and the Elements of Crimes not the statutes of the ICTY and ICTR. 
Consequently, a systematically broad and purposive interpretation of article 31 of the VCLT 
supports that ICC could look to the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals for guidance only where 
article 25 of the Rome Statute is either similar or identical to the article 6 of the ICTR Statute and 
article 7 of the ICTY Statute. Alternatively where article 25 is silent on a matter.   
Goy argued that these three articles concerning individual criminal responsibility are generally 
comparable because all three provisions provide for differentiation between contributions that 
amount to principal liability and contributions that amount to derivative forms of liability. 
Furthermore, he argued that the ICC could recognise participation in a JCE as a form of criminal 
responsibility under article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute because both forms of liability are based 
on a subjective criterion of shared intent. However, article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute only results 
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in a derivative form of liability, whereas article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute attributes principal 
liability for commissions.  Goy clarified his argument by adding that the jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
tribunals cannot be used to interpret article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute because the ICC uses an 
objective-subjective test ie the control-over-crime criterion to distinguish a commission from lesser 
forms of participation, while the ad hoc tribunals have used a purely subjective test to attribute 
principal liability for a commission.  Goy appeared to answer my seventh research question with a 
resounding no, however after comparing the respective tests that are used by the ICC and the ad hoc 
tribunals to distinguish a commission from lesser forms of participation, I found that the test used 
by the ad hoc tribunals is also an objective-subjective test.  
The ICTY Trial Chamber in Vasiljević found that all participants JCE are equally responsible for 
the crime committed irrespective of the part each played in its commission. However ICTY in the 
Brđanin Appeal stated that principal liability only ensues where the accused possessed the requisite 
intent and made a significant contribution to furthering the JCE. Furthermore, the ICTR in the 
Gacumbitsi Appeal and the ICTY the Furundžija Appeal found that committing includes physical 
perpetration or playing an integral part in the commission of a crime with others. Therefore, the 
accused must at least foresee and accept that the crime he or she is being charged with might occur, 
share the direct intent to execute the crime within the common plan (subjective elements) as well as 
make a significant contribution to furthering the common purpose of the JCE (objective element) in 
order to establish liability as a principal. Consequently, while the subjective element may determine 
whether the accused incurs JCE liability, as stated in the Vasiljević Appeal and confirmed by Goy, I 
am of the opinion that it is not sufficient to incur principal liability for crimes committed by other 
members. Therefore while JCE liability may occur as soon as the subjective element is met, liability 
as a principal only ensues after the objective-subjective test is discharged. 
Furthermore, after comparing the objective and subjective requirements for a commission as 
required by the ICC against the requirements of the ad hoc tribunals I found that while 
article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute is not comparable to JCE liability as construed by the ad hoc 
tribunals, article 25(3)(a) is comparable. The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in Lubanga interpreted 
participation in a group, pursuant to article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute, as a catch all provision 
that does not require intent and results in weakest form of liability. Furthermore, according to the 
structure of article 25(3) of the Rome Statute ie the differentiation model, the degree of liability that 
arises from article 25(3)(d) is even weaker than the liability that ensues from aiding and abetting. 
Whereas the ICTY Appeal Chamber in three separate cases, namely: the Vasiljević Appeal, the 
Krstić Appeal and the Simić Appeal found that aiding and abetting warrants a lower sentence than 
for co-perpetration and participating in a JCE. Furthermore, article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute 
lists joint commission as a form of commission, which on its ordinary meaning appears to include 
intentional contributions to a group which are made with the intention of furthering the common 
criminal purpose. The objective requirements (actus reus) for participation in a JCE and joint 
commission pursuant to article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute are, I argue, identical except for the 
fact that the latter requires an essential contribution, while the prior requires a substantial 
contribution. Moreover, the subjective requirements are compatible to a certain extend. Before 
principal liability can ensue pursuant to JCE category three, the prosecution must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused made a substantial contribution to the JCE with the direct intent 
(dolus directus) of furthering the common criminal purpose and the accused must have subjectively 
seen and accepted that rape or other acts of sexual violence are a natural and foreseeable 
consequence of executing of the JCE (dolus eventualis). Article 30 of the Rome Statute, which 
stipulates the general subjective requirements that must be establish before principal liability can 
ensue for an international crime, recognises that dolus eventualis discharges the requisite intent 
where the crime falls within the common criminal purpose of the group. However as I established in 
chapters two through three, rape and other acts of sexual violence are usually not included in the 
common criminal purpose. In these instances article 30 of the Rome Statute requires that the 
accused must have possessed the specific intent (dolus specialis) to commit the foreseeable yet un-
concerted sexual crime before the subjective element can be discharged. Therefore I conclude that 
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participation in a JCE as construed by the ad hoc tribunals is consistent with subjective 
requirements of the ICC for commission, where rape or other sexual acts do not amount specific 
intent crimes such as genocide or persecution.  My hypothesis that the ad hoc tribunals‟ 
conceptualisation of a contribution to a JCE as a form of commission that ensues in principal 
liability could not be supported by the ICC was consequently repudiated.  
In conclusion, it is true that the requirement for commission as construed by the ad hoc tribunals 
are more lenient that the requirements of the ICC. However, participation in a JCE may, I argue, 
theoretically amount to principal liability, pursuant to article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, where 
the un-concerted yet foreseeable crime is not a specific intent crime and the accused‟s degree of 
participation and level of intent satisfies the control-criterion. According to the ICC in the Lubanga 
Confirmation Decision, an accused can incur principal liability as a co-perpetrator, pursuant to 
article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, for making an contribution at the preparatory or execution 
stage provided that certain circumstances are met. Arguably, a contribution to a JCE through which 
the commission of un-concerted crime is enabled, is a contribution at the preparatory phase. 
Therefore the contribution to the JCE can amount to principal liability where: (i) the contribution to 
the JCE is essential in nature therefore resulting in the realisation of the objective elements of the 
un-concerted crime, (ii) the accused‟s contribution was made with the direct intent of furthering the 
common criminal purpose, (iii) the accused is aware that he or she can frustrate the commission of 
the crime and (iv) if the crime does not require specific intent. For example, the ICC in Lubanga 
attributed principal liability to an accused as a co-perpetrator for his involvement in the common 
purpose. This argument rests on the supposition that a contribution to the common criminal plan is a 
contribution to the un-concerted crime during the preparatory phase. This argument is therefore 
consistent with the arguments discussed by Cassese as well as the findings of the ICTY in 
Furundžija and the ICTR in Karemera. Cassese argues that the attribution of liability for an un-
concerted crime is justified by the accused intentional contribution to the concerted crime or 
common criminal purpose because the common criminal plan enables or is consequential to the 
perpetration of the un-concerted crime.  I agree.   
It is important to reiterate that JCE liability is not synonymous with principal liability. Arguably, 
participation in a JCE can amount to accessorial liability or principal liability depending on the 
specific accused‟s degree of contribution and intent. I submit that this proposition is consistent with 
the case law of the ICC and the ad hoc tribunals. As discussed in chapter three, the ICTY in the 
Furundžija Appeal stated that participation can either constitute aiding and abetting or co-
perpetration where the accused intentionally and substantially participates in a JCE with the aim of 
furthering the common criminal purpose. The ICC also displayed differentiation in Katanga and 
Lubanga by attributing different degrees of liability for contributions to a common criminal 
purpose. The ICC convicted Katanga as an accessory for contributing to the commission or 
attempted commission of a crime by a group with a common purpose, pursuant to article 25(3)(d) of 
the Rome Statute, whereas the ICC convicted Lubanga, as a co-perpetrator for his involvement in a 
common purpose. Therefore, participation in a JCE can, I argue, amount to principal liability or 
derivative forms depending on, and relative to, the accused‟s degree of contribution and intent.  
Notwithstanding the usefulness of JCE category three, the doctrine cannot unjustifiably limit the 
rights of the accused or infringe the principles of legality and the principle of culpability. 
Consequently, in chapter six, I set out to determine whether the application of the JCE doctrine, 
specifically in establishing principal liability, limits the rights of the accused, infringes the 
principals of legality or violates the foundational notions criminal law in accordance with my eighth 
research question. My conclusions were that the JCE doctrine neither violates the principles of 
legality nor the human rights of the accused. As discussed by the ICTY in the Tadić Appeal, the use 
of the JCE doctrine and similar constructions of common purpose liability originates from post-
WWII jurisprudence. Therefore the inclusion of participation in a JCE in article 6 of the ICTR 
Statute and article 7 of the ICTY Statute as a form of participation and a mode of liability is not 
retrospective because its origin in customary international law precedes the commission of the 
crimes that were tried by the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC. Furthermore, the use of the JCE doctrine 
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does not remove the prosecution‟s duty prove all the elements of the crime, including the intent and 
individual criminal responsibility of the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. On the contrary, the 
JCE doctrine is a mechanism that helps establish whether the accused did satisfy the objective and 
subjective elements of the crime. Consequently, the accused‟s right to a fair trial is safeguarded 
because the presumption of innocence is preserved. 
However, I found that the Tadić-construction of JCE category three threatens the principle of 
culpability because it attributes equal degrees of liability to all the contributory members of the 
JCE, irrespective of the degree of participation. Furthermore, it attributes equal liability for crimes 
that falls within and outside the common criminal purpose, irrespective of the distinction that the 
prior involves dolus directus, while the latter requires dolus eventualis. Moreover, it attributes 
liability for specific intent crimes where the accused neither carried out the actus reus of the 
specific intent crime nor possessed specific intent (dolus specialis) himself. Instead, the requisite 
special intent is satisfied by the accused‟s subjective foresight and acceptance of the possibility that 
a specific-intent crime might be committed by another as a consequence of executing the JCE and 
that the physical perpetrator might possess specific intent. 
However over the decade of jurisprudence since the ICTY first applied the JCE doctrine in 
Tadić, the ad hoc tribunals have limited the prosecutor‟s discretion to determine the scope of 
wrongdoing by stipulating additional requirements. For instance, the ICTR in the Karemera Appeal 
and the ICTY in the KvoČka Appeal found that the accused could only incur liability for the un-
concerted crimes that he or she subjectively foresaw being committed as a reasonable consequence 
of implementing the JCE. In addition, ICTY in the Brđanin Appeal found that the accused could 
only incur liability if his or her contribution to the JCE is substantial or vital and made with the 
direct intent (dolus directus) of furthering the common criminal plan. Consequently, the additional 
requirements arguably make provision for differentiation in the degree of liability attributed to 
contributory members of the same JCE. In turn, the ability to attribute the degree of liability relative 
to each accused‟s degree of contribution and level of intent safeguards the principle of culpability.  
Nonetheless, all the arguments offered by Cassese, van Sliedregt, Danner and Martinez to justify 
the attribution of liability for specific intent crimes, pursuant to JCE category three, do not appease 
the fact that the accused did not possess specific intent himself. Therefore in order to preserve the 
principle of culpability, I conclude that JCE category three cannot be justifiably used to attribute 
liability for rape and other acts of sexual violence that constitute an act of genocide or persecution. 
Alternatively, to incur principal liability for acts of sexual violence committed by another that 
constitute acts of genocide or persecution the accused must possess the requisite specific intent. In 
these circumstances JCE category one is applicable. The prosecution can establish the accused‟s 
specific intent by proving that the accused contributed to the group with the direct intent of further 
the common genocidal criminal purpose that either included or extemporaneously expanded to 
include acts of sexual violence as it did in Karemera. 
I now proceed to provide my recommendations in order to codify the developments made by the 
ad hoc tribunals over a period of a decade. I suggest that a more detailed construction of the JCE 
doctrine should be incorporated in article 25 of the Rome Statute. In this regard the ICC may opt to 
read “participation in or contributions to a JCE” into article 25 of the Rome Statute. However, an 
amendment of article 25 of the Rome Statute to expressly include a revised version of the JCE 
doctrine is preferable because it will improve legal certainty. The express inclusion of participation 
in a JCE as a form of commission and other forms of participation in article 25 of the Rome Statute 
respects the principles of legality and protects the accused‟s right to be informed of the possible 
modes of liability that can be used against him or her. Furthermore, the express inclusion of a more 
detailed construction of JCE categories one, two and three will prevent the ICC from reading in an 
immature construction of JCE that threatens the principle of culpability. The arguments that the 
Tadić-construction of JCE category three threatens the principal of culpability by: (i) attributing 
equal degrees of liability to all members of a JCE irrespective of their degrees of participation and 
intent, (ii) attributing equal degrees of liability for crimes that fall inside and crimes that fall outside 
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of the common purpose yet that are a foreseeable consequence of implementing the common 
purpose and  (iii) attributing liability for specific intent crimes, were discussed in sub-chapter 6 3 5.  
Arguably, the amendment of article 25 should expressly include a contribution to a JCE in 
articles 25(3)(a) through 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute in order to maintain the differentiation model 
that fosters the culpability principal. Subsequently, when the accused‟s contribution to the JCE 
satisfies the control-over-crime criterion then the contribution can amount to a commission and the 
accused can incur liability as a principal. Alternatively, where the accused‟s contribution and intent 
does not satisfy the control-criterion the judge can decide whether the contribution amounts to 
incitement in terms of article 25(3)(b), aiding and abetting pursuant to article 25(3)(c) or any other 
form of contribution pursuant to article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute. Additionally, the amendment 
of article 25, must include a separation of article 25(3)(d)(i) and 25(3)(d)(ii) of the Rome Statute. 
The disjunctive nature of article 25(3)(d) attributes liability equally for contributions made with 
direct intent ie in furtherance of the common criminal purpose and negligent contributions ie 
contributions made with knowledge of the groups common criminal plan. The disjunctive nature is 
unfair, I argue, according to the foundational notions of criminal law that intentional criminal acts 
should always result in a higher degree of liability and heavier sentencing than negligent acts due to 
the malevolent desires that accompany calculated criminal actions. Finally, the amendment must 
stipulate that only JCE categories one and two can be used to establish principal liability for acts of 
sexual violence as a specific intent crime such as genocide and persecution, not JCE category three.  
The successful prosecution of rape and other acts of sexual violence under international criminal 
law was, and continues to be, a challenge. The commission acts of sexual violence are a grave 
violation of international humanitarian law and human rights that require effective prosecution to 
remedy these breaches. However the reality is that acts of sexual violence rarely form an express 
part of the common criminal plan and high-ranked officials intentionally and systematically use 
others to implement their war strategies while usually ensuring that they are absent when these 
atrocities are committed. It is therefore the responsibility of international criminal law to address 
these practices and prevent impunity by developing mechanisms like the JCE doctrine that can 
address the reality of rape, by capturing the reality of the commission of complex crimes involving 
numerous acts and actors. Consequently, attributing liability where it is due. 
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